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ABSTRACT 
 
SHERINE EL-TOUKHY: Priming optimism: The automaticity of health risk perceptions 
(Under the direction of Jane D. Brown) 
 
Communication initiatives frequently are used to inform people about various 
risks in an attempt to improve their decision making and behavior. People, however, do 
not readily accept personal risk information, often underestimating their susceptibility to 
and the severity of the risks. This dissertation draws on psychological theory and research 
to explain why people underestimate their risks. 
Three experiments were designed to test whether people have an automatic 
tendency to underestimate self-relevant risks - the default option that occurs without 
conscious awareness of underestimation of health risks as a bias and of self-schema 
activation as a source of this bias and is likely to occur when people are mentally taxed. 
Rationale for the theoretical propositions advanced here is derived from research 
documenting that health risk information is (a) processed as self-relevant, (b) inconsistent 
with the positivity bias and self-threatening, and that (c) the activation of the self-schema 
is automatic. 
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that people underestimate their likelihood of 
experiencing negative health conditions and overestimate their likelihood of experiencing 
positive ones. Experiment 2 examined whether underestimation of health risks is an 
efficient process, one that occurs when people are mentally taxed. Finally, Experiment 3 
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tested the effects of health risk controllability and psychological reactance on health risk 
perceptions. 
All three experiments relied on priming to activate the self-schema and measured 
the effects of this activation on reaction time, an implicit measure of risk perceptions. 
Several individual difference variables (e.g., self efficacy) and health risk characteristics 
(e.g., prevalence) that influence risk perceptions were controlled for. 
 Results show that people automatically underestimate their health risks, that is, 
without awareness, intention, or effort. The studies provided conclusive evidence of (a) 
underestimation of susceptibility to negative health conditions and overestimation of 
susceptibility to positive ones and (b) efficiency of underestimation of health risks. 
Results regarding self-schema activation as a source of underestimation of risks were not 
as conclusive. 
 Individual difference variables did not affect implicit measures of risk 
perceptions. Health risk characteristics, on the other hand, influenced risk perceptions. 
The experiments showed an inverted relationship between susceptibility and severity 
dimensions of health risk perceptions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 “Are you greater than AIDS?” (Kaiser Family Foundation [KFF], 2010/11) and 
“This is your brain on drugs” (Partnership for Drug-Free America [PDFA], 1987) are 
examples of health messages that people often encounter in the media. Such messages are 
designed to inform people about personal health risks in an attempt to improve health 
decision making and promote positive behavioral change, the ultimate goals of health 
education and promotion efforts (Glanz, Rimer, & Viswanath, 2008). Common across 
these messages is a self-relevant health risk. Dual process theories of persuasion posit 
that self-relevance induces elaborate information processing, which results in stable and 
strong attitudes that predict behaviors (Brinol & Petty, 2006). A number of behavioral 
change theories posit that perceptions of susceptibility to a severe risk motivate people to 
adopt positive behaviors to reduce or eliminate the risk altogether (Ajzen, 1991; Becker, 
1974; Rogers, 1975; Witte, 1992). 
Studies have shown, however, that people do not readily accept personal risk 
information (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992) and most often underestimate their 
susceptibility to and severity of health risks (e.g., Bränström, Kristjansson, & Ullén, 2005 
re: skin cancer). This dissertation draws on psychological theory and research to explain 
why people underestimate personal health risks. It posits that people have an automatic 
tendency to underestimate self-relevant risks. Rationale for the theoretical propositions 
advanced here is derived from research documenting that health risk information is (a) 
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processed as self-relevant, (b) inconsistent with the positivity bias and self-threatening, 
and that (c) the activation of the mental representation of the self (i.e., self-schema) is 
automatic, a process that occurs without awareness, intention, control, or much cognitive 
resources. 
Risk perceptions reflect a subjective probability that a negative health-related 
incident could happen in a specific time (Menon, Raghubir, & Agrawal, 2008). Risk 
perceptions have two dimensions, susceptibility and severity. Susceptibility is the 
likelihood of experiencing a health risk (e.g., breast cancer) whereas severity is the 
seriousness, harmfulness, or dangerousness of the risk (e.g., stage of breast cancer) 
(Brewer et al., 2007). 
Risk perceptions are a cornerstone of health-specific (e.g., health belief model) 
and general (e.g., theory of planned behavior) behavioral change theories. These 
individual-level theories underline the importance of risk perceptions as necessary, yet 
insufficient, for positive behavioral change. The theories generally posit that people who 
feel susceptible to a severe health risk will be motivated to reduce or eliminate the risk 
(Ajzen, 1991; Becker, 1974; Rogers, 1975; Witte, 1992). 
 These behavioral change theories, however, fail to recognize that people rarely 
estimate their risks accurately (Zeckhauser & Viscusi, 2000). People’s risk perceptions 
are subjective and often deviate from objective risk estimates (e.g., medical tests) of 
susceptibility to and severity of a health risk (Gerend, Aiken, West, & Erchull, 2004). 
Nonetheless, subjective risk perceptions influence behavior more than objective risks 
estimates (Brewer & Hallman, 2006). 
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Although risk perceptions can be overestimated or underestimated, 
underestimation of risks is more common (Brewer & Hallman, 2006). Studies show that 
risk perceptions are underestimated for health risks such as breast cancer (Woloshin, 
Schwartz, Black, & Welch, 1999), HIV (Raghubir & Menon, 1998) and smoking-related 
problems (Strecher, Kreuter, & Kobrin, 1995). This bias is consistent across age groups 
(Weinstein, 1987), time (Shepperd, Helweg-Larsen, & Ortega, 2003) and cultures 
(Chang, Asakawa, & Sanna, 2001). The pattern has been documented whether risk 
perceptions are compared to those of an average other (Weinstein, 1980) or to objective 
measures of risk (Brewer & Hallman, 2006). When risk perceptions are not compared to 
any standard, similar patterns have been documented as evidenced by below mean 
estimates for negative events (Bränström et al., 2005). 
Underestimation of risk prevents people from attending to health messages about 
risks to which they are susceptible and influences how they process such messages 
(Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). Furthermore, people who underestimate their risks are 
satisfied with their current behaviors and do not plan positive behavioral changes (e.g., 
quitting smoking, engaging in protected sex, using contraceptives, getting a swine flu 
vaccine) (Burger & Burns, 1988; Dillard, Mccaul, & Klein, 2006; Larwood, 1978; Sheer 
& Cline, 1994). 
This dissertation posits that the principles of automaticity apply to how people 
process personal health risk messages and may explain why people are biased to 
underestimate personal risks. Three experiments examined the extent to which 
underestimation of self-relevant health risks is automatic -- the default option that occurs 
without conscious awareness of the bias (i.e., underestimation of health risks) and its 
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source (i.e., activation of self-schema); and is likely to occur when people are mentally 
taxed (i.e., under cognitive load) (Bargh, 1994). Additional attention was given to 
reactance, an individual difference variable (Dillard & Shen, 2005), and perceived risk 
controllability, a health risk characteristic (Klein & Larsen, 2002), which have been 
shown to affect perceptions of personal risks in previous studies. Reactance is a 
motivational state to restore or maintain one’s freedom if it is perceived to be taken away 
by restriction of choices (Brehm, 1996). Controllable health risks are “preventable by 
personal action” (Weinstein, 1984, p. 431); that is, health conditions that people believe 
they can control either by not encountering the risk, or by controlling its severity, rate of 
growth and/or treatment outcomes. 
The experiments relied on priming to activate the self-schema and measured the 
effects of this activation on health risk perceptions reaction time, the main dependent 
variable. Participants were primed with self-identity words (e.g., I, me) and then were 
asked to make judgments about their personal susceptibility to and the severity of health 
risks. Based on the premise that any mental process takes time (Cameron & Frieske, 
1994), and that faster reaction times reflect more accessible, automatic, less thoughtful, 
and efficient concepts and processes (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), reaction time was 
assessed. Reaction time was defined as the time in milliseconds that elapses between a 
participant’s exposure to a health condition (e.g., “cancer,” “broken bone”) on a computer 
screen and her response (yes/no) using pre-assigned buttons on a buttons box. 
Controlling for several individual differences (e.g., self-efficacy, dispositional 
optimism) and health risk characteristics (e.g., prevalence), the primary hypothesis was 
that, when asked about likelihood of experiencing a health condition, participants primed 
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with self-identity words would underestimate their health risks as evidenced by faster 
reaction times responding no to negative health conditions (e.g., heart attack) and yes to 
positive health conditions (e.g., healthy gums). 
In Experiment 1, it was hypothesized that participants primed with self-identity 
words (e.g., I, me) would be more likely to respond no to negative health conditions and 
yes to positive ones when asked about their personal susceptibility to these conditions. 
They would make these decisions faster than those primed with third-person (e.g., he/she, 
him/her) or neutral (e.g., it) words as measured by reaction time. Thus, Experiment 1 
examined lack of conscious awareness of underestimation of risk and of self-schema 
activation as its source as a defining feature of automatic health risk perceptions. 
Experiment 2 examined efficiency as a defining feature of health risk perceptions. 
The hypothesis tested was that participants would exhibit faster reaction times responding 
no when asked about personal susceptibility to and severity of health conditions when 
they were mentally taxed (i.e., memorizing an eight-digit number) compared to when 
they were not (i.e., memorizing a two-digit number). These effects were predicted to be 
stronger for participants primed with self-identity words compared to those primed with 
third-person and neutral words. Underestimation of risk perceptions when people’s 
cognitive resources are taxed would be a manifestation of an efficient automatic process; 
a process that occurs when people lack sufficient mental capacity to engage in elaborative 
processing of information. 
The third experiment examined the effects of perceived risk controllability, a 
health risk characteristic, and psychological reactance, an individual difference variable, 
on perceptions of a health risk. The hypothesis tested was that highly reactant people (i.e., 
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those who react negatively to restrictions on personal choice) when primed with self-
identity words would be more likely to exhibit an automatic tendency to underestimate 
their susceptibility to and severity of a negative health condition when compared to 
participants who score low on this individual difference variable. This effect was 
predicted to be stronger if a health condition was perceived to be highly controllable (i.e., 
is preventable if personal action is taken). 
The series of experiments conducted here are important on theoretical, practical, 
and methodological grounds. Theoretically, they are one of the first to make the case for 
the automaticity of risk perceptions. Rather than measuring risk perceptions as outcomes 
of consumption of health messages (Nabi & Oliver, 2009), the processes governing self-
relevant health risk perceptions are identified. Bridging research on self, automatic 
processes, health communication and behavior change could resolve some of the 
inconsistencies in the literature (e.g., when and why personal health risk information is 
effective) and expand the focus of behavioral change theories beyond rational decisions 
to include automatic influences on health behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000; Brewer & 
Rimer, 2008). 
A theoretical model is proposed to describe how people arrive at biased health 
risk perceptions. The model maps out how automatic self-schema activation can bias risk 
perceptions through indirect and direct routes of information processing. Self-schema 
activation takes different forms: pre-conscious, post-conscious and goal-dependent 
automaticity. The effects of post-conscious and goal-dependent automatic activation are 
most relevant to health communication. In the indirect route, the active self-schema 
guides elaborate/controlled processing of health messages consistent with people’s 
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illusory perceptions of control, optimism, and positive self-views. In the direct route, 
people lack the motivation and/or ability to process risk messages. Thus, the active self-
schema solely guides information processing in an automatic fashion. 
Practically, understanding how risk perceptions work has both individual-level 
and public policy implications. On an individual level, understanding risk perceptions 
and the psychological processes responsible for them should promote more informed 
personal and proxy health decisions. On a public policy level, risk perceptions affect how 
a society responds to a health risk (e.g., promoting certain behaviors as healthy; initiating 
medical interventions; expending public funds on certain treatment options and therapies 
for chronic diseases) (Chapman, 2004; Eddy, 1984; Peters, McCaul, Stefanek, & Nelson, 
2006). Knowing more about how health risk perceptions are formed should result in more 
effective public health initiatives. 
Methodologically, the experiments conducted here demonstrate the value of 
priming and reaction time to advance our understanding of risk perceptions and health-
related attitudes and behaviors. These methods uncover implicit cognitions and processes 
of which people are not aware, and override their unwillingness to report these judgments 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
In sum, health communication research and practice should move beyond the 
misplaced emphasis on the accuracy of risk perceptions given increasing evidence in 
support of intuitive/automatic decisions rather than rational decision making. We need to 
understand how automaticity applies to health risk information processing to improve the 
predictive power of theories of behavioral change. This, in turn, can improve the content, 
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implementation and evaluation strategies for interventions and communication 
campaigns. 
In the next chapter, a review of the literature is presented. The chapter presents 
evidence regarding reasons for and implications of underestimated health risk 
perceptions. The study’s theoretical propositions are outlined along with supporting 
evidence. It is posited that underestimation of personal risks is driven by a positivity bias 
and exhibits two features of automatic processes: lack of conscious awareness (of the bias 
and its source) and efficiency. Support for these propositions is derived from research 
documenting that health risk information is processed as self-relevant; is inconsistent 
with the positivity bias and self-threatening; and that self-schema activation is automatic. 
In the third chapter, the study design, hypotheses, procedures, and measures, along with 
pilot work, are presented. The fourth chapter reports the results of three experiments 
testing the main hypotheses. Finally, the fifth chapter includes a summary of the main 
results and a discussion of the theoretical, practical, and methodological implications for 
health risk communication research and practice.
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Risk Perceptions and Behavioral Change 
Risk perceptions reflect a subjective probability that a negative health-related 
incident could happen in a specific time (Menon et al., 2008). Risk perceptions have two 
dimensions, susceptibility and severity, which, either additively or multiplicatively, 
capture one’s perceptions of risk. Susceptibility, usually used interchangeably with words 
such as likelihood, vulnerability, and probability, is the possibility of experiencing a 
health risk. Severity, on the other hand, is the seriousness, harmfulness, or dangerousness 
of the risk (Brewer et al., 2007). 
Risk perceptions are a cornerstone of individual-level behavioral change theories. 
As a crucial dependent variable in health education programs (Glanz et al., 2008; Hornik, 
2002), theorists seek to understand the determinants of health behavior, and the processes 
governing its change and/ or maintenance, which, in turn, can inform interventions 
aiming to improve health behaviors (Glanz et al., 2008). A number of theories of 
behavior change consider risk perceptions a necessary, yet insufficient step, toward 
behavioral change (Ajzen, 1991; Becker, 1974; Rogers, 1975; Witte, 1992). 
Risk perceptions determine behaviors directly, as in the health belief model 
(HBM), or indirectly through attitudes, as in theories of reasoned action (TRA), planned 
behavior (TPB), and the integrated behavioral model (IBM). 
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According to the HBM, for example, a person’s perceptions of threat, which 
include susceptibility to and severity of (both medical/ clinical and social consequences 
such as stigma) a health condition, determine the likelihood of taking action (Becker, 
1974). The model also underlines other determinants of behavior such as benefits of 
engaging in the health behavior promoted in the message, barriers to behavior, cues to 
action, which are environmental cues that serve as reminders to act (e.g., a mass media 
campaign, a close friend being sick, advice from others), and self-efficacy, a concept 
borrowed from Bandura’s (1977, 1998) social cognitive theory (SCT), which refers to a 
person’s capabilities of executing a specific course of action to achieve desired outcomes 
(Becker, 1974; Champion & Skinner, 2008). 
In the TRA, TPB and IBM theories, risk perceptions are some of the underlying 
beliefs that determine attitudes. Attitudes, in turn, determine – among other variables 
such as perceived norms – intentions and, subsequently, behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1973; Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2008). Beliefs reflect the probability that a 
specific outcome will have certain consequences or attributes multiplied by the positive 
or negative evaluation of these consequences and attributes. Behavioral beliefs are not 
determined a priori in the TRA, TPB, and IBM. Rather, pilot work elicits the beliefs 
people regard most important in determining their attitudes. Risk perceptions (concerns 
about susceptibility to and severity of a health risk) are considered determinants of 
attitudes, intentions, and behavior only if mentioned in the pilot phase of developing 
interventions guided by the TRA, TPB, or IBM (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Kaspryzk, Montaño, & Fishbein, 1998; Liska, 1984; Montaño & 
Kasprzyk, 2008; O’Keefe, 2002). 
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In another class of theories, acceptance of a health message rests on recipients’ 
assessment of risk and response- and self-efficacy elements in the message. Both 
protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975) and the extended parallel process 
model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992), which are subsumed under the umbrella of fear appeals,1 
address the use of susceptibility and severity as a persuasive strategy. Both theories posit 
that when the rewards of engaging in a maladaptive behavior outweigh perceptions of 
susceptibility and severity, the message is rejected. When the effectiveness of a 
recommended response and the ability to engage in the promoted behavior outweigh the 
costs of engaging in that behavior, the message is accepted. 
According to the PMT (Rogers, 1975), fear appeal messages are composed of 
susceptibility, severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy. These perceptions produce 
protection motivation for initiating, sustaining, and driving action. Protection motivation 
results in message rejection if one’s perceived susceptibility and severity do not outweigh 
the rewards of engaging in a maladaptive behavior (i.e., threat appraisals). If, on the other 
hand, the effectiveness of a recommended behavior and one’s ability to engage in it 
exceed the costs of engaging in that behavior, the message is accepted (i.e., coping 
appraisals) (Rogers, 1975; 4QIGTU2TGPVKEG&WPP. 
According to Witte’s EPPM (Witte, 1992), people engage in two appraisal 
processes after encountering a fear appeal message: threat appraisal and efficacy 
appraisal. In threat appraisal, they assess their susceptibility to a threat and the 
seriousness of the threat. If the threat is significant and personally relevant, they engage 
                                                 
1 Fear appeals are characteristics of messages designed to scare people by stressing negative consequences 
if they do not engage in the promoted behavior. Fear is a negatively valenced emotion, which is 
accompanied by high levels of arousal when a threat is perceived as significant or serious and personally 
relevant. 
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in the second appraisal process, efficacy appraisal, in which they assess two aspects of 
the message: response efficacy and self-efficacy.2 
Threat and efficacy appraisals result in one of three outcomes. If the threat is low, 
people lack the motivation to process the message and, thus, no further processing ensues 
(i.e., they do not engage in efficacy appraisals). If the threat is high, then the efficacy 
appraisal defines the nature of the outcome. Under high efficacy appraisals, people 
engage in danger control processes where they are likely to think about the recommended 
action and usually adopt the action promoted in the message as a way to eliminate or 
reduce the threat. Under low efficacy appraisals, people engage in fear control processes 
in which they are likely to engage in defensive processing (motivated resistance to the 
message), reactance, and/or denial to avoid experiencing a fear they cannot do anything 
about. 
In sum, risk perceptions are at the core of behavioral change theories: central in 
some and secondary in others. Common across the theories is that risk perceptions 
motivate people to engage in self-protective behaviors. These theories, however, fail to 
recognize that people rarely estimate their risks accurately (Zeckhauser & Viscusi, 2000). 
People’s risk perceptions are subjective and often deviate from objective risk estimates of 
one’s susceptibility to and severity of a health risk (Gerend et al., 2004). However, 
subjective risk perceptions influence behavior more than objective risks estimates 
(Brewer & Hallman, 2006). 
Biases in risk perceptions. 
                                                 
2 Response efficacy is the effectiveness of the recommended action to reduce or eliminate the threat or risk 
whereas self-efficacy refers to people’s own abilities to engage in and execute the recommended behavior. 
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Early models of decision making3 characterized humans as rational beings who 
objectively search and evaluate all available information, and, ultimately, reach accurate 
decisions with the greatest benefit (Simon, 1955). However, both normative (how people 
should make decisions) and descriptive (how people actually make decisions) models of 
decision making are at odds with each other. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued, “the 
deviations of actual behavior from the normative model are too widespread to be ignored, 
too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to be accommodated 
by relaxing the normative system” (p. S252). 
Evidence suggests human judgments are biased (i.e., consistently deviate from 
what would be expected based on objective evaluation of information or favor one 
decision over others) (Keren & Trigen, 2004). To account for limitations in human 
processing capabilities, Simon (1955) argued that human rationality is bounded. Later, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) developed the heuristics and biases approach to describe 
judgments and choices that depart from rational models of decision making. 
Subsequently, decades of research suggest that people rely on heuristics (e.g., 
availability, representativeness, anchoring and adjustment) and exhibit biases (e.g., 
optimistic bias, confirmation bias) in their judgment and decision-making processes 
(Kahneman, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Health is no exception to this rule. People overestimate low probability, high-
salient risks (e.g., nuclear risks) and underestimate high probability, highly controllable 
                                                 
3 Early models of decision making (e.g., Bayes’ theorem) required knowledge of all available information 
and the ability to process this information using statistical principles (Kahneman, 1991; Keren & Trigen, 
2004). These models define the standards for measuring bias. Bayesian inference, sampling statistics, and 
regression analysis are the standard models in studies of judgment, whereas expected utility theory is the 
standard in the domain of choice (Kahneman, 1991). 
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voluntary ones (e.g., physical inactivity). People also fail to account for combined risks 
of simultaneous events (e.g., smoking and alcohol consumption) or those based on 
multiple or extended exposures to a risk (e.g., cumulative risk of smoking) (Svenson, 
1984). Not only do laypeople exhibit these inaccuracies but also experts (e.g., physicians) 
(McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 2000). 
Although risk perceptions can be biased upward or downward, underestimation of 
risks is more common (Brewer & Hallman, 2006). Studies show that risk perceptions are 
underestimated for health risks such as breast cancer (Woloshin et al., 1999), HIV 
(Raghubir & Menon, 1998) and smoking-related problems (Strecher et al., 1995; 
Weinstein, Slovic, & Gibson, 2004; Windschitl, 2002). 
These downward estimates of one’s risk are further strengthened by people’s 
overconfidence in their judgments and search for evidence that is consistent with these 
judgments (i.e., confirmation bias). For example, educating people about probability does 
not eliminate people’s overconfidence in their answers (Fischhoff, Slovic, & 
Lichtenstein, 1977). In support of confirmation bias, when presented with risk/benefit 
information about children’s vaccines, non-vaccinator parents sought information that 
supported their previously held beliefs about the vaccine and discounted information 
inconsistent with their position (Meszaros et al., 1996). Similarly, participants used 
irrelevant information to underestimate their risks of encountering sexually transmitted 
diseases because the information was consistent with a desired outcome (e.g., having sex 
with an attractive person or maintaining a relationship with a current partner) (Knäuper, 
Kornik, Atkinson, Guberman, & Aydin, 2005). 
 15
Underestimation of risk prevents people from attending to health messages about 
risks to which they are susceptible and influences how they process such messages 
(Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). Furthermore, people who underestimate their risks are 
satisfied with their current behaviors and do not plan positive behavioral changes (e.g., 
quitting smoking, engaging in protected sex, using contraceptives, getting a swine flu 
vaccine) (Burger & Burns, 1988; Dillard et al., 2006; Larwood, 1978; Sheer & Cline, 
1994).4 
Theoretical Explanations for Underestimation of Health Risks 
The literature reviewed thus far demonstrates how ubiquitous underestimation of 
health risk perceptions is. Such bias is resistant to de-biasing attempts (Weinstein & 
Klein, 2002) and persistent despite availability of information (Weinstein, 1980) and 
cognitive resources (Lench & Ditto, 2008). 
This indicates a persistent source of the bias. The experiments described in this 
dissertation were designed to test two theoretical propositions to explain why people 
underestimate personal health risks. 
Theoretical proposition 1. Underestimation of health risks is driven by a positivity 
bias. When the self-schema is active, perceptions of susceptibility will be biased upward 
for positive (e.g., healthy gums) and downward for negative (e.g., stroke) health 
conditions. Perceptions of severity will be biased downward for negative health 
conditions. 
                                                 
4 Optimism about personal risks is considered a hallmark of mental and psychological health, which, in 
turn, is important for physiological health (See Maruta, Colligan, Malinchoc, & Offord, 2002; Reed, 
Kemeny, Taylor, Wang, & Visscher, 1994; Scheier & Carver, 1992; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994; Taylor, 
Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). 
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Theoretical proposition 2. Underestimation of negative health risks is automatic. 
Biased risk perceptions possess two automaticity features: lack of awareness and 
efficiency. Underestimation of personal risks occurs without (a) conscious awareness of 
underestimation of risk as a bias or of self-schema activation as the source of this bias 
and (b) much cognitive resources. 
Rationale for the aforementioned propositions is derived from research 
documenting that (a) health risk information is processed as self-relevant, (b) health risks 
are inconsistent with the positivity bias and self-threatening, and (c) self-schema 
activation is automatic, occurring despite lack of awareness, intention, control and 
cognitive resources. 
Next, key findings supporting these two propositions are presented. 
Health Risk Information is Processed as Self-relevant. 
The self5 is a unique mental structure that influences information processing (i.e., 
facilitates encoding and retrieval of information), an effect that is attributed to both 
structure and organization of self-knowledge in people’s minds (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 
2003). Self-relevant information is better remembered compared to other methods of 
coding information (e.g., semantic) (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 
1997). Furthermore, people are quick in identifying and retrieving self-relevant 
information and descriptive traits and are confident about their judgments (Kuiper & 
Rogers, 1979; Markus, 1977). They are resistant to information inconsistent with their 
                                                 
5 The meaning of the self is different in many of the conceptualizations of self-related phenomena (e.g., 
self-awareness, self-efficacy, self-focus, self-talk, loss of self), making it difficult for sociologists and 
psychologists to agree on a unifying definition. Gordon Allport (1961) mentioned that it was easy to feel 
the self, but difficult to define. One definition uses reflexive thinking as an underlying ability in the 
majority of self-related concepts. Thus, the self can be defined as a mental capacity that allows a person to 
take oneself as the object of one’s thoughts; that is to think about him/herself (Leary & Tangney, 2003). 
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self-description (Markus, 1977). Studies have provided evidence for self-reference effects 
even on a neurological level (Kelley et al., 2002; Kircher et al., 2002). 
Oftentimes, health risk messages explicitly reference the self. “Get yourself 
tested” (KFF, 2009) is an example of such messages. When the self is not explicitly 
referenced, health messages are most likely processed as self relevant because they urge 
the recipient to assess her own risk factors regarding the risk in question and take further 
action based on these risk perceptions (Kircher et al., 2002). However, self-relevant risk 
messages are at odds with the positivity bias and are self-threatening. 
Health Risk Information is Inconsistent with the Positivity Bias and Self-
threatening. 
 
Inconsistency with positivity bias. People develop positive views of themselves 
early in life. Research shows that children, as early as five months, prefer positive 
feedback (e.g., approving voices). Societies’ endorsement of positive reinforcement 
perpetuates this preference. Repeated activation renders these positive views well 
practiced, chronically accessible, and applicable for processing new information (Fernald, 
1993; Paulhaus, 1993; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990). 
To maintain positive self-views, people develop defense mechanisms that guard 
against self-relevant negative information (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998). People 
favor (Zuckerman, 1979), seek (Sedikides, 1993) and uncritically accept (Kunda, 1990) 
positive feedback but neglect (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Sedikides & Green, 2000), 
discount with skepticism (Kunda, 1990), attempt to refute (Wyer & Frey, 1983) or 
selectively forget negative feedback (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1976). Furthermore, 
people think causes of positive events lie within themselves (e.g., personal skills) 
whereas similar events in lives of others are due to external reasons (e.g., luck) (Bradley, 
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1978; Ross, Green, & House, 1977). They circumvent their own flaws by judging them as 
common and unimportant while exaggerating their strengths (Marks, 1984).6 
In health, similar patterns are evident. People uncritically accept positive health 
information and devalue negative feedback especially when unexpected (Renner, 2004). 
People selectively focus on their risk-reducing behaviors (Gerrard, Gibbons, & Warner, 
1991) and attribute good health outcomes to personal reasons and bad outcomes to 
external ones (Kahlor, Dunwoody, & Griffin, 2002). Furthermore, health risk messages 
evoke defense mechanisms where a message is judged as less valid and accurate as 
opposed to messages consistent with one’s preference for being healthy (Ditto & Lopez, 
1992; Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986). 
On an aggregate level, meta-analyses have found that tailoring based on personal 
risk results in less acceptance of the message (Albarracin et al., 2003; Noar, Benac, & 
Harris, 2007). When susceptibility and severity have positively affected behavior, the 
target audience has been high-risk groups who had already acknowledged their risks 
(Janz, 1984). 
Self-threat. Health risks are threatening, not only in the physical sense, but also to 
one’s positive self regard (McCoy, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999). Two pieces of evidence 
support this reasoning. 
First, people tend to self affirm (i.e., restore a positive self regard by emphasizing 
one’s successes) after being threatened. Vulnerability to health risks is considered 
threatening as evidenced by participants’ tendency to self affirm afterward. For example, 
                                                 
6 The positivity bias does not rule out that people acknowledge “negative pockets of incompetence” about 
themselves (Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 203). See also Showers & Zeigler-Hill (2003) on the organization of 
self-knowledge for undeniable negative events such as divorce. 
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listing risky sexual behaviors that increased vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases 
led participants to self affirm by providing favorable ratings on a personality measure and 
reporting careful contraceptive behaviors (McCoy et al., 1999). 
Second, people are more accepting of threatening information if their self is 
affirmed (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). For example, self-affirmed participants were 
more accepting of health risk messages about the link between caffeine (Reed & 
Aspinwall, 1998) and alcohol consumption (Klein & Harris, 2009) and breast cancer, and 
of graphic warning labels on cigarette packs (Harris, Mayle, Mabbot, & Napper, 2007). 
Furthermore, self-affirmed participants engage in positive behaviors (i.e., condom 
purchase) (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). Similar patterns have been documented 
using implicit measures (van Koningsbruggen, Das, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2009). 
In sum, personal health risk messages are self-relevant, yet are at odds with 
positivity bias and self-threatening. These effects are important given evidence of the 
automatic activation of self-schema. 
Self-schema Activation is Automatic.7 
Research on the self has shifted from a focus on consciousness to 
unconsciousness and automatic processing. Studies have shown that the self-schema is 
automatically and unconsciously activated upon encountering self-relevant information. 
                                                 
7 Automatic processes have one or more of the following features: lack of awareness, intention, control, or 
cognitive resources. Automatic processes are ones of which a person is not consciously aware, do not 
intend (no intention exists or no causal link exists between act and intention), is unable to change, stop, or 
avoid and require only limited processing resources (Bargh, 1994; Moors, & Houwer, 2007). For early 
work on the primacy of unconsciousness, see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice (1998); Libet, 
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl (1983); Wegner & Wheatley (1999). For reviews on historical roots and context 
of automaticity research, see Bargh & Ferguson (2000); Bruner (1957); Nisbett & Wilson (1977). 
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For example, people automatically allocate attention to their names (Moray, 1959) and 
self-descriptive traits (Bargh, 1982). 
Furthermore, the self is automatically associated with positive. Participants are 
faster associating the self with positive as opposed to negative items (Greenwald & 
Franham, 2000). People have implicit preference for their name letters and birthday 
dates, which can even influence life decisions such as selection of career and romantic 
partners (Jones, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2004; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 
2001). 
Further, participants with limited cognitive resources (e.g., those under memory 
or time constraints) preferred positive social feedback and interaction partners who 
evaluated them favorably (Swann et al., 1990) and indicated higher likelihood of 
experiencing positive events (Lench & Ditto, 2008). Support for the positivity bias has 
also been found on a neurological level (Watson, Dritschel, Obansawin, & Jentzsch, 
2007).  
Additional Theoretical Propositions 
Self-report perceptions of risk are sensitive to health risk characteristics as well as 
individual difference variables (Harris, Griffin, & Murray, 2008; Helweg-Larson & 
Shepperd, 2001). This dissertation aimed to test the effects of health risk characteristics 
and individual differences on implicit measures of risk perceptions. Further, it aimed to 
test the differential effect, if any, of risk characteristics and individual differences on 
susceptibility and severity, the two dimensions of risk perceptions of interest in this 
dissertation. 
Health risk characteristics influencing risk perceptions. 
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Risks vary on several dimensions, which, in turn, influence risk perceptions. 
Frequency of a health risk is correlated with increased perceived susceptibility 
(Weinstein, 1980) and decreased severity perceptions (Jemmott et al., 1986). Similarly, 
personal experience with a risk increases susceptibility perceptions (Velde, Hooykaas, & 
Pligt, 1992; Weinstein, 1980), a result that has been explained in terms of availability and 
representativeness heuristics. For example, family history of cancer and memories of 
loved ones influence women’s personal assessments of breast and/or ovarian cancer risk 
(Kenen, Ardern-Jones, & Eeles, 2003). Similar results were documented regarding 
women’s perceived susceptibility to breast cancer, heart disease, and osteoporosis 
(Gerend et al., 2004; Katapodi, Facione, Humphreys, & Dodd, 2005). 
Stereotype salience and exempt beliefs, on the other hand, are related to decreased 
risk perceptions (Weinstein, 1980, 1987). When people have a stereotypical image of a 
person to whom negative events can happen, they tend to underestimate their own risks. 
When no stereotype exists, they are less optimistic. One explanation is that stereotypes or 
exemplars result in a contrast, rather than assimilation, effect; that is, people easily 
distance themselves as different from the exemplar being displayed in the message 
(Zillmann, 2002), which leads them to underestimate their risks. Exempt beliefs are 
defined as the belief that if a person has not yet suffered a health condition, s/he is 
unlikely to encounter the risk in the future. These beliefs have been shown to influence 
risk perceptions downward (Weinstein, 1987). 
Perceived health risk controllability is correlated with decreased risk perceptions 
(Taylor et al., 1992; Velde et al., 1992). Weinstein (1984) defined controllable risks as 
“preventable by personal action” (p. 431). Control is related to stereotype salience such 
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that people typically have no stereotype in mind for uncontrollable health risks (i.e., it 
can happen to anyone). Control is also related to personal experience. Experiencing a 
negative event negates illusions of control, and, thus, makes a risk available in people’s 
minds (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). 
In a meta-analysis of the relationship between optimistic bias and controllability, 
Klein and Larsen (2002) found that controllability explained about 10% of the variance (r 
= .49). In three experiments, Lin, Lin, and Ragubir (2003) found that self-positivity bias 
was greater for events perceived to be controllable. According to the self-positivity 
account, people prefer controllable risks to uncontrollable ones. To the extent that they 
can attribute risks to controllable events, people can maintain and boost their self-esteem 
by thinking they have the abilities and skills to reduce or eliminate the risk (Harris et al., 
2008). Given this body of research, this summary proposition is proposed: 
Theoretical proposition 3. Frequency of and personal experience with a health 
condition will elicit overestimated risk perceptions whereas stereotype salience, exempt 
beliefs, and controllability will elicit underestimated risk perceptions. 
Individual differences influencing risk perceptions. 
Several individual differences are correlated with risk perceptions. Controllability 
is an individual difference variable that correlates with risk perceptions. Hoorens and 
Buunk (1993) found that people high on internal locus of control (as opposed to external 
locus of control), those who believe that their health status is dependent on their own 
behaviors (as opposed to being dependent on external factors such as others or luck) 
(Wallston & Wallston, 1981), were more optimistic about their chances of encountering 
various health problems (e.g., alcohol problems, heart attack, suicide, AIDS, cancer). 
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Similarly, self-esteem is correlated with low levels of risk perceptions (Helweg-
Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). Self-esteem is “the evaluative dimension of self-knowledge 
(e.g., “am I good at this?”)” (Baumeister, 1999, p. 2). People high on self-esteem are 
more resilient in the face of obstacles, negative feedback, and life events (Shrauger & 
Rosenberg, 1970; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977). In health contexts, Robberson and Rogers 
(1988) found that a positive appeal to self-esteem (e.g., positive effects of exercise on self 
confidence, self acceptance, and appearance) resulted in more intentions to engage in 
healthy behaviors compared to a negative appeal to self-esteem. High self-esteem people 
resist threatening information (Gerrard, Kurylo, & Reis, 1991), engage in defensive 
processing of risk information resulting in an underestimation of health risks (Smith, 
Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1997) and have low commitment to behavioral change (Gibbons, 
Eggleston, & Benthin, 1997). 
Self-efficacy is considered key in behavior enactment (Viswanath, Wallington, & 
Blake, 2009). Defined as confidence in one’s own abilities to engage in and execute 
recommended behaviors (Bandura, 1977, 1998), self-efficacy is integral to several 
behavioral change theories (e.g., HBM, TRA, TPB, EPPM). Further, efficacy beliefs 
moderate the relationship between risk perceptions and self-protective and information-
seeking behaviors. When informed about risks, people who are high on self-efficacy are 
more likely to engage in risk-reduction and information-seeking behaviors (Rimal, 2001; 
Rimal & Real, 2003). 
Reactance is positively correlated with self-esteem (Brockner & Elkind, 1985). 
Reactance is a motivational state that aims to restore or maintain one’s freedom when 
one’s autonomy is eliminated or reduced (as when choices are perceived to be restricted). 
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Reactance is dependent on the importance of the behavioral/ attitudinal/ emotional 
domain, the magnitude of the threat, and the degree of reduction in one’s freedom. In 
other words, the more important the domain is for a person, the greater the threat, and the 
greater the reduction is in one’s freedom, the greater the magnitude of reactance a person 
exhibits (Brehm, 1966). 
Conceptualized as a mix of negative cognitions and anger (Dillard & Shen, 2005), 
reactance results in going against the recommended or suggested alternative such as 
healthy foods (Bushman, 1998; Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004) even when recommended 
by an expert source, increased confidence in one’s decisions (Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 
2004), and initiation of risky behaviors (e.g., smoking) (Miller, Burgoon, Grandpre, & 
Alvaro, 2006). Furthermore, highly reactant patients show detrimental patterns to therapy 
as evidenced by low levels of improvement (based on therapists’ ratings), boundary 
augmentation, which refers to engaging in behaviors meant to distance a person away 
from his/her therapist, and early termination of therapy (Seibel & Dowd, 1999). Recent 
evidence suggests that reactance can be triggered without people’s conscious awareness 
or intent (Chartrand, Dalton, & Fitzsimons, 2007). 
Finally, low risk perceptions are correlated with happy mood (Larsen & 
Shepperd, 2001) and dispositional optimism, a general expectancy that positive outcomes 
will happen in the future (Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). On the other hand, negative-affect 
related variables (e.g., sad mood, state and trait anxiety) are correlated with high levels of 
risk perceptions. Negative affect makes negative thoughts about oneself, and to a lesser 
extent negative thoughts about others, salient or accessible and therefore is associated 
with high levels of risk perceptions (Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). On a neurological level, 
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optimism involves the activation of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, a region that 
shows irregularities among depressed individuals (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 
2007). 
Finally, self-consciousness refers to people’s tendency to focus their attention 
inward or outward (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Research has shown that 
individual differences on self-consciousness with its two subscales, private and public 
self consciousness, reflect a chronic activation of self-knowledge (Hull, Slone, Meteyer, 
& Matthews, 2002).8 Wheeler, Morrison, DeMarree, and Petty (2008) further demarcated 
two subscales of private self-consciousness: internal self-awareness -- one’s awareness of 
his/her own feelings, and thoughts; and self-reflection -- one’s rumination about the self. 
The previous research on individual differences can be summarized theoretically as:  
Theoretical proposition 4. Internal locus of control, self-efficacy, self-esteem, 
reactance, dispositional optimism, and self-reflection will elicit lower levels of risk 
perception whereas depression, external locus of control, and self-awareness will elicit 
higher levels of risk perception. 
In sum, risk perceptions are necessary for behavioral change. Yet, people’s 
estimates of personal health risks are inaccurate and are most often underestimated for 
negative health conditions. Underestimation of health risks creates a paradoxical situation 
for health communication messages, which typically highlight personal susceptibility to 
and severity of health risks as a persuasive strategy. 
This dissertation takes a psychological approach to explain why people 
underestimate health risks despite health communication efforts to inform them. It posits 
                                                 
8 See Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty (2007) on the “active self account” that advocates the importance of 
studying the role of the self on behavioral priming. 
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that people are predisposed to automatically underestimate self-relevant risks. Using 
implicit measures of risk perceptions, three experiments were designed to examine two 
defining features of automatic processes: (a) lack of conscious awareness of 
underestimation of risks as a bias and of self-schema activation as a source of this bias, 
and (b) efficiency. 
The effects of health risk characteristics and individual differences on implicit 
measures of risk perceptions are also examined. It is unclear whether their influence on 
implicit measures of risk perceptions, if any, will mirror the patterns documented with 
self-report data or not. Finally, susceptibility and severity are examined separately to 
uncover a differential effect, if any, of health risk characteristics and individual 
differences on these two dimensions of risk perceptions investigated in this dissertation. 
The next chapter outlines the design, hypotheses, and procedures of three 
experiments, and three pilot studies.
CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
This dissertation examined the extent to which underestimation of personal health 
risk perceptions is an automatic process by testing two defining features of automatic 
processes: (a) lack of conscious awareness of both underestimation of health risk 
perceptions as a bias and the source of this bias (i.e., self-schema activation) and (b) 
efficiency (i.e., occurrence of the bias under limited cognitive resources). 
 Three experiments examined the effects of self-schema activation on health risk 
perceptions. The main research question was: Controlling for perceived health risk 
characteristics and individual difference variables, what is the relationship between self-
schema activation and perceptions of personal susceptibility to and severity of health 
conditions? 
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that people are not consciously aware of their 
underestimation of health risks as a bias and of the self-schema activation as a source of 
this bias. Experiment 2 examined health risk perceptions under cognitive load to 
determine whether underestimation of risk is an efficient process (i.e., a process that 
occurs when people are mentally taxed). Within the context of a health message, 
Experiment 3 examined the effects of health risk controllability and psychological 
reactance on health risk perceptions. 
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Experiment 1: Unconscious awareness of underestimation of personal health risk 
perceptions 
 
Experiment 1 examined lack of conscious awareness of underestimation of 
personal health risk perceptions as a bias and of self-schema activation as a source of this 
bias. The experiment was a 3 (prime: self-identity, third-person, neutral words) x 2 
(priming method: supraliminal, subliminal priming)9 x 2 (valence of health condition: 
positive, negative) mixed-factorial design. Both the prime and priming method were 
between-subjects factors and valence of the health risk was a within-subjects factor. A 
conscious condition was added to the design for comparison with the priming conditions, 
bringing the total number of conditions to seven. In the conscious condition, participants 
were not primed and, thus, the condition was not crossed with the prime and priming 
method factors.  
Previous research has shown that health risk information is inconsistent with the 
positivity bias and self-threatening. Self-schema activation and the positivity bias have 
been shown to operate at an automatic or unconscious level. Thus, the hypothesis tested 
in Experiment 1 was that when the self-schema was activated, perceptions of personal 
susceptibility to health conditions would be biased upward for positive health conditions 
and downward for negative ones (See Appendix 1: Table 1 for study hypotheses and 
results). 
H1: Responses and reaction times to questions about personal susceptibility to 
health conditions will be biased upward for positive conditions and downward for 
negative ones (main effect for valence of health condition) and for participants primed 
                                                 
9 A full description of these techniques and how they were applied is presented in the “Manipulations and 
measures” section of this chapter. 
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with self-identity words (main effects for prime). Participants will be more likely to 
respond (a) “yes” in response to positive health conditions and “no” in response to 
negative health conditions, and (b) to respond faster. Responses and reaction times will 
be biased for participants in the self-identity words condition compared to participants 
primed with third-person and neutral words. 
Experiment 2: Efficiency of underestimation of personal health risk perceptions 
Experiment 2 examined the efficiency feature of underestimation of personal 
health risk perceptions by manipulating participants’ cognitive resources. The experiment 
examined the effects of self-schema activation on perceptions of personal susceptibility 
to and severity of negative health conditions under high and low cognitive load 
conditions using a 3 (prime: self-identity, third-person, neutral words) x 2 (cognitive 
load: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design. 
Previous literature has documented people’s self-positivity bias under limited 
cognitive resources (either by imposing a time constraint or cognitive load). Imposing a 
constraint on participants’ cognitive capacity serves two purposes. First, if people have an 
automatic tendency to judge themselves as less at risk for negative health conditions and 
more prone to experience positive health outcomes, this tendency should not be disrupted 
under scarce cognitive resources (e.g., when people are forced to adopt a speed criterion 
or are engaged in another simultaneous task). As a matter of fact, this tendency should be 
stronger under limited processing capacities. Second, constraining participants’ cognitive 
resources simulates real time situations in which people typically engage in other 
activities while they are exposed to media messages in general and health messages in 
particular (Perse, 1990). 
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Consistent with the rationale and hypothesis for Experiment 1, the hypothesis 
tested in Experiment 2 was that when the self-schema is activated, perceptions of 
personal susceptibility to and severity of negative health conditions will be biased 
downward. This effect was expected to be stronger in the high cognitive load condition 
(i.e., under limited cognitive resources). 
H2a: Participants in the self-identity words condition (main effects for self-
schema activation) and under high cognitive load (main effects for cognitive load) will be 
more likely to respond (a) “no” as opposed to “yes” to questions about personal 
susceptibility to and severity of negative health conditions, and (b) to respond faster, 
compared to participants in the third-person, and neutral words conditions, and low 
cognitive load condition. 
H2b: Constraining participants’ cognitive resources will bias responses and 
reaction times to questions about personal susceptibility to and severity of health 
conditions when the self-schema is activated. There will be an interaction effect between 
self-schema activation and cognitive load such that participants primed with self-identity 
words will be more likely to: (a) respond “no” as opposed to “yes” to questions of 
personal susceptibility to and severity of negative health conditions and (b) to respond 
faster, when under high cognitive load compared to low cognitive load. 
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in three ways. First, Experiment 2 was 
limited to negative health conditions because these conditions have implications for 
information processing, precautionary behavior, and initiation of a medical course of 
action (Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). Second, perceptions of severity were assessed. Third, 
Experiment 2 (and 3) relied exclusively on subliminal priming, rather than both 
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supraliminal and subliminal priming, for two reasons: (1) both subliminal and 
supraliminal conditions should yield similar results in Experiment 1, and (2) subliminal 
priming is considered a more stringent procedure that is in line with automaticity research 
because it ensures that participants are not consciously aware of the prime and its effects 
on their risk perceptions (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). 
Experiment 3: Effects of health risk controllability and psychological reactance on 
health risk perceptions 
 
 Experiment 3 examined the effects of health risk controllability, a health risk 
characteristic, and psychological reactance, an individual difference variable, on 
judgments of susceptibility to and severity of a health risk. The experiment was a 3 
(prime: self-identity, third-person, neutral words) x 2 (health risk controllability: high vs. 
low, manipulated variable) between-subjects design. Psychological reactance was a 
measured independent variable. 
Previous literature suggests both psychological reactance and perceived health 
risk controllability bias risk perceptions downward. These effects should be stronger 
when the self-schema is activated. 
H3a: Participants in the self-identity words condition (main effects for self-
schema activation), high on reactance (main effects for psychological reactance), and in 
the highly controllable health risk condition (main effects for perceived health risk 
controllability) will be more likely (a) to respond “no” as opposed to “yes” to questions 
of personal susceptibility to and severity of a negative health condition, and (b) to 
respond faster, compared to participants in the third-person, and neutral words 
conditions, participants low on reactance, and those in the low controllability condition. 
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H3b: Health conditions perceived to be highly controllable will bias responses 
and reaction times to questions about personal susceptibility to and severity of health 
conditions when the self-schema is activated. There will be a two-way interaction effect 
between self-schema activation and perceived health risk controllability such that 
participants primed with self-identity words will be more likely to: (a) respond “no” as 
opposed to “yes” in response to questions about personality susceptibility to and severity 
of a health condition, and (b) respond faster, when the health condition is perceived as 
highly controllable as opposed to less controllable. 
H3c: Psychological reactance will bias responses and reaction times to questions 
about personal susceptibility to and severity of health conditions when self-schema is 
activated. There will be a two-way interaction effect between self-schema activation and 
reactance such that participants high on reactance will be more likely to: (a) respond 
“no” as opposed to “yes” in response to questions about personal susceptibility to and 
severity of a health condition, and (b) respond faster, when primed with self-identity 
words compared to third-person and neutral words. 
H3d: There will be a three-way interaction effect between self-schema activation, 
psychological reactance, and perceived health risk controllability such that participants 
high on reactance will be more likely to: (a) respond “no” as opposed to “yes” in 
response to questions about personal susceptibility to and severity of a health condition, 
and (b) respond faster, when primed with self-identity words compared to third-person 
and neutral words. This effect will be stronger for highly controllable health conditions 
compared to those perceived as less controllable. 
Additional Hypotheses 
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 Previous studies have shown that perceived health risk characteristics and 
individual differences bias self-report risk perceptions upward or downward. No data are 
available regarding their effects on implicit measures of risk perceptions. Further, little is 
known about the differential effect, if any, of health risk characteristics and individual 
differences on susceptibility and severity, the two dimensions of risk perceptions 
investigated in this dissertation. 
Several health risk characteristics (i.e., prevalence, stereotype salience, perceived 
risk controllability, exempt beliefs, and personal experience) were controlled for in 
examining the effects of the independent variables on perceptions of personal 
susceptibility to and severity of health conditions. Individual difference variables that 
have been shown to influence risk perceptions in previous studies were also controlled 
for. These variables were: depression, dispositional optimism, health locus of control, 
psychological reactance, self-consciousness, self-efficacy, and self-esteem. The last two 
hypotheses predict the direction of influence of these variables: 
 H4: Participants will overestimate their susceptibility to highly prevalent health 
conditions with which they have had personal experience. Participants will 
underestimate their susceptibility to controllable health conditions, and ones for which 
exempt beliefs and stereotypes of a typical person who suffers the health condition are 
salient. 
H5: Participants high on self-efficacy, internal locus of control, self-esteem, 
psychological reactance, dispositional optimism, and self-reflection will be more likely to 
underestimate their susceptibility to and severity of negative health conditions and 
overestimate their susceptibility to positive ones. Participants low on self-efficacy and 
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reactance, high on external locus of control, self-awareness, and depression will be more 
likely to overestimate their susceptibility to and severity of negative health conditions and 
underestimate their susceptibility to positive ones. 
Participants 
 A convenience sample of undergraduate and graduate students was recruited from 
the subject pool in the UNC-CH School of Journalism and Mass Communication as well 
as campus wide. Students participated in the experiments in return for course credit or 
monetary incentives. The UNC-CH Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved 
the study design and procedures.10 
 A priori power analysis suggested that, for a 6-condition study, a total of 53 
participants per cell would be sufficient to detect small effect size (ω2 = .04) with a power 
of .80, at the standard .05 significance level (G Power Software; Keppel & Wickens, 
2004).11 
Procedures 
Upon registration, participants received an email with a link to an online survey, 
which included control variables (e.g., self-efficacy). Order of presentation of survey 
items was randomized. To proceed with the survey, participants had to read an online 
consent form and agree to participate in the study. Having participants fill out the survey 
before coming to the lab minimized potential effects on later tasks (i.e., priming and 
dependent variable measures). 
                                                 
10 IRB# 11 – 0547. 
  
11 Studies measuring response time as a dependent variable typically run a minimum of 30 participants per 
condition (e.g., Payne, 2001) to a maximum of 55 (e.g., Comello & Slater, 2011). 
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Upon arrival to the lab, participants were randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions and given a participant ID. They were asked to sign a hard copy of the consent 
form, turn off cell phones, and put away their backpacks. 
 At the end of each experimental session, participants answered funneled 
debriefing questions to ensure they were unaware of the nature and purpose of the 
primes, the relationship between the priming procedure and the dependent task, and any 
effect the priming task might have had on their subsequent responses to questions of 
personal susceptibility to and severity of health conditions (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). 
Participants who were recruited for monetary incentives were compensated (See Table 2 
for a summary of study procedures). 
Studies were administered in the Media Effects Lab in the School of Journalism 
and Mass Communication. The lab accommodates five participants at a time. MediaLab 
and DirectRT software are installed on each computer. 
Manipulations and Measures 
In all three experiments, priming was used to manipulate self-schema activation 
and response key and reaction time were measured as the main dependent variables. 
Independent variables. 
Self-schema activation. Self-schema was manipulated by two priming techniques. 
In the supraliminal priming condition (Experiment 1: condition supraliminal), 
participants participated in a supposed language ability task. They were presented with 25 
five-word sets and asked to form grammatically correct four-word sentences. This task is 
known as the “scrambled sentence task” (Srull & Wyer, 1979). Each of the five-word sets 
contained a self (i.e., I, me), third-person (i.e., he/she) or neutral (i.e., it) prime. Order of 
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presentation of the scrambled sentences was randomized (See Appendix 2 for study 
manipulations and measures). 
The supraliminal priming technique ensured that participants were unaware of the 
effects of the prime (i.e., scrambled sentence task) on later tasks (i.e., risk perceptions) 
even though they were consciously aware of the prime. 
Subliminal priming, although a weaker prime compared to the supraliminal 
method, ensured the primes were inaccessible for conscious awareness and, thus, 
awareness of the prime did not contribute to the hypothesized effects. In the subliminal 
prime conditions (Experiment 1,subliminal condition; and Experiment 3), participants 
participated in a supposedly visual acuity task, in which they were asked to indicate 
whether items flashed on a computer screen appeared from the top, bottom, left, or right 
side of a central fixation point. The flashed words were the primes (i.e., self-identity, 
third-person, or neutral words). 
Participants were instructed to focus their eyes on the center of the computer 
screen because it was the best way to identify the location of the flashed items. The items 
were white on a black background. Primes appeared in the participants’ parafoveal visual 
region.12 Each prime was both front and back masked (10 milliseconds).13 The prime 
itself lasted for 50 milliseconds. Order of presentation of primes and their location were 
randomized (following Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). In Experiment 1, a total of 50 primes 
were presented to participants, divided on two trials. In Experiment 3, this number was 
                                                 
12 Parafoveal or peripheral visual region is 2 to 6 degrees from a central fixation point. 
 
13 The mask is a stimulus that has the same features of the prime but does not interfere with the prime or 
initiate any spread activation in the memory. The mask erases the visual buffer of a person, which ensures 
that the actual duration of the prime in people’s visual memory is equal to its actual duration on the 
computer screen. In this study, the front mask was “&&&&” and the back mask was “xxxx.” 
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increased to 80 primes, 40 per trial. In the first trial, participants were asked to press pre-
assigned yes and no buttons to indicate whether the stimulus appeared from the right or 
left of the computer screen. In the second trial, they had to identify whether the stimulus 
appeared from the top or bottom of the screen. 
Finally, for Experiment 2, the primes, front and back masked, were presented in 
participants’ parafoveal vision followed by the target word (i.e., health conditions) 
appearing in the middle of the computer screen. Similar to Experiments 1 and 3, items 
were white on a black background. Each prime was both front and back masked (10 
milliseconds). The prime itself lasted 50 milliseconds. Order of presentation of primes 
and their location were randomized. 
Valence of health condition. In Experiment 1, perceptions of susceptibility to 
both positive and negative health conditions were assessed. Based on pilot work 
(described below), a list of 50 negative health conditions had been compiled. Ten health 
conditions were reworded to convey a positive health condition (e.g., healthy gums, 
healthy bones). 
Cognitive load. In Experiment 2, cognitive resources were manipulated by having 
participants in the high cognitive load condition hold an eight-digit number in their 
memory versus a two-digit number for participants in the low cognitive load condition. 
Numbers were generated using Random.org, an online number generator website. 
Participants were prompted to memorize a new number every 25 health conditions. 
 38
Participants responded to four blocks of 25 health conditions each.14 Order of 
presentation of blocks was randomized. 
Psychological reactance. In Experiment 3, Hong’s 14-item reactance scale was 
used to test the effects of reactance, as a measured individual difference variable, on 
health risk perceptions (Hong & Faedda, 1996). 
Health risk controllability. In Experiment 3, risk controllability was manipulated. 
Based on pilot work described below, two versions of an informational pamphlet about 
Balamuthia infection, a rare but deadly disease, were presented to participants. Results of 
the pilot work suggested the manipulation was successful. 
Dependent variables. 
Response key. Two buttons on a buttons box were pre-assigned a yes or no 
response. Participants hit either button in response to the susceptibility to and severity of 
health condition presented on the screen. 
Reaction time. Reaction times, the time that elapsed from the presentation of a 
target word (Experiments 1 and 2) or a short sentence (Experiment 3) on the computer 
screen till the participant hit one of the two pre-assigned response keys, were recorded in 
milliseconds. 
Behavioral measure. Experiment 3 used a behavioral measure where participants 
were given a choice to take a one-page pamphlet that included additional information 
about Balamuthia infection, the health condition they had read about in the study. 
Control variables. 
                                                 
14 For susceptibility items, participants in the high-load condition memorized the numbers 25691843 for 
Block 1 and 97128563 for Block 2 versus 23 and 68, respectively, for the low-load condition. Similarly, for 
severity, participants in the high-load condition memorized the numbers 65341782 for Block 1 and 
27981564 for Block 2 versus 17 and 26, respectively, for the low-load condition. 
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Individual difference variables. The study used Beck’s (1979) depression 
inventory to measure depression. The 21-item scale measured behavioral indications of 
depression such as social withdrawal and sleep disturbance. 
 To measure dispositional optimism, a ten-item Life Orientation Test (Scheier, 
Carver, & Bridges, 1994) was used. The scale included items such as “I’m always 
optimistic about my future.” 
Control as an individual difference variable was measured using the health locus 
of control scale (Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan, & Maides, 1976). The scale’s 11 items tap 
internal (e.g., “If I take care of myself, I can avoid illness”) and external (e.g., “Good 
health is largely a matter of good fortune”) locus of control. 
Self-consciousness was measured using Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss’s (1975) 
23-item scale. Example items included: “I’m always trying to figure myself out.” 
Self-efficacy was measured using Sherer et al.’s (1982) scale. It includes 17 items 
such as “When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work.”  
Rosenberg’s (1979) 10-item scale was used to measure self-esteem. It included 
items such as “I take a positive attitude toward myself.” 
Finally, to ensure the results obtained were not due to differences in participants’ 
affective states, a modified version of the affect-arousal scale (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 
2003; Salovery & Birnbaum, 1989) was administered at the end of each experimental 
session. The scale is an eight-item semantic differential measure of affect (e.g., sad/ 
happy) and arousal (e.g., calm/ excited).  
Health risk characteristics. Data collected in Pilot Study 1 (described below) 
were used to control for health risk characteristics. In Pilot Study 1, undergraduate 
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students rated 99 health conditions on various dimensions: familiarity, prevalence, 
stereotype salience, perceived risk controllability, exempt belief, and personal 
experience. These variables were used to create clusters of health conditions that were 
familiar to the student population. These clusters were used to calculate mean response 
key and reaction times in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Baseline reaction time and response key accuracy. To familiarize participants 
with the study procedures and collect baseline reaction time and response key accuracy, a 
list of 20 words, 10 animals (e.g., monkey) and 10 objects (e.g., desk), were randomly 
presented to participants. Participants were asked to indicate as quickly as possible 
whether each word was an animal, in which case they would press yes, or not, in which 
case they would press no. 
Data Analysis 
Data was analyzed using the PASW 19.0 statistical package. Data were screened 
for missing values, univariate and multivariate outliers, and fit to the assumptions 
underlying the statistical methods used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Repeated measures analysis of variance was used for hypotheses testing. 
Significant interactions were followed by tests for simple main effects. Logistic 
regression analysis was used for dichotomous dependent variables (e.g., behavioral 
measure in Experiment 3). 
For reaction times, data points less than 300 milliseconds and more than 5,000 
were deleted. Then, outliers beyond four standard deviations were excluded from the 
analysis to reduce their influence on the solution. Finally, a log transformation was 
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performed to normalize response time data, which tend to be positively skewed. Analyses 
were performed on transformed data (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Fazio, 1990). 
Pilot Work 
 Three pilot studies were conducted. Pilot Study 1 identified health conditions 
familiar to the student population, which were used in Experiments 1 and 2, and provided 
normative data to control for health risk characteristics. Pilot Study 2 pretested the risk 
controllability manipulation used in Experiment 3. Pilot Study 3 tested the associative 
strength between the self and sickness and health traits to determine whether 
sickness/health were traits that people considered (non) self-descriptive (See Appendix 3 
for a description of pilot work).15 
Pilot Study 1: Selection of health conditions. 
To select health conditions familiar to the student population, a list of health 
conditions was compiled from several studies (e.g., Christensen-Szalanski, Brck, & 
Christensen-Szalanski, 1983; Harris et al., 2008; Klar & Ayal, 2004) and online resources 
(e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Health conditions chosen were neither 
general in nature (e.g., digestive problems) nor gender specific (e.g., breast cancer). 
 Three groups of undergraduate students (N = 70 in total participated for course 
credit) rated a list of 33 different health conditions (a total of 99 conditions across the 
three groups) on several characteristics that affect risk perceptions (e.g., Christensen-
Szalanski et al., 1983; Harris et al., 2008; Weinstein, 1980). 
(1) Familiarity: the extent to which participants had previously encountered the name 
of the health condition. 
                                                 
15 IRB# 10 – 2019. 
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(2) Frequency or population prevalence: the percentage of people to whom this health 
condition could occur. 
(3) Stereotype salience: the ease with which participants could identify a person who 
suffers from the health condition. 
(4) Perceived risk controllability: the extent to which a person could control the 
health condition. 
(5) Personal experience: the extent to which each participant has personally 
experienced the health condition in question or known a close other (family 
member or a friend) who has suffered this condition. 
(6) Exempt belief: the belief that if a health condition had not yet happened to a 
participant, it is unlikely to happen to him/her. 
(7) Personal susceptibility: the likelihood of developing or experiencing the health 
condition.  
(8) Severity: the noxiousness, seriousness, or dangerousness of the health condition if 
a participant developed it. 
Results. Based on the familiarity ratings, 50 health conditions were known to 90% 
or more of the participants and were, thus, used in Experiments 1 and 2.16  
A correlation matrix for ratings of health conditions on dimensions of perceived 
prevalence, stereotype salience, risk controllability, exempt belief, and personal 
experience, susceptibility, and severity as well as third-person susceptibility and severity 
appear in Table 3.  
                                                 
16 Pilot Study 2 replicated familiarity of health conditions ratings collected in Pilot Study 1. Health 
conditions unfamiliar to the rating groups in Pilot Study 1 were also unknown to participants in Pilot Study 
2. 
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A hierarchical cluster analysis was run on the 50 familiar health conditions based 
on five standardized health characteristics variables: perceived prevalence, stereotype 
salience, controllability, exempt beliefs, and personal experience.17 Using Ward’s 
method, the analysis produced three clusters, between which the health risk 
characteristics variables were significantly different (See Table 4 for descriptive statistics 
for clusters and differences on health risk characteristics). The first cluster included 17 
health conditions perceived to be of low prevalence, salience, controllability, exempt 
beliefs, and personal experience (e.g., leukemia, HPV). The second cluster included 26 
health conditions (e.g., allergies, diabetes) perceived to be moderate on these risk 
characteristics variables. The third cluster included seven conditions (e.g., flu, stress) that 
were scored high on these variables (See Appendix 3 for a complete list of health 
conditions familiar to undergraduate population and the cluster to which each condition 
belongs). 
In sum, 50 health conditions were selected for inclusion in Experiments 1 and 2. 
These 50 conditions fell into three homogeneous clusters based on participants’ ratings of 
them based on several health risk characteristics. 
Pilot Study 2: Pretesting health risk controllability manipulation. 
To pretest the health risk controllability manipulation used in Experiment 3, three 
groups of undergraduate students rated one of three versions of an informational 
pamphlet about Balamuthia infection. Balamuthia infection was chosen because it is a 
                                                 
17 Variables were standardized to eliminate the influence of prevalence, which was measured on a 0 – 100 
scale, on cluster formation. 
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rare disease, which reduced participants’ prior knowledge about and/or personal 
experience with the disease as potential confounding variables.18 
 Three versions of the pamphlet provided identical information regarding 
susceptibility to and severity of the disease and were similar in word count. Pamphlets 
differed in levels of control over routes of infection (i.e., the extent to which one can 
prevent exposure to the disease), rate of progress (i.e., control over successive 
development of the disease from one stage to another), and curability (i.e., ease of 
diagnosis, and availability and effectiveness of treatment). 
Participants read the informational pamphlet and, then, rated Balamuthia infection 
on various dimensions of perceived risk controllability for both the self and a third person 
(i.e., participants’ perceptions of control that an average third-person would have over the 
disease). Dimensions of perceived health risk controllability included: control over 
susceptibility, severity, progression rate, treatment effectiveness, and general control (See 
Appendix 3 for a complete description of Pilot Study 2). 
Results. Seventy students participated in the study for course credit. Students 
were randomly and equally assigned to one of three conditions: high-risk controllability, 
low-risk controllability, and a neutral condition (n = 24, 23, and 23, respectively). 
All ten items measuring perceived health risk controllability, for the self and 
average third person, were examined. There were no missing values on any of the items. 
A correlation matrix along with means and standard deviations appears in Table 5.  
                                                 
18 Familiarity ratings collected in Pilot Studies 1 and 2 confirmed students were not familiar with 
Balamuthia infection. In Pilot Study 1, none of the participants had heard about the disease whereas only 2 
participants (8.7%) had heard about it in Pilot Study 2 but had no personal experience with it. 
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Two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted using an oblique 
Principal Components Analysis.19 The two factors explained 84.95% of the variance. The 
results revealed that perceived risk controllability had two underlying factors that were 
moderately correlated. The first factor was related to perceived general control whereas 
the second factor was related to perceived susceptibility control. Based on the analysis, 
two averaged indices were created. Eight items reflected general control (α = .96), and 
two items reflected susceptibility control (r = .79), with a correlation of .58 between the 
two factors, which is suitable for a multivariate analysis of variance (See Table 6 for 
factor loadings, factor correlation, and internal reliability statistics). 
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance was performed on perceived health 
risk susceptibility and general control as dependent variables. Evaluation of the 
assumptions of normality of sampling distributions, linearity, and homogeneity of 
variance within each experimental condition were satisfactory.20  
                                                 
19 Evaluation of normality of distribution, outliers, and factorability were satisfactory. All variables were 
within the acceptable ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. One case exceeded the critical value of Z.005. 
Multivariate outliers were checked using Mahalanobis distance. Two cases were above the critical value of 
chi-square (χ2(.001, 10) = 29.58) but did not have a large Cook’s D value, which suggested they were not 
influential on the solution. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy revealed there was 
a degree of common variance appropriate for conducting a Principal Components Analysis (KMO = .91). 
Each item’s Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was greater than .60, with the lowest being .85. 
Accordingly, all items were retained for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated the correlation 
matrix is factorable (χ2 = 791.05, p < .001). The initial solution indicated there were two factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. Similarly, Catell’s criterion for the scree plot suggested that there might be two 
factors. With the extraction of two factors, there were only five (11.0%) non-redundant residuals with 
absolute values greater than .05. 
 
20 The two dependent variables were within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness and kurtosis for all 
three experimental conditions. No univariate outliers were detected at Z.005 level. No multivariate outliers 
exceeded the critical value of chi-square (χ2(.001, 2) = 13.81). Levene’s test showed variances were 
homogeneous for the two dependent variables: susceptibility control (F(2,67) = 2.17, p = .122) and general 
control (F(2, 67) = 1.58, p = .213). Box’s M test revealed no problems regarding the homogeneity of the 
variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 10.62, p = .118). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 = 10.41, 
p = .005) suggesting the two dependent variables were suitable for multivariate analysis. 
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The Manova was significant (Pillais = .66, F(4, 134) = 16.48, p < .001) 
suggesting there were differences among the three conditions on at least one linear 
combination. As a follow-up to the significant MANOVA, a Discriminant Function 
Analysis was performed to find the linear combination(s) that maximize the differences 
among the groups. For a significant MANOVA, the first function is always found to be 
significant (Λ= .36, p < .001). The second function in isolation was not significant (Λ= 
.96, p = .133).21 
 Function 1’s eigenvalue of 1.67 had a canonical correlation of .79 and explained 
98% of the variance. Function 2’s eigenvalue of .03 had a canonical correlation of .18 
and explained 2% of the variance. The first function was heavily dominated by perceived 
susceptibility control22 whereas the second function was heavily dominated by perceived 
general control.23  
 Conducting a one way ANOVA demonstrated that discriminant scores from the 
first function were significant (F(2, 67) = 56.12, p < .001) whereas scores from the 
second function were not (F(2, 67) = 1.15, p = .321). To find which groups differed from 
each other, Tukey HSD was conducted. For the first function, the test revealed all three 
conditions were significantly different from each other at the .05 level. 
This series of analyses suggest the manipulation of health risk controllability was 
successful (see Figure 1). The Manova and the follow-up tests suggested there was one 
                                                 
21 In the univariate world, all two models testing for differences between levels of independent variable, 
risk controllability, on the two dependent variables were found to be significant (perceived susceptibility 
control: F(2, 69) = 50.47, p < .001, perceived general control: F(2, 69) = 20.87, p < .001).  
 
22 The correlation between the first weighted composite and susceptibility control was .94 with a 
standardized coefficient of .84. 
 
23 The correlation between the second weighted composite and perceived general control was .80 with a 
standardized coefficient of .99. 
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function that separated the three experimental conditions, which was heavily dominated 
by perceived susceptibility control. Perceived susceptibility control varied by the levels 
of risk controllability manipulation. Participants in the high-risk controllability group 
exhibited a high level of perceived susceptibility control (M = 4.72, SD = 1.09), followed 
by the neutral (M = 2.45, SD = 1.18), and low-risk controllability (M = 1.86, SD = .77) 
groups. 
In sum, Pilot Study 2 pretested the risk controllability manipulation used in 
Experiment 3. The manipulation was successful: Participants in the high controllability 
condition perceived themselves as being more in control over the likelihood of 
contracting the disease compared to participants in the low controllability condition. 
Pilot Study 3: Associative strength between the self and health and sickness 
traits. 
 
The purpose of this pilot study was to examine whether sickness/health are traits 
that people consider (non)self-descriptive similar to negative/positive traits, which has 
been shown in previous studies (Greenwald & Franham, 2000). The study was a 2 
(prime: self-identity words vs. neutral) x 2 (trait category: positive, negative, health, 
sickness) mixed-factorial design. The prime was the between-subject factor and the trait 
category was the within-subject factor. 
In response to whether traits presented on the computer screen were self-
descriptive or not, it was hypothesized that responses and reaction times to questions will 
be biased downward for negative and sickness traits and upward for positive and health 
ones (main effect for trait category) and for participants primed with self-identity words 
(main effects for prime). Participants will be more likely to respond (a) “no” in response 
to negative and sickness traits, and “yes” in response to positive and health traits, and 
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(b) to respond faster. Responses and reaction times will be biased for participants in the 
self-identity words condition compared to those in the neutral condition. 
Procedures. Under the guise of a personality traits study, participants were asked 
to indicate as quickly as possible whether each trait that appeared on the computer screen 
was self-descriptive or not by pressing one of two pre-assigned buttons on a buttons box: 
yes or no. A total of 40 personality traits had been randomly selected from Anderson’s 
(1968) 200 high meaningful personality traits using Random.org, a random number 
generator. Twenty traits were positive (e.g., “sincere”) and 20 were negative (e.g., 
“phony”). Embedded within Anderson’s personality traits was a list of 13 health- (e.g., 
“healthy,” “wholesome”) and 11 sickness-related words (e.g., “unhealthy,” “sick”). Order 
of presentation of traits was randomized (See Appendix 3 for a complete list of positive, 
negative, health, and sickness traits). 
Participants were subliminally primed with self-identity words (e.g., I, me) 
whereas the neutral group was primed with a letter string (e.g., &&&xxx). Primes were 
white on a black background. Primes were presented in participants’ parafoveal vision for 
50 milliseconds and were both front- and back-masked (10 milliseconds for each mask) 
followed by a personality trait appearing in the middle of the computer screen till a 
response was recorded. Order of presentation of primes and their location were 
randomized. 
Results. A total of 150 students participated in the study for a $5 incentive. They 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: self vs. neutral primes. Ninety-seven 
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participants were females (64.7%) and 128 were right-handed (85.3%).24 Mean age was 
20.93 (SD = 1.54). There were no missing values on any variable. 
Baseline measures. No differences were detected between self and neutral 
conditions on baseline (i.e., practice trial) response key accuracy and reaction time. 
Participants in both self (M = 19.62, SD = .58) and neutral (M = 19.64, SD = .62) 
conditions correctly identified the practice-trial items as animals/non-animal (t(148) = -
.13, p = .893).25 Raw baseline reaction time data fell between 331 and 5,294 milliseconds. 
Data points exceeding 5 seconds were excluded (n = 1). Then, data points that were 4 SD 
away from the mean were considered outliers and excluded (n = 35), a 1.2% total data 
points lost. Mean baseline reaction time after outlier deletion was not statistically 
different between the self (M = 648.63, SD = 1.12) and neutral (M = 650.57, SD = 1.11) 
conditions (t(148) = -.16, p = .873).26 
Effects of prime and trait category. Pilot Study 3 tested the effects of the prime 
(self vs. neutral) and trait category (positive, negative, health, sickness) on two dependent 
variables: response key (yes/no) and reaction time. In response to whether traits presented 
on the computer screen were self-descriptive (yes) or not (no), it was predicted that 
participants would respond “yes” to positive and health traits and “no” to negative and 
                                                 
24 Data on right vs. left-handedness were collected to control for their influence on reaction time, which has 
been shown in previous studies (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).  
 
25 Data were checked for assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variances. Skewness and kurtosis 
were within ±2 for each condition with the exception of kurtosis in the neutral condition (3.81). 
Homogeneity of variances were assumed as evidenced by a non significant Levene’s test (F(1, 148) = .01, 
p = .984). 
 
26 Data were checked for assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variances. Skewness and kurtosis 
were within ±2 for each condition. Homogeneity of variances were assumed as evidenced by a non 
significant Levene’s test (F(1, 148) = .15, p = .697). 
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sickness traits. Reaction times for “yes” responses to positive and health traits would be 
faster than “no” responses. Reaction times for “no” responses to negative and sickness 
traits would be faster than “yes” responses. Finally, it was predicted that these patterns 
would be stronger for participants in the self-prime condition than participants in the 
neutral condition. 
(1) Effects of prime and trait category on response key. Means for response keys 
yes and no were calculated for each trait category Participants were similar across the two 
experimental conditions in responding yes (i.e., self-descriptive trait) to positive and 
health traits and no (i.e., non self-descriptive trait) to negative and sickness traits. 
Participants identified positive (e.g., “sincere”) and health (e.g., “healthy”) traits as self-
descriptive in the self (M = .89 and .70, SD = .13 and .18, respectively) and neutral (M = 
.91 and .71, SD = .11 and .20, respectively) conditions. On the contrary, participants 
identified negative (e.g., “gossipy”) and sickness (e.g., “unhealthy”) traits as non self-
descriptive in the self (M = .91 and .93, SD = .10 and .11, respectively) and neutral (M = 
.89 and .95, SD = .15 and .09, respectively) conditions (See Table 7). 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed with prime as a 
between-subjects factor, and trait category (positive, negative, health, sickness) as a 
within-subjects factor, to detect differences on mean count of yes responses to trait 
categories (i.e., yes signifies a self-descriptive trait). Data were screened for fit of 
underlying assumptions of normality of the sampling distribution, homogeneity of 
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variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicolinearity.27 Using Wilks’ criterion, the 
interaction term between prime and trait category was not significant (F(1.77, 262.31) = 
.57, p = .545, ηp2 = .004). For the between-subjects factor, no statistically significant 
differences were found between conditions when response key was averaged over all trait 
categories (F(1, 148) = .19, p = .660, ηp2 = .001). Mean response key count was .43 and 
.44 for the self and neutral conditions, respectively. When averaged over groups, 
however, response key was found by Hotellings’ T to be significant by trait category 
(F(1.77, 262.31) = 1252.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .894).28 
To correct for post hoc inflation of familywise Type I error, individual alphas for 
each of the six contrasts were set up using the False Discovery Rate approach (FDR).29 
Post hoc results indicated participants identified positive traits as self-descriptive (M = 
.90) significantly more than they identified negative (M = .09), health (M  = .70), and 
sickness (M = .05) traits as self-descriptive. Similarly, participants identified health traits 
as self-descriptive significantly more than they identified negative and sickness traits as 
self-descriptive. Finally, participants identified negative traits as self-descriptive 
significantly more than sickness traits. All comparisons were significant at p < .001. 
                                                 
27 Distribution of mean response key was not within the acceptable range of ±2 for negative and sickness 
traits. Sixteen data points fell beyond Z.005. Six cases were considered multivariate outliers, which exceeded 
the critical chi-square value of χ2(.001, 4) = 18.46 but only one had a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of 
variances was assumed for all dependent variables as evidenced by non-significant Levene’s tests. 
Homogeneity of the variance –covariance matrices was assumed given equal n. Linearity of the relationship 
between the dependent variables was checked by plotting all pairs of dependent variables. Correlations 
between variables were moderate, which is not a threat to multicollinearity. 
 
28 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 154.50, p < .001). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .59). 
 
29 P values were set up at .008, .016, .025, .033, .041, and .05 for consecutive contrasts ranked from the 
smallest to biggest p values. 
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(2) Effects of prime and trait category on reaction time combined for yes and no 
response key. Raw reaction time data for target trait categories fell between 318 and 
24,256 milliseconds. Data points exceeding 5 seconds were deleted (n = 6). Then, data 
points beyond 4 SD were considered outliers and deleted (n = 89), a total of 0.92% data 
points lost (See Table 8 for descriptive statistics). 
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed with prime as between-
subjects factor, and trait category as a within-subjects factor, to detect differences on 
reaction time combined for the yes and no response keys. Mean reaction time was 
calculated for each of the four trait categories (positive, negative, health, sickness). Data 
were screened for the fit of underlying assumptions regarding the normality of the 
sampling distribution, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and 
multicolinearity.30 
Using Wilks’ criterion, the interaction term between prime and trait category was 
not significant (F(2.71, 401.11) = 1.98, p = .122, ηp2 = .013). For the between-subjects 
factor, no statistically significant differences were found between conditions when 
reaction time was averaged over all trait categories (F(1, 148) = .004, p = .948, ηp2 < 
.001). Mean reaction time was 922.57 and 924.69 for the self and neutral conditions, 
respectively. When averaged over groups, however, reaction time was found by 
                                                 
30 Distribution of reaction time within each condition was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness 
and kurtosis. Three cases fell beyond Z.005. One case exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 4) = 18.46 but did 
not have a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for all dependent variables except for 
mean response time to sickness (F(1, 148) = 5.19, p = .024). Box’s M test revealed no problems regarding 
the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 14.223, p = .182). Linearity of the relationship 
between the dependent variables was checked by plotting all pairs of dependent variables. Variables were 
highly correlated, an expectation in multivariate analysis, and posed no problems. 
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Hotellings’ T to be significant by trait category (F(2.71, 401.11) = 64.03, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.302)31 (See Figure 2). 
Post hoc analysis, adjusted for Type I error inflation using the FDR approach, 
indicated participants responded significantly faster to positive traits (M = 868.96) 
compared to negative (M = 933.25), health (M = 988.55), and sickness (M = 903.64) 
traits. Further, people responded faster to negative traits compared to health traits. 
Finally, participants responded faster to sickness traits compared to negative and health 
traits. All comparisons were significant at p < .001. 
Although the interaction term between prime, the between-subjects factor, and all 
four trait categories, the within-subjects factor, was not significant, limiting the analysis 
to positive and sickness traits revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 148) = 3.80, p = 
.053, ηp2 = .025) and a within-subjects, trait category (positive vs. sickness) effect (F(1, 
148) = 12.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .079) whereas the prime, the between-subjects factor, was 
not significant (F(1, 148) = .08, p = .772, ηp2 = .001). 
As a follow up to a significant interaction, main effects, with alpha set to .025, 
revealed no differences between the two experimental groups with trait category held 
constant: positive (F(1, 148) = .89, p = .346) and sickness (F(1, 148) = .16, p = .687) 
traits. Mean reaction time to positive traits was 857.03 and 883.07 in the self and neutral 
conditions, respectively. Mean reaction time to sickness traits was 910.33 and 898.87 in 
the self and neutral conditions, respectively. With experimental group held constant, main 
effects revealed no differences in reaction time to positive and sickness traits within the 
                                                 
31 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 22.63, p < .001). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .90). 
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neutral condition (F(1, 148) = 1.29, p = .259). Within the self condition, however, there 
was a statistically significant difference (F(1, 148) = 15.14, p < .001). Participants 
responded faster to positive (M = 857.03, SD = 1.21) compared to sickness (M = 910.33, 
SD = 1.24) traits. 
(3) Effects of prime and trait category on reaction time split by yes and no 
response key. A closer look at Table 8 revealed a pattern in which participants identified 
positive (M = 877.00) and health (M = 990.83) traits as self-descriptive faster than they 
identified these traits as non self-descriptive (M = 1,099.00 and 1,124.60, respectively). 
On the contrary, participants identified negative (M = 963.82) and sickness (M = 916.22) 
traits as non self-descriptive faster than they identified them as self-descriptive (M = 
1,202.26 and 1,273.50, respectively) (See Figures 3a and 3b). Performing a repeated 
measures analysis of variance on reaction time to trait categories (positive, negative, 
health, sickness) split by response key (yes/no)32 showed a non significant interaction 
between prime and trait category (F(4.81, 105.89) = 1.01, p = .413, ηp2 = .044) and prime 
(F(1, 22) = .53, p = .474, ηp2 = .024). Trait category, however, had a significant effect on 
reaction time (F(4.81, 105.89)  = 13.71, p < .001, η2 = .384).33 
Post hoc comparisons, corrected for familywise Type I error inflation using the 
FDR approach, showed six significant differences. Participants identified positive traits 
as self-descriptive (M = 918.33) significantly faster than they identified negative (M = 
                                                 
32 Reaction time split by yes and no response keys signifies reaction time for traits identified as self-
descriptive (i.e., time to respond “yes”) and those identified as non self-descriptive (i.e., time to respond 
“no”). 
 
33 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 47.72, p = .009). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .68). 
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1,235.94) and sickness (M = 1,261.82) traits as self-descriptive and health as non self-
descriptive (M = 1,172.19). Participants also identified negative (M = 995.40) and 
sickness (M = 963.82) traits as non self-descriptive faster than they identified sickness 
traits as self-descriptive (M = 1,261.82). Finally, participants identified sickness traits as 
non self-descriptive (M = 963.82) faster than they identified negative traits as self-
descriptive (M = 1,235.94).34 
It is noteworthy that differences between the two groups were not attributed to 
differential affect/arousal status. Measured at the end of the experimental session, the 
affect/arousal index (α = .89) was similar for the self (M = 1.27, SD = 1.81) and neutral 
(M = 1.33, SD = 1.74) conditions (t(148) = -.21, p = .832 ns).35 
In sum, Pilot Study 3 provided partial support for the hypothesis. The main effects 
for trait category were supported whereas the main effects for the self primes were not. 
Consistent across the two experimental conditions, trait category was a powerful 
predictor of response key and reaction time. Participants identified positive and health 
traits as self-descriptive. In contrast, they identified sickness and negative traits as non 
self-descriptive. In terms of reaction times, participants responded faster to positive traits 
followed by sickness, negative, and health traits. Participants found it easier to identify 
positive and health traits as self-descriptive (as evidenced by faster reaction time) but 
                                                 
34 The analysis on reaction time split by response key (yes/no) was performed on only 24 cases (n = 12 per 
condition). Few participants identified negative and sickness traits as self-descriptive and positive and 
health traits as non self-descriptive, which reduced the sample size from 150 to 24 with listwise deletion. 
Reported means are for 24 cases. 
 
35 Distribution of the dependent variable was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. 
Equal variances were assumed as evidenced by a non significant Levene’s test (F(1, 148) = .19, p = .662). 
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more difficult to identify negative and sickness traits as self-descriptive (as evidenced by 
slower reaction time). 
Although there were no differences between the experimental conditions in 
response key and reaction time, participants in the self-prime condition responded 
significantly slower to sickness as opposed to positive traits.  
Conclusions from Pilot Studies 
Three pilot studies were conducted. Pilot Study 1 identified 50 health conditions 
with which the student population was familiar. These health conditions were then 
grouped into three homogeneous clusters based on several health risk characteristics. In 
the analysis for Experiment 2 (described in Chapter 4), response key and reaction time 
data were averaged across the health conditions that belonged to each cluster. 
Pilot Study 2 showed that the manipulation of health risk controllability was 
successful. The informational pamphlet used in the pilot was used in Experiment 3 to test 
the effects of health risk controllability along with psychological reactance on risk 
perceptions when the self-schema was active. 
Finally, Pilot Study 3 tested the associative strength between the self and health 
and sickness traits. The study provided preliminary evidence that sickness and health 
traits mirror negative and positive traits in their implicit (dis)association with the self, 
which has been shown in previous studies (e.g., Greenwald & Franham, 2000). 
The next chapter describes the results from the three main experiments designed 
to test the hypotheses. Experiment 1 examined the proposition that people are not 
consciously aware of their underestimation of health risks as a bias and of self-schema 
activation as a source of the bias. Experiment 2 examined the proposition that 
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underestimation of health risks is an efficient process, one that occurs when people are 
mentally taxed. Finally, Experiment 3 examined the effects of a manipulated health risk 
characteristic (i.e., risk controllability) and an individual difference variable (i.e., 
psychological reactance) on health risk perceptions. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Experiment 1: Unconscious awareness of underestimation of personal health risk 
perceptions 
 
 Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that people are not consciously aware of their 
underestimation of health risk perceptions as a bias or of self-schema activation as the 
source of this bias. The experiment was a 3 (prime: self-identity, third-person, neutral) x 
2 (priming method: subliminal, supraliminal) x 2 (valence of health condition: positive, 
negative) mixed-factorial design. Both the prime and priming method were between-
subjects factors whereas the valence of health condition was a within-subjects factor. The 
study included an additional conscious condition, which was not crossed with the prime 
and priming method. 
A total of 325 participants were recruited for a $10 incentive. They were 
randomly assigned to one of seven experimental conditions. The majority of participants 
were females (n = 243, 74.8%) and right-handed (n = 300, 92.3%). Mean age was 21.20 
(SD = 2.39). Data for Experiment 1 included measures of individual differences (e.g., 
self-efficacy) as well as response key and reaction time data for susceptibility to 40 
negative (e.g., HIV) and 10 positive (e.g., fertility) health conditions, for a total of 50.  
First, baseline measures are described. Second, descriptive statistics and reliability 
of individual difference variables are presented along with their effects on response key 
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as a dependent variable. Third, response key and reaction time data are analyzed to detect 
differences between the experimental conditions. 
Baseline measures. 
A series of univariate ANOVAs, with prime and priming method as fixed factors, 
showed no differences between the experimental groups on baseline response key 
accuracy and reaction time. For baseline response key accuracy, there were no 
differences between the experimental conditions in total correct response key as a 
dependent variable. The interaction term (F(2, 273) = .22, p = .801), prime (F(2, 273) = 
.72, p = .485), and priming method (F(1, 273) = .98, p = .321) were not significant. 
Participants in the self (M = 19.46, SD = 1.18), third-person (M = 19.64, SD = .68) and 
neutral (M = 19.44, SD = 1.44) conditions correctly identified practice-trial items as 
animal/non-animal. Averaged across priming method, means were 19.48 (SD = 1.05) and 
19.54 (SD = 1.23) for the subliminal and supraliminal priming conditions, respectively.36 
Similarly, there were no differences between the unconscious and conscious conditions 
(F(1, 323) = .74, p = .388).37 Participants in the unconscious (M = 19.51, SD = 1.15) and 
conscious (M = 19.67, SD = .63) conditions correctly identified practice-trial items as 
animal/non-animal. 
Raw baseline reaction time data fell between 336 and 9,471 milliseconds. Data 
points exceeding 5 seconds were excluded (n = 2). Then, data points that were 4 SD away 
from the mean were considered outliers and excluded (n = 65), a 1.03% total data points 
                                                 
36 Total correct response key was transformed using 1/(K-X) formula after which skewness and kurtosis 
were within the acceptable ±2 within conditions. Two cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. Equal 
variances were not assumed as evidenced by a significant Levene’s test (F(5, 273) = 2.92, p = .014). 
 
37 Total correct response key was transformed using 1/(K-X) formula after which skewness and kurtosis 
were within the acceptable ±2 within conditions. Equal variances were assumed as evidenced by a non-
significant Levene’s test (F(1, 323) = 2.93, p = .087). 
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lost. A univariate ANOVA performed on log-transformed data showed the interaction 
term between prime and priming method (F(2, 273) = .65 p = .523), prime (F(2, 273) = 
.21, p = .805), and priming method (F(1, 273) = .68, p = .408) were not significant. Mean 
reaction time to practice trial items was 634.74 (SD = 1.11), 637.67 (SD = 1.11), and 
631.10 (SD = 1.12) for participants in the self, third-person, and neutral conditions, 
respectively. Averaged over priming method, reaction time was 637.96 (SD = 1.12) for 
the subliminal condition and 630.95 (SD = 1.10) for the supraliminal condition. 
Similarly, there were no differences between the unconscious and conscious conditions 
(F(1, 323) = .00, p = .986).38 Participants in the unconscious conditions responded in 
634.45 (SD = 1.11) milliseconds whereas those in the conscious condition responded in 
634.30 (SD = 1.09) milliseconds. 
Individual differences. 
Individual difference variables were screened for normality of distributions and 
outliers. There were no missing values (See Table 9 for descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix). 
Participants scored low on the depression inventory (M = 1.36, SD = .29, α = 
.85).39 Anchored between 0 and 3, participants responded to 21 behavioral indications of 
depression (e.g., sleep disturbances), with high scores reflecting high levels of 
depression. Consistently, participants were optimistic, as measured by the life orientation 
                                                 
38 The distribution of log-transformed reaction time data was within the acceptable range of ±2 for 
skewness and kurtosis within each experimental condition. Equal variances were assumed as evidenced by 
a non-significant Levene’s test with prime and priming method as fixed factors (F(5, 273) = .97, p = .433) 
and with unconscious vs. conscious factor (F(1, 323) = 2.47, p = .116). 
 
39 Reported reliability is for 20 items of the depression inventory. A weight loss item was excluded because 
it reduced the sample size from 325 to 127 (those who were trying to loose weight) with listwise deletion. 
With the weight loss item included, reliability was .82 (n = 127). 
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test (M = 2.54, SD = .65, α = .79). Anchored between 0 = strongly disagree and 4 = 
strongly agree, with high scores reflecting high levels of optimism, participants 
responded to six statements such as “I’m always optimistic about my future.”  
Participants showed slightly high levels of internal health locus of control (M = 
3.85, SD = .49, α = .58). Anchored between 1 = strongly disagree and 6 = strongly agree, 
participants responded to 11 items tapping internal (e.g., “If I take care of myself, I can 
avoid illness”) and external (e.g., “Good health is largely a matter of good fortune”) locus 
of control. The scale was coded in the direction of internal locus of control: High scores 
reflected high levels of internal health locus of control and low scores reflected high 
levels of external health locus of control.  
Two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted using an oblique 
Principal Axis Factoring. The two factors explained 23.39% of the variance.40 Consistent 
with the literature, results revealed health locus of control had two underlying factors. 
The first factor was related to internal locus of control whereas the second factor was 
related to external locus of control. Based on the analysis, five items reflected internal 
locus of control (α = .60), and five items reflected external locus of control (α = .56), 
                                                 
40 Evaluation of normality of distribution, outliers, and factorability were satisfactory. All variables were 
within the acceptable ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. Thirteen cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. 
Multivariate outliers were checked using Mahalanobis distance. Four cases were above the critical value of 
chi-square (χ2(.001, 11) = 31.26) but did not have a large Cook’s D value, which suggested they were not 
influential on the solution. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy revealed there was 
a degree of common variance appropriate for conducting a factor analysis (KMO = .69). Each item’s 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was greater than .60, with the lowest being .65. Accordingly, all 
items were retained for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated the correlation matrix is 
factorable (χ2 = 377.83, p < .001). The initial solution indicated there were two factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1. Similarly, Catell’s criterion for the scree plot suggested that there might be two factors. With 
the extraction of two factors, there were 13 (23.0%) non-redundant residuals with absolute values greater 
than .05. 
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with a correlation of .08 between the two factors (See Table 10 for factor loadings, factor 
correlation, and internal reliability statistics). 
Participants were slightly reactant (M = 3.07, SD = .46, α = .78). Anchored 
between 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree, participants responded to 14 
statements that measured psychological reactance (e.g., “Regulations trigger a sense of 
resistance in me”). Psychological reactance was positively correlated with self-
consciousness and negatively with self-efficacy and self-esteem. 
Participants’ scores were roughly at the mid point of the self-consciousness scale 
(M = 2.53, SD = .37, α = .74) Anchored between 0 = extremely uncharacteristic of me 
and 4 = extremely characteristic of me, with high scores reflecting high levels of self-
consciousness, participants responded to 23 items (e.g., “I am constantly examining my 
motives”). 
Three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted using a varimax 
Principal Axis Factoring. The three factors explained 30.70% of the variance.41 
Consistent with the literature, results revealed self-consciousness had three underlying 
factors. The first factor was related to social anxiety (e.g., “I feel anxious when I speak in 
front of people”). The second was related to public self (e.g., “I’m concerned about what 
                                                 
41 Evaluation of normality of distribution, outliers, and factorability were satisfactory. All variables were 
within the acceptable ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. Fifty-five cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. 
Multivariate outliers were checked using Mahalanobis distance. Five cases were above the critical value of 
chi-square (χ2(.001, 23) = 49.72) but did not have a large Cook’s D value, which suggested they were not 
influential on the solution. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy revealed there was 
a degree of common variance appropriate for conducting a factor analysis (KMO = .78). Each item’s 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was greater than .60, with the lowest being .63. Accordingly, all 
items were retained for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated the correlation matrix is 
factorable (χ2 = 1706.92, p < .001). The initial solution indicated there were six factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1. Catell’s criterion for the scree plot suggested that there might be three or four factors. 
Consistent with the literature, three factors were extracted, after which there were 63 (24.0%) non-
redundant residuals with absolute values greater than .05. 
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other people think of me”). The third factor was related to private self (e.g., “I’m 
generally attentive to my inner feelings”). Private self was further broken down to two 
subscales: self-awareness and self-reflection, which explained 37.12% of the variance, 
with a correlation of r = -.49 between the two subscales. Self-awareness included four 
items such as “I’m alert to changes in my mood” (M = 2.91, SD = .51, α = .54). Self-
reflection consisted of two items such as “I’m always trying to figure myself out” (M = 
2.63, SD = .86, r = .49) (See Table 11 for factor loadings, factor correlation, and internal 
reliability statistics). 
Participants were highly efficacious (M = 3.59, SD = .50, α = .86). Anchored 
between 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree, with high scores reflecting high 
self-efficacy, participants responded to 17 items such as “When I make plans, I am 
certain I can make them work.” Similarly, participants scored high on self-esteem (M = 
3.04, SD = .46, α = .86). Anchored between 1 = strongly agree and 4 = strongly disagree, 
with high scores reflecting high self-esteem, participants responded to ten items such as 
“On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.” 
Relationship between individual differences and response key. It was predicted 
in Hypothesis 5 that participants high on self-efficacy, internal locus of control, self-
esteem, psychological reactance, dispositional optimism, and self-reflection would be 
more likely to underestimate their susceptibility to negative health conditions and 
overestimate their susceptibility to positive ones. 
To test Hypothesis 5, mean response key no (i.e., one’s perception of him/herself 
as not susceptible to a given health condition) for susceptibility to positive and negative 
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health conditions was computed. A canonical variate analysis42 was conducted to 
examine the number, if any, of the underlying composites between two sets of variables 
(individual differences and mean response key). The individual differences set included 
depression inventory, life orientation, health locus of control, psychological reactance, 
self reflection, self awareness, self consciousness, self efficacy, and self esteem. The 
response key set included mean no for susceptibility to positive and negative health 
conditions. 
The canonical variate analysis showed that the two sets of variables were related 
on at least one pair of variates (Pillais = .12, F = 2.27, p = .002). A dimension reduction 
analysis showed functions 1 through 2 were significant (Λ = .88, F = 2.28, p = .002), 
suggesting that the first pair of variates was related. The first canonical correlation was 
.30, with an eigenvalue of .10 explaining 77.66% of the variance. Functions 2 through 2 
in isolation were not significant (Λ = .97, F = 1.16, p = .320). 
With a cutoff correlation of .3, data on the first canonical variate showed that the 
individual difference variables that were correlated with the canonical variate were 
depression, life orientation, self consciousness, self efficacy, and self esteem. Among the 
response key variables, susceptibility to negative health conditions correlated with the 
first canonical variate. This pair of canonical variates indicated that those who scored low 
on depression inventory (-.75) and self consciousness (-.32), and were high on optimism 
(as measured by life orientation) (.71), self efficacy (.73), and self esteem (.83) were 
associated with underestimated perceptions of susceptibility to negative health conditions 
(.99) (Table 12). 
                                                 
42 Canonical correlation is a multivariate test used to analyze the relationships between two sets of variables 
(i.e., an independent variables set and a dependent variables set) (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). 
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Effects of prime, priming method, and valence of health condition on 
perceptions of susceptibility to health conditions. 
 
Experiment 1 tested the effects of prime and priming method as between-subjects 
factors, and valence of health condition as a within-subjects factor, on response key and 
reaction time to susceptibility to positive and negative health conditions. In response to 
whether one was susceptible (yes) or not (no) to positive (e.g., healthy weight) and 
negative (e.g., stroke) health conditions, it was predicted in Hypothesis 1 that participants 
would respond “yes” to positive health conditions and “no” to negative ones. Reaction 
times for “yes” responses to positive conditions would be faster than “no” responses. 
Reaction times for “no” responses to negative conditions would be faster than “yes” 
responses. Finally, it was predicted that these patterns would be stronger for participants 
in the self-prime condition than participants in the third-person and neutral conditions. 
No differences were predicted based on priming method (sub vs. supraliminal conditions) 
and conscious vs. unconscious conditions. 
(1) Effects on response key. A repeated measures analysis of variance was 
performed with prime and priming method as a between-subjects factor, and valence of 
health condition (positive, negative) as a within-subjects factor, to detect differences on 
mean count of no response key to health conditions (i.e., “no” signifies one’s perception 
of him/herself as not susceptible to a given health condition). Data were screened for fit 
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of underlying assumptions of normality of sampling distribution, homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicolinearity.43 
Using Wilks’ criterion, the interaction term between prime and priming method 
was not significant (F(2, 273) = .14, p = .868, ηp2 = .001). For the between-subjects 
factors, no statistically significant differences were found between conditions when 
response key count was averaged over primes (F(2, 273) = .83, p = .435, ηp2 = .006) or 
priming method (F(1, 273) = .33, p = .564, ηp2 = .001). When averaged over valence of 
health condition, however, response key was found to be significant (F(1, 273) = 
3445.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .927). As predicted, post hoc results indicated participants 
identified themselves as not susceptible to negative health conditions (M = .76) 
significantly more as compared to positive ones (M = .09) (p < .001) (Table 13). 
(2) Effects on reaction time combined for yes and no response key. Raw reaction 
time data for positive and negative health conditions fell between 237 and 71,543 
milliseconds. Data points below 300 milliseconds (n = 2) and above 5,000 milliseconds 
(n = 10) were deleted. Then, data points beyond 4 SD were considered outliers and 
deleted (n = 157), a total of 1.04% data points lost (See Table 14 for descriptive 
statistics). 
                                                 
43 Distribution of mean response key was not within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. 
Seventeen cases fell beyond Z.005. Six cases were considered multivariate outliers, which exceeded the 
critical chi-square value of χ2(.001, 2) = 13.81 but only one had a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of variances 
was assumed for dependent variables as evidenced by non-significant Levene’s tests (F(5, 273) = 1.04, p = 
.392 and F(5, 273) = 1.16, p = .329 for positive and negative conditions, respectively). Homogeneity of the 
variance –covariance matrices was assumed given equal n. Linearity of the relationship between the 
dependent variables was checked by plotting the two dependent variables. Correlation between two 
variables was -.16 (p < .01), which is not a threat to multicollinearity. 
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A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed with prime and priming 
method as between-subjects factors, and valence of health condition as a within-subjects 
factor, to detect differences on reaction time combined for yes and no response key. Mean 
reaction time was calculated for positive and negative health conditions. Data were 
screened for fit of underlying assumptions regarding normality of sampling distribution, 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicolinearity.44 
For the between-subjects factors, no statistically significant differences were 
found between conditions based on the prime (F(2, 273) = 1.16, p = .314, ηp2 = .008), 
priming method (F(1, 273) = 2.12, p = .146, ηp2 = .008), or their interaction (F(2, 273) = 
2.07, p = .128, ηp2 = .015). Mean reaction time was 968.27, 1006.93, and 974.98 for self, 
third-person, and neutral conditions, respectively. Averaged over priming method, mean 
reaction time to positive health conditions was 979.48 and 1,028.01 for subliminal and 
supraliminal priming conditions, respectively. For negative health conditions, mean 
reaction time was 954.99 and 970.50 for the subliminal and supraliminal priming 
conditions, respectively. 
Using Wilks’ criterion, there was a significant interaction between priming 
method and valence of health condition (F(1, 273) = 4.88, p = .028, ηp2 = .018). As a 
within-subjects factor, valence of health condition was significant (F(1, 273) = 34.56, p < 
                                                 
44 Distribution of reaction time within each condition was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness 
and kurtosis. Eight cases fell beyond Z.005. No cases exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 2) = 13.81. 
Homogeneity of variances was assumed for dependent variables as evidenced by non significant Levene’s 
tests (F(5, 273) = .53, p = .748 and F(5, 273) = .80, p = .547 for reaction time to positive and negative 
conditions, respectively). Box’s M test revealed no problems regarding the homogeneity of the variance-
covariance matrices (χ2 = 12.25, p = .677). Linearity of the relationship between the dependent variables 
was checked by plotting the two dependent variables. Variables were highly correlated (r = .80, p < .01), an 
expectation in multivariate analysis, and posed no problems. 
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.001, ηp2 = .112). As a follow up to a significant interaction, main effects, with alpha set 
to .025, revealed no differences between the two priming groups with valence of health 
condition held constant: positive (F(1, 277) = 3.80, p = .052) and negative (F(1, 277) = 
.55, p = .458) traits. Reaction time to positive health conditions was 979.48 and 1,028.01 
within the subliminal and supraliminal conditions, respectively. Reaction time to negative 
health conditions was 954.99 and 970.50 within the subliminal and supraliminal 
conditions, respectively. 
With priming method held constant, main effects revealed differences in reaction 
time to positive and negative health conditions within the subliminal (F(1, 277) = 6.79, p 
= .010) and supraliminal (F(1, 277) = 32.28, p < .001) conditions. Participants were 
slower in responding to positive health conditions compared to negative ones. This 
difference in reaction time was statistically significant at p = .011 within the subliminal 
condition and p < .001 within the supraliminal condition. In the subliminal priming 
condition, mean reaction time to positive health conditions was 979.48 and 954.99 to 
negative conditions. Similarly, in the supraliminal priming condition, mean reaction time 
to positive health conditions was 1,028.01 and 970.50 to negative ones (Figure 4).45 
(3) Effects on reaction time split by yes and no response key. A repeated 
measures analysis was performed with prime and priming method as between-subjects 
factors, and valence of health condition as a within-subjects factor, to detect differences 
                                                 
45 To control for familywise Type I error inflation, p values were set up at .0125 and .025 for two 
consecutive contrasts ranked from the smallest to biggest p values. 
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on reaction time split by yes and no response key.46 Mean reaction time was calculated 
for both yes and no responses to positive and negative health conditions. Data were 
screened for fit of underlying assumptions regarding normality of sampling distribution, 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicolinearity.47 
For the between-subjects factors, no statistically significant differences were 
found between conditions based on the prime (F(2, 142) = 2.18, p = .116, ηp2 = .030), 
priming method (F(1, 142) = 1.13, p = .289, ηp2 = .008), or their interaction (F(2, 142) = 
.90, p = .406, ηp2 = .013). The within-subjects factor, however, was significant (F(1.64, 
233.66) = 14.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .095).48 As predicted, pairwise comparisons, correcting 
for familywise Type I error, showed that participants perceived themselves as not 
susceptible to negative health conditions (M = 931.10) faster than being susceptible to 
negative (M = 1,023.29) and positive (M = 997.70) conditions. Participants also 
perceived themselves as not susceptible to negative conditions faster than they perceived 
themselves as not susceptible to positive ones (M = 1,051.96). All pairwise comparisons 
were significant at p < .001 (Figure 5).49 
                                                 
46 Reaction time split by yes and no response keys signifies reaction time for health conditions one 
identifies as likely to experience or is susceptible to (i.e., time to respond “yes”) and those one identifies as 
less likely to experience or is not susceptible to (i.e., time to respond “no”). 
 
47 Distribution of reaction time within each condition was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness 
and kurtosis. Fifteen cases fell beyond Z.005. One case exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 4) = 18.46. 
Homogeneity of variances was assumed for all four dependent variables. Box’s M test revealed no 
problems regarding the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 67.86, p = .104). Linearity 
of the relationship between the dependent variables was checked by plotting all pairs of dependent 
variables. Variables were moderately correlated, an expectation in multivariate analysis, and posed no 
problems. 
 
48 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 176.48, p < .001). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .54). 
 
49 This analysis was based on 148 cases with listwise deletion. 
 70
Effects of unconsciousness vs. consciousness on perceptions of susceptibility 
to health conditions. 
 
Performing an analysis on response key and reaction time data with consciousness 
(unconscious vs. conscious) as a between-subjects factor produced results similar to the 
ones reported above. For the purposes of this analysis, all six conditions involving a 
priming procedure were combined into a single unconscious condition and compared to a 
conscious condition, the seventh condition in this experiment. 
For mean count of no responses to health conditions (i.e., “no” signifies one’s 
perception of him/herself as not susceptible to a given health condition), valence of health 
condition (positive vs. negative health conditions) was a significant predictor of the 
dependent variable (F(1, 323) = 1832.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .850) whereas membership in 
the unconscious vs. conscious condition did not result in significant differences between 
the groups (F(1, 323) = 2.54, p = .112, ηp2 = .008) nor was the interaction term between 
valence of health condition and the between-subjects factor significant (F(1, 323) = .01, p 
= .910, ηp2 < .001).50 
The valence of the health condition (positive vs. negative health conditions) was a 
significant predictor of reaction time. Combined for yes and no responses, valence of 
health condition was significant (F(1, 323) = 11.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .035) whereas 
membership in unconscious vs. conscious group did not have an effect (F(1, 323) = 2.75, 
p = .098, ηp2 = .008) nor did the interaction term between the within- and between-
                                                 
50 Distribution of response key within each condition was not within the acceptable range of ±2 for 
skewness and kurtosis. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for dependent variables as evidenced by 
non-significant Levene’s tests (F(1, 323) = .01, p = .893 and F(1, 323) = .001, p = .980 for positive and 
negative conditions, respectively). With unequal n, Box’s M test revealed a problem regarding the 
homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 8.36, p = .042). 
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subjects factors (F(1, 323) = .91, p = .342, ηp2 = .003).51 Similarly, split by yes and no 
responses, valence of health condition was a significant predictor of reaction time 
(F(1.71, 280.85) = 8.07, p = .001, ηp2 = .047). On the contrary, membership in 
unconscious vs. conscious group did not have a significant effect (F(1, 164) = 3.02, p = 
.084, ηp2 = .018) nor did the interaction term between the within- and between-subjects 
factors (F(1.71, 280.85) = .94, p = .380, ηp2 = .006).52  
Finally, a semantic differential affect/arousal index (α = .84) was similar across 
experimental groups. The interaction term (F(2, 273) = .33, p = .715), prime (F(2, 273) = 
.84, p = .432), and priming method (F(1, 273) = .004, p = .947) were not significant. 
Measured at the end of experimental sessions, means were around the mid point of the 
semantic differential index: for the self (M = 1.51, SD = 1.40), third-person (M = 1.39, 
SD = 1.53), and neutral (M = 1.24, SD = 1.32) primes, averaged over prime conditions, 
and for the subliminal (M = 1.39, SD = 1.46) and supraliminal (M = 1.38, SD = 1.37) 
conditions, averaged over priming method conditions. Similarly, there were no 
differences when the unconscious conditions was compared to the conscious one (F(1, 
323) = .005, p = .945). Means were 1.38 (SD = 1.42) and 1.40 (SD = 1.66), respectively. 
                                                 
51 Distribution of reaction time within each condition was within the acceptable range for skewness and 
kurtosis. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for dependent variables as evidenced by non-significant 
Levene’s tests (F(1, 323) = 3.31, p = .070 and F(1, 323) = 2.67, p = .103 for positive and negative 
conditions, respectively). Box’s M test revealed no problems regarding the homogeneity of the variance-
covariance matrices (χ2 = 2.28, p = .523). 
 
52 Performed on 166 cases, distribution of reaction time within each condition was within the acceptable 
range for skewness and kurtosis. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for all dependent variables as 
evidenced by non-significant Levene’s tests. Box’s M test revealed no problems regarding the homogeneity 
of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 13.65, p = .256). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 180.93, p < .001). Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .51). 
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This indicated that any differences between the experimental groups should not be 
attributed to a differential affect/arousal status.53 
In sum, Experiment 1 provided partial support for Hypothesis 1. The 
hypothesized main effect of valence of health condition was supported whereas the main 
effect of self primes in biasing perceptions of susceptibility to health conditions was not. 
Consistent with the literature, no differences were found based on priming method (sub 
or supraliminal) (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Finally, no differences were found between 
the unconscious and conscious conditions in response key and reaction time as dependent 
variables. 
Replicating the results of Pilot Study 3, Experiment 1 showed that the valence of 
the health condition was a powerful predictor of response key and reaction time. 
Participants perceived themselves as not susceptible to negative (e.g., diabetes) as 
opposed to positive (e.g., healthy heart) health conditions. In terms of reaction times, 
participants responded faster to negative health conditions compared to positive ones. 
Further, not being susceptible to a negative health condition was the easiest of decisions 
participants had to make (as evidenced by faster reaction time).  In contrast, identifying 
oneself as being susceptible to negative and positive conditions as well as not being 
susceptible to positive conditions was more difficult (as evidenced by slower reaction 
time). 
Finally, Experiment 1 partially supported Hypothesis 5. As predicted, low levels 
of depression and self-consciousness, and high levels of optimism, self-efficacy, and self-
                                                 
53 The distribution of affect/arousal index for each condition was within the acceptable range of ±2 for 
skewness and kurtosis. Three cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. Equal variances were not assumed 
with prime and priming method as fixed factors (Levene’s test: F(2, 470) = 2.37 p = .038) but were 
assumed with conscious vs. unconscious as a factor (Levene’s test: F(1, 323) = 2.18 p = .140). 
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esteem were associated with underestimated perceptions of susceptibility to negative 
health conditions. Internal locus of control, psychological reactance, and self-reflection 
were not associated with underestimation of health risks as hypothesized. 
Experiment 2: Efficiency of underestimation of personal health risk perceptions 
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that underestimation of health risk perceptions 
is an efficient process, one that occurs when people are mentally taxed. The experiment 
was a 3 (prime: self-identity, third-person, neutral words) x 2 (cognitive load: high, low) 
between-subjects design. 
A total of 476 participants were recruited. They were randomly assigned to one of 
six experimental conditions. The majority of participants were females (n = 366, 76.9%) 
and right-handed (n = 428, 89.9%). Mean age was 21.68 (SD = 2.33). Participants were 
recruited for course credit (n = 225, 47.3%) or a $10 monetary incentive (n = 251, 
52.7%). 
Data for Experiment 2 included measures of individual differences (e.g., self-
efficacy) as well as response key and reaction time data for susceptibility to and severity 
of 50 health conditions. First, baseline measures are described. Second, descriptive 
statistics and reliability of individual difference variables are presented along with their 
effects on response key. Third, response key and reaction time data are analyzed to detect 
differences between the experimental conditions based on prime and cognitive load, the 
two manipulated variables in the study. 
Baseline measures. 
A series of univariate ANOVAs, with cognitive load and prime as fixed factors, 
showed no differences between the experimental groups on baseline (i.e., practice trial) 
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response key accuracy. They did differ, however, on baseline reaction time. For baseline 
response key accuracy, there were no differences between the experimental conditions in 
total correct response key as a dependent variable. The interaction term (F(2, 470) = .66, 
p = .514), cognitive load (F(1, 470) = .71, p = .399), and prime (F(2, 470) = .12, p = 
.884) were not significant. Participants in the self (M = 19.61, SD = 1.17), third-person 
(M = 19.72, SD = .89) and neutral (M = 19.60, SD = 1.39) conditions correctly identified 
practice-trial items as animals/non-animal. Averaged across cognitive load, means were 
19.59 (SD = 1.34) and 19.69 (SD = .96) for the high and low load conditions, 
respectively.54 
Raw baseline reaction time data fell between 303 and 10,905 milliseconds. Data 
points exceeding 5 seconds were excluded (n = 2). Then, data points that were 4 SD away 
from the mean were considered outliers and excluded (n = 87), a .91% total data points 
lost. A univariate ANOVA performed on log-transformed reaction time data showed the 
interaction term between cognitive load and prime (F(2, 470) = 1.16, p = .311) and 
cognitive load (F(1, 470) = .001, p = .974) were not significant.55 Mean reaction time for 
participants in the high load condition was 665.27 (SD = 1.12) whereas reaction time for 
those in the low load condition was 665.11 (SD = 1.13). 
There were significant differences, however, in baseline reaction time based on 
prime (F(2, 470) = 6.68, p = .001, ηp2 = .028). Post hoc analysis, corrected for familywise 
                                                 
54 Total correct response key was transformed using 1/(K-X) formula after which skewness and kurtosis 
were within the acceptable ±2. Ten cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. Equal variances were assumed 
as evidenced by a non-significant Levene’s test (F(5, 470) = 2.02, p = .073). 
 
55 The distribution of log-transformed reaction time data was within the acceptable range of ±2 for 
skewness and kurtosis within each experimental condition. Equal variances were assumed as evidenced by 
a non-significant Levene’s test (F(5, 470) = .77, p = .565). 
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Type I error inflation using the FDR approach, showed two significant differences. 
Participants in the self condition (M = 684.38, SD = 1.13) had significantly slower 
reaction time compared to those in the third-person (M = 655.39, SD = 1.12, p = .004) 
and neutral (M = 656.14, SD = 1.12, p = .005) conditions. 
Individual differences. 
Individual difference variables were screened for normality of distributions and 
outliers. There were no missing values (See Table 15 for descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix). 
Participants scored low on the depression inventory (M = 1.35, SD = .28, α = 
.83).56 Consistently, participants were optimistic, as measured by the life orientation test 
(M = 2.61, SD = .62, α = .82). 
Participants showed slightly high levels of internal health locus of control (M = 
3.79, SD = .50, α = .62). Consistent with the literature, results revealed health locus of 
control had two underlying factors, which explained 25.02% of the variance. 57 The first 
factor was related to internal locus of control whereas the second factor was related to 
                                                 
56 The reported reliability is for 20 items of the depression inventory. A weight loss item was excluded 
because it reduced the sample size from 476 to 159 (those who were trying to loose weight) with listwise 
deletion. When the weight loss item was included, reliability was .85 (N = 159). 
 
57 Evaluation of normality of distribution, outliers, and factorability were satisfactory. All variables were 
within the acceptable ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. Twenty-six cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. 
Multivariate outliers were checked using Mahalanobis distance. Five cases were above the critical value of 
chi-square (χ2(.001, 11) = 31.26) but did not have a large Cook’s D value, which suggested they were not 
influential on the solution. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy revealed there was 
a degree of common variance appropriate for conducting a factor analysis (KMO = .73). Each item’s 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was greater than .60, with the lowest being .65. Accordingly, all 
items were retained for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated the correlation matrix is 
factorable (χ2 = 611.81, p < .001). The initial solution indicated there were two factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1. Similarly, Catell’s criterion for the scree plot suggested that there might be two factors. With 
the extraction of two factors, there were 13 (23.0%) non-redundant residuals with absolute values greater 
than .05. 
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external locus of control. Based on the analysis, five items reflected internal locus of 
control (α = .67), and six items reflected external locus of control (α = .56), with a 
correlation of .13 between the two factors (See Table 10 for factor loadings, factor 
correlation, and internal reliability statistics). 
Participants were slightly reactant (M = 3.00, SD = .45, α = .78). Psychological 
reactance was positively correlated with self-consciousness and negatively with self-
efficacy and self-esteem. 
Participants’ scores were roughly at the mid point of the self-consciousness scale 
(M = 2.49, SD = .39, α = .78). Results revealed self-consciousness had three underlying 
factors, which explained 31.59% of the variance.58 The first factor was related to social 
anxiety (e.g., “I feel anxious when I speak in front of people”). The second was related to 
public self (e.g., “I’m concerned about what other people think of me”). The third factor 
was related to private self (e.g., “I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings”). Private 
self was further broken down to two subscales: self-reflection and self-awareness, which 
explained 34.44% of the variance, with a correlation of .42. Self-reflection included four 
items such as “I reflect about myself a lot” (M = 2.72, SD = .66, α = .69). Self-awareness 
included four items such as “I’m alert to changes in my mood” (M = 2.92, SD = .48, α = 
                                                 
58 Evaluations of normality of distribution, outliers, and factorability were satisfactory. All individual items 
were within the acceptable ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. One hundred and sixty seven cases exceeded the 
critical value of Z.005. Ten cases exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 23) = 49.72 but did not have large 
Cook’s D values. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy revealed there was a degree 
of common variance and hence the sample was appropriate for conducting a Principal Axis Factoring 
(KMO = .81). Additionally, each item’s Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was greater than .60, with 
the lowest being .67. Accordingly, all items were retained for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
indicated the correlation matrix is factorable (χ2 = 2590.39, p < .001). The initial solution indicated there 
were five factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Catell’s criterion for the scree plot suggested that there 
might be three factors. With the extraction of three factors, there were 59 (23.0%) non-redundant residuals 
with absolute values greater than 0.05. 
 77
.60) (See Table 16 for factor loadings, factor correlation, and internal reliability 
statistics). 
Finally, participants scored high on self efficacy (M = 3.66, SD = .46, α = .84) 
and self esteem (M = 3.08, SD = .44, α = .86). 
Relationship between individual differences and response key. In Hypothesis 4, 
it was predicted that participants would overestimate their susceptibility to highly 
prevalent health conditions with which they have had personal experience and 
underestimate their susceptibility to controllable health conditions, and ones for which 
exempt beliefs and stereotypes of a typical person who suffers the health condition were 
salient. In Hypothesis 5, it was predicted that participants high on self-efficacy, internal 
locus of control, self-esteem, psychological reactance, dispositional optimism, and self-
reflection would be more likely to underestimate their susceptibility to and severity of 
negative health conditions and overestimate their susceptibility to positive ones. 
To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, mean response key no for both susceptibility to (i.e., 
one’s perception of him/herself as not susceptible to a given health condition) and 
severity of (i.e., one’s perception of a given health condition as not severe if s/he 
experiences it) three clusters of health conditions was computed (based on Pilot Study 1). 
A canonical variate analysis was conducted to examine the number, if any, of the 
underlying composites between two sets of variables (individual differences and mean 
response key) and their nature. The individual differences set included depression 
inventory, life orientation, health locus of control, psychological reactance, self 
reflection, self awareness, self consciousness, self efficacy, and self esteem. The response 
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key set included mean response key no to susceptibility and severity of three health 
condition clusters. 
The canonical variate analysis showed that the two sets of variables were related 
on at least one pair of variates (Pillais= .20, F= 1.79, p < .001). A dimension reduction 
analysis showed functions 1 through 6 were significant (Λ = .81, F = 1.80, p < .001), and 
functions 2 through 6 were significant (Λ = .88, F = 1.43, p = .039), suggesting that two 
pairs of variates were related. The first canonical correlation was .28, with an eigenvalue 
of .08 explaining 41.44% of the variance. The second canonical correlation was .23, with 
an eigenvalue of .05 explaining 26.67% of the variance. 
With a cutoff correlation of .3, data on the first canonical variate showed the 
individual differences variables that were correlated with the canonical variate were 
depression, self esteem, life orientation, self-consciousness, self-efficacy, and health 
locus of control. Among the response key variables, susceptibility to Cluster 2 and 3 
health conditions correlated with the first canonical variate. This pair of canonical 
variates indicated that those who were depressed (.84) and self conscious (.46), and low 
on self esteem (-.67), life orientation (-.60), self efficacy (-.46), and health locus of 
control (-.40) were associated with increased perceived susceptibility to Cluster 2 health 
conditions (e.g., diabetes, heart failure) (-.64) and Cluster 3 health conditions (e.g., flu, 
diarrhea) (-.34). 
Data on the second canonical variate showed that those who were low on life 
orientation (-.38) and who were self conscious (.33) were associated with decreased 
perceived severity of Cluster 1 health conditions (e.g., brain tumors) (.31) and 
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susceptibility to Cluster 3 health conditions (e.g., flu) (.32) but increased severity of 
health conditions in Cluster 3 (-.78) (Table 17). 
Effects of prime and cognitive load on susceptibility to and severity of health 
conditions. 
 
Anchored between 1 = extremely easy and 9 = extremely difficult, a manipulation 
check confirmed participants in the high cognitive load perceived memorizing an 8-digit 
number as more difficult (M = 4.06, SD = 1.88) compared to participants in the low load 
condition (M = 1.67, SD = .97) who memorized a 2-digit number (t(356.19) = 17.37, p < 
.001).59 
Participants in the low load condition recalled the four numbers with 100% (n = 
238), 99.6% (n = 237), 98.7% (n = 235), and 97.1% (n = 231) success across the four 
blocks. Participants in the high load had a lower success rate at 81.1% (n = 193), 78.2% 
(n = 186), 74.4% (n = 177), and 77.7% (n = 185). Inclusion of response key and reaction 
time data in the analysis was contingent upon successful recall of the number to ensure 
the cognitive load manipulation was at work. 
In response to whether one were susceptible (yes) or not (no) to negative health 
conditions and whether these conditions would be severe (yes) or not (no) if one 
experienced them, it was predicted in Hypothesis 2a that participants would respond “no” 
when primed with self-identity words and when under high cognitive load. Reaction 
times for “no” responses would be faster than “yes” responses. It was predicted in 
                                                 
59 Distribution of the dependent variable was within the acceptable range of ± 2 for each condition except 
for the kurtosis in the low cognitive load condition. Equal variances were not assumed as evidenced by a 
significant Levene’s test (F(1, 474) = 127.08, p < .001). 
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Hypothesis 2b that these patterns would be stronger for participants in the self-prime 
condition when under high (as opposed to low) cognitive load. 
(1) Effects of prime and cognitive load on response key. Six univariate ANOVAs 
were performed with cognitive load and prime as fixed factors.60 Dependent variables 
were mean response key yes for susceptibility to and severity of three health condition 
clusters61 (Table 18). 
Cluster 1 health conditions. Perceived susceptibility to Cluster 1 health conditions 
(e.g., brain tumors) was affected by the prime (F(2, 470) = 4.75, p = .009, ηp2 = .020) but 
not by cognitive load (F(1, 470) = .05, p = .824, ηp2 < .001) nor the interaction term 
between the prime and load (F(2, 470) = .45, p = .632, ηp2 = .002).62 As predicted, 
pairwise comparisons, adjusted for familywise Type I error using the FDR approach, 
showed that participants in the self condition significantly underestimated the likelihood 
of contracting Cluster 1 health conditions (M = .14) compared to the neutral condition (M 
= .23) (p = .006). The third-person condition (M = .19) was not statistically different from 
either the self (p = .230) or neutral (p = .322) conditions. Means were .18 for the high 
cognitive load condition and .19 for the low condition (Figure 6). 
                                                 
60 A decision in favor of a series of univariate over multivariate analysis of variance was made because 
multivariate analysis of variance best suits dependent variables that are highly negatively correlated or 
moderately correlated |.6| in either direction. MANOVA is considered wasteful if the variables are not 
correlated or are highly positively correlated (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). The correlations between mean 
response key to susceptibility and severity of health condition clusters included a mix of uncorrelated, 
highly and moderately positively correlated variables. 
 
61 Mean response key yes for susceptibility to health condition clusters signifies one’s perception of 
him/herself as susceptible to health conditions that belonged to a given cluster. Mean response key yes for 
severity of health condition clusters signifies one’s perception of health conditions that belonged to a given 
cluster as severe if s/he experiences it. 
 
62 Distribution of response key was within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis within each load 
and prime condition. Twelve cases exceeded critical value of Z.005. Homogeneity of variances was assumed 
given equal n although Levene’s test was significant (F(5, 470) = 4.69, p < .001). 
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As for the severity of Cluster 1 health conditions, the analysis showed that 
perceived severity was affected by the interaction term between cognitive load and prime 
(F(2, 470) = 4.77, p = .009, ηp2 = .020), and load (F(1, 470) = 46.15, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.089), but not by the prime (F(2, 470) = .86, p = .422, ηp2 = .004).63 
As a follow up to a significant interaction, main effects, with alpha set to .025, 
showed that within the high cognitive load condition, prime conditions were not 
statistically different from each other (F(2, 470) = 1.12, p = .327). Means were .54, .60, 
and .55 for the self, third-person, and neutral conditions, respectively. Within the low 
cognitive load condition, primes were statistically different (F(2, 470) = 4.51, p = .011). 
Pairwise comparisons, adjusted for familywise Type I error using the FDR approach, 
showed participants in the third-person condition (M = .66) significantly underestimated 
the severity of the diseases compared to those in the neutral condition (M = .79) (p = 
.003). Means for the self condition (M = .74) was not statistically different from those in 
the third-person (p = .058) or neutral (p = .821) conditions. 
Further, cognitive load conditions differed significantly from each other within 
the self (F(1, 470) = 22.62, p < .001) and neutral (F(1, 470) = 31.08, p < .001) conditions 
but not within the third-person (F(1, 470) = 2.07, p = .150) condition. As predicted, 
pairwise comparisons, adjusted for familywise Type I error, showed participants primed 
with self-identity words underestimated the severity of Cluster 1 health conditions when 
under high load (M = .54) compared to those under low load (M = .74) (p < .001). 
Similarly, participants primed with neutral words underestimated the severity of diseases 
                                                 
63 Distribution of response key was within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis with each 
experimental condition. No case exceeded critical value of Z.005. Homogeneity of variances was assumed 
given equal n although Levene’s test was significant (F(5, 470) = 13.53, p < .001). 
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when under high (M = .55) as opposed to low (M = .79) cognitive load (p < .001). 
Finally, participants’ perceived severity of diseases did not differ under high (M = .60) 
and low (M = .66) conditions when primed with third-person words (p = .150) (Figure 7). 
Cluster 2 health conditions. For susceptibility and severity to Cluster 2 health 
conditions, and susceptibility to Cluster 3 health conditions, cognitive load had an effect 
whereas the prime and the interaction term between cognitive load and prime did not 
have an effect. Perceived susceptibility to Cluster 2 health conditions (e.g., asthma, 
allergies) were different based on cognitive load (F(1, 470) = 5.09, p = .024, ηp2 = .011) 
but not by prime (F(2, 470) = 2.53, p = .081, ηp2 = .011) or load and prime interaction 
(F(2, 470) = 1.10, p = .333, ηp2 = .005).64 As predicted, participants in the high cognitive 
load condition underestimated the likelihood of contracting Cluster 2 health conditions 
(M = .28) compared to those in the low load condition (M = .32) (p = .024) (Figure 8). 
Similarly, cognitive load had a significant effect on perceived severity of Cluster 
2 health conditions (F(1, 470) = 51.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .099) whereas the prime (F(2, 470) 
= 2.68, p = .069, ηp2 = .011) and the interaction term between load and prime (F(2, 470) = 
2.03, p = .132, ηp2 = .009) did not have an effect.65 As predicted, participants in the high 
cognitive load condition underestimated the severity of Cluster 2 health conditions (M = 
.39) compared to those in the low load condition (M = .53) (p < .001) (Figure 9). 
                                                 
64 Distribution of response key was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness and kurtosis within each 
condition. Six cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. Homogeneity of variances was assumed given 
equal n. Levene’s test was not significant (F(5, 470) = 1.89, p = .094). 
 
65 Distribution of response key was within the acceptable range of ±2 within each condition. No case 
exceeded Z.005. Homogeneity of variances was assumed given equal n although Levene’s test was 
significant (F(5, 470) = 4.01, p < .001). 
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Cluster 3 health conditions. Finally, perceived susceptibility to Cluster 3 health 
conditions (e.g., flu) was significantly different across the cognitive load conditions (F(1, 
470) = 20.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .043) but not across prime conditions (F(2, 470) = .91, p = 
.403, ηp2 = .004). The interaction term between cognitive load and prime was not 
significant (F(2, 470) = .02, p = .974, ηp2 < .001).66 As predicted, participants in the high 
load conditions significantly underestimated the likelihood of contracting Cluster 3 health 
conditions (M = .53) compared to those in the low load condition (M = .65) (p < .001) 
(Figure 10). Perceived severity, on the other hand, was similar across cognitive load and 
prime conditions. The interaction term (F(2, 470) = .48, p = .617, ηp2 = .002), cognitive 
load (F(1, 470) = 2.22, p = .137, ηp2 .005), and prime (F(2, 470) = 1.04, p = .354, ηp2 = 
.004) did not affect perceived severity of Cluster 3 health conditions67 (Figure 11). 
If alpha were set at .008 (for six univariate analyses) to correct for familywise 
Type I error, cognitive load would be the sole factor causing participants to underestimate 
the severity of Cluster 1 and 2 health conditions and susceptibility to Cluster 3 health 
conditions.  
(2) Effects of prime and cognitive load on reaction time combined for yes and 
no responses. 
  
Susceptibility reaction time. A repeated measures analysis of variance was 
performed with prime and cognitive load as between-subjects factors, and reaction time 
                                                 
66 Distribution of response key was within the acceptable range of ±2 within each condition. No case 
exceeded Z.005. Homogeneity of variances was assumed given equal n although Levene’s test was 
significant (F(5, 470) = 3.75, p = .002). 
 
67 Distribution of response key was within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis. Fourteen cases 
exceeded Z.005. Homogeneity of variances was assumed given equal n. Levene’s test was not significant 
(F(5, 470) = 1.45, p = .203). 
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for susceptibility to Cluster 1, 2, and 3 health conditions as a repeated measure, to detect 
differences on reaction time combined for the yes and no response key. Mean reaction 
time was calculated for each of three health condition clusters. Data were screened for fit 
of underlying assumptions regarding normality of sampling distribution, homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicolinearity.68 
For the between-subjects factors, no statistically significant differences were 
found between conditions based on the prime (F(2, 452) = 2.43, p = .088, ηp2 = .011), or 
the interaction term between prime and cognitive load (F(2, 452) = .663, p = .516, ηp2 = 
.003). Mean reaction time was 1,069.05, 1,047.12, and 1,018.59 for participants in the 
self, third-person, and neutral conditions, respectively. There were differences, however, 
based on cognitive load (F(1, 452) = 11.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .024). Pairwise comparisons 
show that reaction time in the high cognitive load condition (M = 1,076.46) was 
significantly slower than those in the low load condition (M = 1,013.91) (p = .001) 
(Figure 12). 
Within-subjects effects showed a significant 3-way interaction between prime, 
cognitive load, and repeated measure (i.e., reaction time for susceptibility to Clusters 1, 2, 
and 3) (F(2.84, 642.79) = 3.10, p = .028, ηp2 = .014).69 As a follow up to a significant 3-
way interaction, simple interaction effects showed reaction time was different for health 
                                                 
68 Distribution of reaction time was within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis within each 
condition. Twelve cases fell beyond Z.005. Three cases exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 3) = 16.26. 
Homogeneity of variances was assumed for dependent variables as evidenced by non significant Levene’s 
tests (F(5, 452) = .75, p = .586, F(5, 452) = 2.156, p = .058, and F(5, 452) = .249, p = .940 for Clusters 1, 
2, and 3, respectively). Box’s M test revealed a problem regarding the homogeneity of the variance-
covariance matrices (χ2 = 46.52, p = .033). Linearity of the relationship between the dependent variables 
was checked by plotting all pairs of dependent variables. Variables were highly correlated and posed no 
problems. 
 
69 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 235.18, p < .001). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .71). 
 85
condition clusters only for participants primed with self-identity words when under high 
cognitive load (F(2, 904) = 3.78, p = .023). Mean reaction times were 1,117.89 for 
Cluster 1 health conditions, 1,097.99 for Cluster 2 health conditions, and 1,065.12 for 
Cluster 3 health conditions. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons did not show statistical 
differences in reaction time by health condition cluster. Running three paired-tests, 
however, revealed that reaction time to Cluster 1 health conditions was significantly 
slower compared to reaction time to Cluster 3 health conditions (t(71) = 2.09, p = .040). 
Reaction time to Cluster 1 was not different from reaction time to Cluster 2 (t(71) = 1.52, 
p = .132). Reaction time did not differ between Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 health conditions 
(t(71) = 1.56, p = .121). 
All other simple interactions were not significant: Reaction time to health 
condition clusters did not differ for participants primed with third-person (F(2, 904) = 
1.89, p = .152) or neutral (F(2, 904) = .90, p = .910) when under high load. Similarly, 
reaction time to health condition clusters did not differ for participants primed with self-
identity (F(2, 904) = 1.33, p = .265), third-person (F(2, 904) = 1.36, p = .257), or neutral 
(F(2, 904) = .32, p = .728) words when under low cognitive load. 
Severity reaction time. A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed 
with prime and cognitive load as between-subjects factors, and reaction time for severity 
of Cluster 1, 2, and 3 health conditions as a repeated measure, to detect differences on 
reaction time combined for the yes and no response key. Mean reaction time was 
calculated for each of the three health condition clusters. Data were screened for fit of 
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underlying assumptions regarding normality of sampling distribution, homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicolinearity.70 
For the between-subjects factors, reaction time to health condition clusters 
differed based on the interaction term between prime and load (F(2, 446) = 3.15, p = 
.044, ηp2 = .014), and the prime (F(2, 446) = 3.10, p = .046, ηp2 = .014) but not by 
cognitive load (F(1, 446) = 2.19, p = .139, ηp2 = .005). As a follow up to a significant 
interaction, simple effects set at .01 for five simple effects, showed that cognitive load 
conditions were statistically different within the neutral prime condition (F(3, 444) = 
3.67, p = .012) but not within the third-person (F(3, 444) = .45, p = .713) or self (F(3, 
444) = 2.34, p = .073) prime conditions. Mean reaction time averaged across all health 
condition clusters was 1,035.14 in the high load and 959.40 in the low load condition for 
participants primed with neutral words (p = .004). For those primed with third-person 
words, reaction time was 1,039.92 and 1,016.24 in the high and low conditions, 
respectively. For those primed with self-identity words, reaction time was 1,032.76 and 
1,059.25 in the high and low conditions, respectively. 
Effects of the primes were evident within the low cognitive load (F(6, 888) = 
2.94, p = .007) but not the high load (F(6, 888) = 1.89, p = .076) conditions. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that participants in the self condition (M = 1,059.25) were 
significantly slower than those in the neutral condition (M = 959.40) (p = .001) but did 
                                                 
70 Distribution of reaction time was within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis within each 
condition. Thirty cases fell beyond Z.005. Four cases exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 3) = 16.26 but did 
not have a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for Cluster 1 (F(5, 446) = .30, p = .909) 
and Cluster 2 (F(5, 446) = .97, p = .430) health conditions but not for Cluster 3 (F(5, 446) = 3.09, p = .009). 
Box’s M test revealed a problem regarding the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 
74.26, p < .001). Linearity of the relationship between the dependent variables was checked by plotting all 
pairs of dependent variables. Variables were highly correlated and posed no problems. 
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not differ from those primed with third-person words (M = 1,016.24) (p = .346). The 
latter group did not differ from the neutral condition either (p = .097) (Figure 13). 
Within-subjects effects show a significant interaction between prime and repeated 
measure (i.e., reaction time for severity of Cluster 1, 2, and 3 health conditions) (F(3.095, 
892) = 3.26, p = .020, ηp2 = .014).71 As a follow up to a significant interaction, simple 
interaction effects showed reaction time was different for health condition clusters within 
the self (F(2, 989) = 18.00, p < .001) and neutral (F(2, 898) = 3.57, p = .029) prime 
conditions but not within the third-person condition (F(2, 898) = 2.96, p = .052). Within 
the self-prime condition, pairwise comparisons showed that reaction time to Cluster 3 
health conditions (M = 1,006.93) was significantly faster than Cluster 2 (M = 1,083.92) (p 
< .001) and Cluster 1 (M = 1,051.96) (p = .004). Reaction time to Cluster 1 was 
significantly faster than Cluster 2 (p = .002). Similarly, within the neutral-prime 
condition, reaction time to Cluster 1 health conditions (M = 986.27) was significantly 
faster than reaction time to Cluster 2 (M= 1,013.91) (p = .006). However, reaction time to 
Cluster 1 was not different from Cluster 3 (M = 990.83). Cluster 2 was also not 
significantly different from reaction time to Cluster 3. 
Susceptibility – severity relationship. 
A closer look at Table 18 showed an inverted relationship between perceived 
susceptibility to a disease and perceived severity. For Cluster 1 health conditions (e.g., 
brain tumors), the mean perceived susceptibility (i.e., response key yes signifies one’s 
perception s/he was susceptible to health conditions that belonged to a given cluster) was 
.19 whereas perceived severity (i.e., response key yes signifies one’s perception health 
                                                 
71 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 153.87, p < .001). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .77). 
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conditions that belonged to a given cluster would be severe if s/he experienced it) was 
.64. On the contrary, mean perceived susceptibility to Cluster 3 health conditions (e.g., 
flu) was .59 with .14 severity. Perceived susceptibility to and severity of Cluster 2 health 
conditions (e.g., diabetes) fell in between Clusters 1 and 2, with perceived susceptibility 
at .30 and severity at .46 (Figure 14).  
Similarly, a closer look at Table 19 showed differences in reaction time of 
susceptibility to and severity of health condition clusters. For Clusters 1 and 2, 
participants were faster dismissing the possibility that they were at risk for these health 
conditions than acknowledging they were. For severity, participants were faster 
acknowledging that Cluster 1 and 2 health conditions were severe than dismissing that 
they were not. Reaction time to Cluster 3 showed a reverse pattern. Participants were 
faster acknowledging they were at risk for these health conditions than dismissing they 
were not. For severity, participants were faster dismissing Cluster 3 health conditions 
were not severe than acknowledging they were (Figure 15). 
To further probe the relationship between susceptibility and severity to different 
health condition clusters, mean reaction time was computed for the susceptibility to and 
severity of each health conditions cluster split by yes and no response key. Three repeated 
measures analyses of variance were performed, one for each cluster with four dependent 
variables, as a repeated measure: mean reaction time for susceptibility to health 
conditions cluster for (1) yes, and (2) no response keys, and mean reaction time for 
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severity of health conditions cluster for (3) yes, and (4) no response keys.72 Cognitive 
load and primes were fixed factors. 
Cluster 1. Results for Cluster 1 showed the two fixed factors, load (F(1, 249) = 
.61, p = .435, ηp2 = .002) and prime (F(2, 249) = 2.38, p = .094, ηp2 = .019), and their 
interaction (F(2, 249) = .76, p = .466, ηp2 = .006) did not have an effect.73 The repeated 
measure, however, had an effect (F(2.862, 712.717) = 44.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .151).74 
Pairwise comparisons, adjusted for familywise Type I error, showed participants were 
slower in acknowledging they were susceptible to Cluster 1 health conditions (M = 
1,250.25) than dismissing they were not (M = 1,180.32) (p = .024). On the contrary, 
participants were significantly faster acknowledging Cluster 1 health conditions were 
severe (M = 1,028.01) than dismissing they were not severe (M = 1,191.24) (p < .001). 
Further, participants were significantly slower in acknowledging they were susceptible to 
Cluster 1 health conditions than acknowledging these health conditions were severe (p < 
.001). And, participants were significantly slower in dismissing they were not susceptible 
                                                 
72 Reaction time for susceptibility split by yes and no response keys signifies reaction time for health 
conditions one identifies as likely to experience or is susceptible to (i.e., time to respond “yes”) and those 
one identifies as less likely to experience or is not susceptible to (i.e., time to respond “no”). For severity, 
reaction time split by yes and no response keys signifies reaction time for health conditions one identifies as 
severe if s/he experiences it (i.e., time to respond “yes”) and those one identifies as not severe (i.e., time to 
respond “no”). 
 
73 Distribution of reaction time was within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis within each 
condition. Twenty-three cases fell beyond Z.005. Two cases exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 4) = 18.46 
but did not have a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for all dependent variables 
except severity for response key yes (F(5, 249) = 2.55, p = .028). Box’s M test revealed a problem 
regarding the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 109.92, p < .001). Linearity of the 
relationship between the dependent variables was checked by plotting all pairs of dependent variables. 
Variables were moderately correlated. 
 
74 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 18.41, p < .001). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .95). 
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to Cluster 1 health conditions than acknowledging the health conditions were severe (p < 
.001) (Figure 16). 
Cluster 2. Results for Cluster 2 showed that load (F(1, 420) = 6.46, p = .011, ηp2 
= .015) had an effect on reaction time whereas prime (F(2, 420) = 2.34, p = .097, ηp2 = 
.011) and the interaction between load and prime (F(2, 420) = 1.76, p = .172, ηp2 = .008) 
did not.75 Pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the high load condition (M = 
1,104.07) were significantly slower than those in the low load (M = 1,059.25) (p = .011). 
The repeated measures results showed that reaction time to susceptibility and 
severity split by response key as a repeated measure, had an effect (F(2.850, 1197.155) = 
25.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .056). Further, there were two significant interactions between 
reaction time and cognitive load (F(2.850, 1197.155) = 3.97, p = .009, ηp2 = .009) and 
between reaction time and prime (F(5.701, 1197.155) = 2.33, p = .033, ηp2 = .011).76 As a 
follow up to significant interactions, simple effects, with alpha set at .025 for cognitive 
load and .016 for primes, showed that reaction time differed within both high (F(3, 1272) 
= 15.16, p < .001) and low (F(3, 1272) = 13.44, p < .001) load conditions. Within the 
high cognitive load condition, pairwise comparisons, adjusted for familywise Type I 
error, showed three significant differences. Participants were significantly slower in 
acknowledging they were susceptible to Cluster 2 health conditions (M = 1,153.45) than 
                                                 
75 Distribution of reaction time was within the acceptable range of ± 2 for skewness and kurtosis within 
each condition. Twenty-nine cases fell beyond Z.005. Eight cases exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 4) = 
18.46 but did not have a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for all dependent 
variables. Box’s M test revealed a problem regarding the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices 
(χ2 = 91.99, p < .001). Linearity of the relationship between the dependent variables was checked by 
plotting all pairs of dependent variables. Variables were moderately correlated. 
 
76 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2 = 31.64, p < .001). 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .95). 
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acknowledging these health conditions were severe (M = 1,039.92) (p < .001). On the 
contrary, participants were slower in dismissing the health conditions were not severe (M 
= 1,116.86) than acknowledging they were (p < .001). Finally, participants were slower 
in dismissing they were not susceptible to Cluster 2 health conditions (M = 1,111.73) 
than acknowledging the health conditions were severe (p = .002). 
Within the low cognitive load condition, there were four significant differences. 
Participants were significantly slower in acknowledging they were susceptible to Cluster 
2 health conditions (M = 1,099.00) than dismissing they were not (M = 1,025.65) (p < 
.001) and that the health conditions were severe (M = 1,028.01) (p < .001). On the 
contrary, participants were significantly slower in dismissing the health conditions as not 
severe (M = 1,091.44) than acknowledging they were (p < .001) and that one was not 
susceptible to them (p < .001). 
Within the prime conditions, reaction time was significantly different within the 
self (F(3, 1269) = 8.15, p < .001), third-person (F(3, 1269) = 4.36, p = .005), and neutral 
(F(3, 1269) = 16.90, p < .001) conditions. Within the self-prime condition, pairwise 
comparisons showed three significant differences. Participants were significantly slower 
in acknowledging they were susceptible to Cluster 2 health conditions (M = 1,153.45) 
than dismissing they were not (M = 1,073.98) (p = .001) and that the health conditions 
were severe (M = 1,073.98) (p = .001). On the contrary, dismissing the health conditions 
as not severe (M = 1,132.40) was significantly slower that acknowledging they were (p = 
.023). 
Within the third-person prime condition, pairwise comparisons showed two 
significant differences. Participants were significantly slower in acknowledging they 
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were susceptible to Cluster 2 health conditions (M = 1,106.62) than acknowledging these 
health conditions were severe (M = 1,044.72) (p = .002). The latter was significantly 
faster than dismissing these health conditions as not severe (M = 1,096.47) (p = .020). 
Finally, within the neutral-prime condition, pairwise comparisons showed three 
significant differences. Participants were significantly slower in acknowledging they 
were susceptible to Cluster 2 health conditions (M = 1,114.29) or dismissing they were 
not (M = 1,069.05) than acknowledging these health conditions were severe (M = 984.01) 
(p < .001, for each comparison). Further, dismissing the health conditions as not severe 
(M = 1,086.42) was significantly slower than acknowledging they were (p < .001) (Figure 
17). 
Cluster 3. Results for Cluster 3 showed that both the interaction term between 
load and prime (F(2, 202) = 3.64, p = .028, ηp2 = .035) and load (F(1, 202) = 5.87, p = 
.016, ηp2 = .028) had an effect on reaction time whereas prime (F(2, 202) = .59, p = .554, 
ηp2 = .006) did not.77 As a follow up to a significant interaction, simple effects, with alpha 
set at .01, showed that cognitive load had an effect within the neutral prime (F(4, 199) = 
3.43, p = .010) but not with the self (F(4, 199) = 2.30, p = .059) or third-person (F(4, 
199) = .19, p = .938) conditions. Primes did not have an effect with the low (F(8, 398) = 
1.32, p = .229) or high (F(8, 398) = .79, p = .603) cognitive load conditions. Pairwise 
comparisons for reaction time within the neutral condition did not reveal any significant 
                                                 
77 Distribution of reaction time was within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis within each 
condition. Thirty-two cases fell beyond Z.005. One case exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 4) = 18.46 but 
did not have a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for all dependent variables. Box’s 
M test revealed no problems regarding the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 62.90, p 
= .165). Linearity of the relationship between the dependent variables was checked by plotting all pairs of 
dependent variables. Variables were moderately correlated. 
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differences. Performing paired t tests, however, showed that acknowledging one was 
susceptible to Cluster 3 health conditions (M = 1,020.93) was significantly faster than 
dismissing one was not (M = 1,091.44) (p = .025). Further, dismissing the health 
conditions as not severe (M = 1,016.24) was significantly faster than dismissing one was 
not susceptible to them (p = .012) (Figure 18). 
It is noteworthy that a semantic differential affect/arousal averaged index (α = 
.85) was similar across experimental groups. The interaction term (F(2, 470) = .59, p = 
.554), cognitive load (F(1, 470) = .27, p = .603), and prime (F(2, 470) = .01, p = .981) 
were not significant. Measured at the end of experimental sessions, means were around 
the mid point of the semantic differential index: for the self (M = .79, SD = 1.65), third-
person (M = .78, SD = 1.44), and neutral (M = .81, SD = 1.66) primes, averaged over 
prime conditions, and for the high (M = .76, SD = 1.52) and low (M = .83, SD = 1.64) 
load, averaged over cognitive load conditions. This indicated that any differences 
between the experimental groups were not attributed to a differential affect/arousal 
status.78 
In sum, Experiment 2 provided partial support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
regarding the effects of self primes and cognitive load and their interaction on biasing 
risk perceptions. As predicted in Hypothesis 2a, main effects for self primes were evident 
for susceptibility to Cluster 1 health conditions. Main effects for cognitive load were 
evident for susceptibility to Clusters 2 and 3 and severity of Cluster 2 conditions. As 
                                                 
78 The distribution of affect/arousal index was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness and kurtosis 
for each condition. Forty-six cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. Equal variances were not assumed as 
evidenced by a significant Levene’s test (F(2, 470) = 2.37 p = .038). 
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predicted in Hypothesis 2b, self primes and high cognitive load interacted to bias severity 
of Cluster 1 health conditions downward. 
In terms of response key, participants primed with self-identity words 
underestimated the likelihood of experiencing Cluster 1 health conditions (e.g., brain 
tumors), the only significant effect of self primes on biasing risk perceptions. Participants 
who memorized an 8-digit number (i.e., high cognitive load) underestimated the 
likelihood of experiencing Cluster 2 (e.g., allergies, diabetes) and 3 (e.g., flu) health 
conditions and the severity of Cluster 2 health conditions. Further, participants primed 
with self-identity words underestimated the severity of Cluster 1 health conditions but 
only when under high cognitive load, in support of the interaction hypothesis (H2b). 
These effects, however, were not evident for Clusters 2 and 3 health conditions. 
In terms of susceptibility reaction times, participants in the self-identity words 
condition had slow reaction times to Cluster 1 health conditions compared to Cluster 3 
when they were under high cognitive load. For severity reaction time, participants in the 
self prime condition responded faster to Cluster 3, followed by Cluster 1, and 2 health 
conditions. Reaction times were slower in the high cognitive load compared to the low 
load condition. 
Experiment 2 fully supported Hypothesis 4. Participants underestimated their 
susceptibility to Cluster 1 (e.g., leukemia, HPV) and 2 (e.g., allergies, diabetes) health 
conditions, which were perceived to be of low and moderate prevalence, salience, 
controllability, exempt beliefs, and personal experience. In contrast, they overestimated 
their susceptibility to Cluster 3 health conditions (e.g., flu, stress) that were scored high 
on these health risk characteristics variables. 
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Although no predictions were made regarding perceptions of severity based on 
health risk characteristics, Experiment 2 revealed an inverted relationship between 
susceptibility to and severity of health condition clusters. In terms of response key, 
participants acknowledged the severity of Cluster 1 and 2 health conditions but tended to 
underestimate their likelihood of experiencing them. In contrast, participants 
acknowledged their likelihood of experiencing Cluster 3 health conditions but tended to 
underestimate the severity of these health conditions. These judgments were also 
reflected in reaction time data. Participants were faster acknowledging the severity of 
Cluster 1 and 2 health conditions as opposed to dismissing their severity. On the other 
hand, participants were faster dismissing their likelihood of experiencing Cluster 1 and 2 
health conditions as opposed to acknowledging the likelihood of experiencing them. 
Participants exhibited a reversed pattern for Cluster 3 health conditions. Participants were 
faster acknowledging their likelihood of experiencing these health conditions and 
dismissing their severity compared to dismissing the likelihood of experiencing these 
health conditions and acknowledging their severity. These fast reaction times reflect well-
rehearsed judgments that participants have regarding their susceptibility to and severity 
of different health condition clusters. 
In partial support of Hypothesis 5 (and consistent with Experiment 1), depression 
and self-consciousness, and low levels of optimism, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and health 
locus of control were associated with increased perceptions of susceptibility to Cluster 2 
and 3 health conditions and severity of Cluster 3 health conditions. Further, self-
consciousness and low levels of optimism were associated with increased perceptions of 
severity of Cluster 3 health conditions but decreased perceptions of susceptibility to 
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Cluster 3 and severity of Cluster 1 health conditions. Psychological reactance and self-
awareness were not associated with overestimation of health risks as hypothesized. 
Experiment 3: Effects of health risk controllability and psychological reactance on 
health risk perceptions 
 
Within the context of a health message, Experiment 3 tested the effects of health 
risk controllability and psychological reactance on perceived susceptibility to and 
severity of a disease when primed with self-identity, third-person, or neutral words. The 
study also included a behavioral measure of information seeking. The experiment was a 3 
(prime: self-identity, third-person, neutral words) x 2 (risk controllability: high, low) 
between-subjects design with psychological reactance as a measured variable. 
A total of 90 participants were recruited for a $10 incentive. They were randomly 
assigned to one of six experimental conditions. The majority of participants were females 
(n = 53, 58.9%) and right-handed (n = 81, 90.0%). Mean age was 21.15 (SD = 2.92). 
Data for Experiment 3 included measures of individual differences (e.g., self-
efficacy) as well as response key and reaction time data for susceptibility to and severity 
of Balamuthia infection. First, baseline measures are described. Second, descriptive 
statistics and reliability of individual difference variables are presented. Third, response 
key and reaction time data are analyzed to detect differences between the experimental 
conditions based on experimental treatments. 
Baseline measures. 
A series of univariate ANOVAs, with prime and risk controllability as fixed 
factors, showed no differences between the experimental groups on baseline (i.e., practice 
trial) response key accuracy and reaction time. For baseline response key accuracy, there 
were no differences between the experimental conditions in total correct response key as 
 97
a dependent variable. The interaction term (F(2, 84) = .24, p = .783), risk controllability 
(F(1, 84) = .14, p = .709), and prime (F(2, 84) = .66, p = .517) were not significant. 
Participants in self (M = 19.60, SD = .62), third-person (M = 19.70, SD = .59) and neutral 
(M = 19.76, SD = .43) conditions correctly identified practice-trial items as animals/non-
animal. Averaged across risk controllability, means were 19.66 (SD = .60) and 19.71 (SD 
= .50) for the controllable and uncontrollable conditions, respectively.79 
Raw baseline reaction time data fell between 397 and 3,640 milliseconds. Data 
points that were 4 SD away from the mean were considered outliers and excluded (n = 
19), a 1.05% total data points lost. A univariate ANOVA performed on log-transformed 
reaction time data showed the interaction term between risk controllability and prime 
(F(2, 84) = .52, p = .593), risk controllability (F(1, 84) = .264, p = .609) and prime (F(2, 
84) = 1.73, p = .183) were not significant.80 Mean reaction time for participants in the 
controllable condition was 629.94 (SD = 1.11) whereas reaction time for those in the 
uncontrollable condition was 622.58 (SD = 1.11). Averaged over primes, means were 
610.66 (SD = 1.10) for the self condition, 643.13 (SD = 1.10) for the third-person 
condition, and 625.17 (SD = 1.12) for the neutral condition. 
Individual differences. 
                                                 
79 The distribution of total correct response key for each condition was within the acceptable range of ±2 
for skewness and kurtosis. Four cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005 (2.58). Equal variances were 
assumed as evidenced by a non-significant Levene’s test (F(5, 84) = 1.69, p = .145). 
 
80 The distribution of log-transformed reaction time data was within the acceptable range of ±2 for 
skewness and kurtosis within each experimental condition. Equal variances were assumed as evidenced by 
a non-significant Levene’s test (F(5, 84) = .80, p = .551). 
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Individual difference variables were screened for normality of distributions and 
outliers. There were no missing values (See Table 20 for descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix). 
Participants scored low on the depression inventory (M = 1.41, SD = .34, α = 
.87).81 Consistently, participants were optimistic, as measured by the life orientation test 
(M = 2.56, SD = .77, α = .85). 
Participants showed slightly high levels of internal health locus of control (M = 
3.88, SD = .61, α = .73). Consistent with the literature, results revealed health locus of 
control had two underlying factors, which explained 33.17% of the variance. 82 The first 
factor was related to internal locus of control whereas the second factor was related to 
external locus of control. Based on the analysis, four items reflected internal locus of 
control (α = .69), and six items reflected external locus of control (α = .67), with a 
correlation of r = -.25 between the two factors (See Table 20 for factor loadings, factor 
correlation, and internal reliability statistics). 
                                                 
81 The reported reliability is for 20 items of the depression inventory. A weight loss item was excluded 
because it reduced the sample size from 90 to 29 (those who were trying to loose weight) with listwise 
deletion. When the weight loss item was included, reliability was .67 (N = 29). 
 
82 Evaluation of normality of distribution, outliers, and factorability were satisfactory. All variables were 
within the acceptable ±2 for skewness and kurtosis. Eight cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. 
Multivariate outliers were checked using Mahalanobis distance. No case was above the critical value of 
chi-square (χ2(.001, 11) = 31.26). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy revealed there 
was a degree of common variance appropriate for conducting a factor analysis (KMO = .72). Each item’s 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was greater than .60, with the lowest being .67. Accordingly, all 
items were retained for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated the correlation matrix is 
factorable (χ2 = 203.63, p < .001). The initial solution indicated there were two factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1. Similarly, Catell’s criterion for the scree plot suggested that there might be two factors. With 
the extraction of two factors, there were 22 (40.0%) non-redundant residuals with absolute values greater 
than .05. 
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Participants were slightly reactant (M = 3.00, SD = .54, α = .83). Psychological 
reactance was positively correlated with self-consciousness and negatively with self-
efficacy and self-esteem. 
Participants’ scores were roughly at the mid point of the self-consciousness scale 
(M = 2.59, SD = .37, α = .74). Results revealed self-consciousness had three underlying 
factors, which explained 31.53% of the variance.83 The first factor was related to social 
anxiety (e.g., “I feel anxious when I speak in front of people”). The second was related to 
public self (e.g., “I’m concerned about what other people think of me”). The third factor 
was related to private self (e.g., “I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings”). Private 
self was further broken down to two subscales: self-reflection and self-awareness, which 
explained 37.59% of the variance, with a correlation of .33. Self-reflection included four 
items such as “I reflect about myself a lot” (M = 2.85, SD = .62, α = .70). Self-awareness 
included two items such as “I’m alert to changes in my mood” (M = 3.10, SD = .57, r = 
.31) (See Table 21 for factor loadings, factor correlation, and internal reliability 
statistics). 
Finally, participants scored high on self efficacy (M = 3.60, SD = .52, α = .87) 
and self esteem (M = 3.10, SD = .50, α = .89). 
                                                 
83 Evaluations of normality of distribution, outliers, and factorability were satisfactory. All individual items 
were within the acceptable range for skewness and kurtosis. Thirty-three cases exceeded the critical value 
of Z.005. No case exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 23) = 49.72. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy revealed there was a degree of common variance and hence the sample was appropriate 
for conducting a Principal Axis Factoring (KMO = .64). Some items had a Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
(MSA) less than .60, with the lowest being .32. All items were retained for the analysis. Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity indicated the correlation matrix is factorable (χ2 = 598.47, p < .001). Initial solution indicated 
there were four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Catell’s criterion for the scree plot suggested that 
there might be three factors. With the extraction of three factors, there were 107 (42.0%) non-redundant 
residuals with absolute values greater than .05. 
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Effects of prime, risk controllability, and psychological reactance on 
susceptibility to and severity of a health risk and information seeking. 
 
Experiment 3 tested the effects of risk controllability (controllable vs. 
uncontrollable), primes (self, third-person, neutral), and psychological reactance on 
perceived susceptibility to and severity of a health condition, and an information-seeking 
behavioral measure. 
In response to whether one was susceptible (yes) or not (no) to Balamuthia 
infection and whether the disease would be severe (yes) or not (no) if one experiences it, 
it was predicted in Hypothesis 3a that participants in the self-identity words condition, 
high on reactance, and in the highly controllable health risk condition would respond 
“no.” Reaction times for “no” responses would be faster than “yes” responses. This 
pattern was predicted to be stronger for participants primed with self-identity words in 
the high controllability condition (H3b), for highly reactant participants when primed 
with self-identity words (H3c), and for highly reactant participants when primed with 
self-identity words and exposed to the high controllability (H3d).  
(1) Effects on response key. A series of sequential logistic regressions84 were 
performed to test the effects of individual difference variables and experimental treatment 
on response key for susceptibility to and severity of the health condition as well as a 
behavioral measure in which participants requested additional information about the 
disease or not. 
A sequential logistic regression was performed to assess the prediction of 
perceived susceptibility to Balamuthia infection (0 = no, 1 = yes), first on the basis of 
                                                 
84 Logistic regression predicts a binary outcome (e.g., yes/no) from a set of discrete, continuous, or a mix of 
discrete and continuous predictors (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). 
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individual difference variables and then after addition of primes and risk controllability.85 
There was a good model fit on the basis of the individual differences alone, χ2 = 72.93, p 
= .671, using a deviance criterion. After addition of the experimental treatment, χ2 = 
63.77, p = .840, Nagelkerke R2 = .33. Comparison of log-likelihood ratios for models 
with and without experimental treatment showed statistically significant improvement 
with the addition of experimental treatment (χ2 = 9.15, p < .05). Classification rates on 
the basis of individual differences alone were 98.9% for no and 1.1% for yes, with an 
overall classification rate of 81.1%. The addition of experimental treatment improved 
overall classification rate to 85.6%, which was reflected in a 10.0% success rate in 
predicting yes response to susceptibility of the disease. Looking at the contribution of 
individual predictors revealed that self-reflection and risk controllability statistically 
enhanced the prediction of susceptibility response key. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, 
seventy five percent of participants who perceived Balamuthia infection as a disease they 
might contract were in the uncontrollable risk condition (Table 22). 
A second sequential logistic regression was performed to assess the prediction of 
perceived severity to Balamuthia infection (0 = no, 1 = yes), first on the basis of 
individual difference variables and then after addition of primes and risk controllability.86 
There was a good model fit on the basis of the individual differences alone, χ2 = 90.14, p 
= .184, using a deviance criterion. After addition of the experimental treatment, χ2 = 
82.23, p = .293, Nagelkerke R2 = .40. Comparison of log-likelihood ratios for models 
                                                 
85 Evaluation of adequacy of expected frequencies for categorical predictors revealed one cell with less than 
5 observations. No serious violation of linearity in the logit was observed. 
 
86 Evaluation of adequacy of expected frequencies for categorical predictors revealed no need to restrict 
model goodness-of-fit tests. No serious violation of linearity in the logit was observed. 
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with and without experimental treatment showed statistically significant improvement 
with the addition of experimental treatment (χ2 = 7.91, p < .05). Classification rates on 
the basis of individual differences alone were 20.0% for no and 80.0% for yes, with an 
overall classification rate of 76.7%. The addition of experimental treatment improved 
overall classification rate to 81.1%, which was reflected in a 28.9% success rate in 
predicting no response to severity of the disease. Looking at the contribution of 
individual predictors revealed that depression, self-efficacy, self-awareness, and risk 
controllability statistically enhanced the prediction of severity response key. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 3a, sixty percent of participants who perceived Balamuthia infection to 
be severe were in the uncontrollable risk condition. 
Finally, a third sequential logistic regression was performed to assess the 
prediction of behavioral measure in which participants requested additional information 
about Balamuthia infection (0 = no, 1 = yes), first on the basis of individual difference 
variables and then after addition of primes and risk controllability.87 There was a good 
model fit on the basis of the individual differences alone, χ2 = 91.00, p = .168, using a 
deviance criterion. After addition of the experimental treatment, χ2 = 83.41, p = .262, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .34. Comparison of log-likelihood ratios for models with and without 
experimental treatment showed no statistically significant improvement with the addition 
of experimental treatment (χ2 = 7.58, p > .05). Classification rates on the basis of 
individual differences alone were 84.4% for no and 15.6% for yes, with an overall 
classification rate of 77.8%. The addition of experimental treatment reduced overall 
                                                 
87 Evaluation of adequacy of expected frequencies for categorical predictors revealed no need to restrict 
model goodness-of-fit tests. No serious violation of linearity in the logit was observed. 
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classification rate to 74.4%, but improved the rate in predicting the request of additional 
information about the disease to 21.1%. Looking at the contribution of individual 
predictors revealed that self-reflection, self-awareness, gender, and risk controllability 
statistically enhanced the prediction of severity response key. Sixty five percent of 
participants who requested additional information about Balamuthia infection were in the 
uncontrollable risk condition. 
(2) Effects on reaction time combined for yes and no responses. A repeated 
measures analysis of variance was performed with prime and risk controllability, as fixed 
factors, and psychological reactance, as a continuous independent variable, and reaction 
time for susceptibility and severity of Balmauthia disease, as a repeated measure, to 
detect differences on reaction time combined for the yes and no response keys. Data were 
screened for fit of underlying assumptions regarding normality of sampling distribution, 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicolinearity.88 
For the between-subjects factors, reaction time to susceptibility and severity of the 
disease did not differ based on the interaction term between prime and risk controllability 
(F(2, 83) = .30, p = .737, ηp2 = .007), the prime (F(2, 83) = .16, p = .846, ηp2 = .004), or 
risk controllability (F(1, 83) = 1.372, p = .245, ηp2 = .016). Mean reaction times were 
2,275.09 for the self prime, 2,344.22 for the third-person prime, and 2,296.14 for the 
                                                 
88 Distribution of reaction time was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness and kurtosis within each 
condition. Two cases fell beyond Z.005. Two cases exceeded the critical value of χ2(.001, 2) = 13.81 but did not 
have a large Cook’s D. Homogeneity of variances was assumed for the two dependent variables (F(5, 84) = 
1.42, p = .223 for susceptibility and F(5, 84) = 1.36, p = .246 for severity). Box’s M test revealed no 
problem regarding the homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices (χ2 = 16.78, p = .398). Linearity of 
the relationship between the dependent variables was checked by plotting the two dependent variables. 
Variables were moderately correlated and posed no problems. 
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neutral prime. Averaged over controllability conditions, reaction times were 2,393.31 for 
the controllable condition and 2,218.19 for the uncontrollable condition. 
Within-subjects results showed a significant interaction between psychological 
reactance and repeated measure (i.e., susceptibility and severity reaction time) (F(1, 83) = 
4.92, p = .029, ηp2 = .056). As a follow up to a significant interaction, a regression 
analysis showed that psychological reactance was a significant predictor of susceptibility 
reaction time (F(1, 88) = 5.48, p = .021, R2 = .059). One unit increase in reactance was 
associated with slower reaction time (β = -.242, p = .021). This effect was not evident for 
severity reaction time (F(1, 88) = .004, p = .951, R2 = .00, β = .007, p = .951).89 
The semantic differential affect/arousal index (α = .83) was similar across 
experimental groups. The interaction term (F(2, 84) = .16, p = .849), risk controllability 
(F(1, 84) = .14, p = .706), and prime (F(2, 84) = .05, p = .945) were not significant. 
Measured at the end of experimental sessions, means were around the mid point of the 
semantic differential index: for the self (M = 1.18, SD = 1.36), third-person (M = 1.07, 
SD = 1.54), and neutral (M = 1.07, SD = 1.40) primes, averaged over prime conditions, 
and for the controllable (M = 1.17, SD = 1.53) and uncontrollable (M = 1.05, SD = 1.32) 
conditions, averaged over risk controllability conditions. This indicated that any 
differences between the experimental groups were not attributed to a differential 
affect/arousal status.90 
                                                 
89 Testing the effects of prime, risk controllability, and reactance on reaction time split by yes and no was 
not feasible because of lack of adequate number of cases for the analysis with listwise deletion. 
 
90 The distribution of affect/arousal index was within the acceptable range of ±2 for skewness and kurtosis 
for each condition. Nine cases exceeded the critical value of Z.005. Equal variances were assumed as 
evidenced by a non-significant Levene’s test (F(5, 84) = .23 p = .945). 
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 In sum, Experiment 3 tested the effects of primes in the context of a health 
message along with the effects of risk controllability and psychological reactance on 
perceptions of susceptibility to and severity of Balamuthia infection. The experiment did 
not find support for the hypothesized main effects of primes (H3a) and the interaction 
between primes and risk controllability (H3b), primes and reactance (H3c), and primes, 
risk controllability, and reactance (H3d). Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, results showed 
that risk controllability was a powerful predictor of response key. Participants who read 
about Blamuthia as an uncontrollable disease perceived themselves to be susceptible to 
the disease; perceived the disease to be severe; and requested additional information 
about the disease at the end of the experimental session. Inconsistent with H3a, 
psychological reactance was associated with slower reaction times to perceived 
susceptibility. 
Conclusion 
 Three experiments were conducted to test the automatic nature of health risk 
perceptions. Experiment 1 provided evidence of upward bias for positive health 
conditions and downward bias for negative ones. Experiment 2 provided evidence that 
underestimation of health risks is an efficient process that occurs when people are 
mentally taxed. Finally, in the context of a health message, Experiment 3 provided 
support for the effect of health risk controllability on risk perceptions. An uncontrollable 
disease elicited perceptions of susceptibility to and severity of the disease as well as 
information seeking. 
 In the next chapter, a summary of results is provided along with theoretical, 
practical, and methodological implications for the work presented here.
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Although risk perceptions are necessary for positive behavioral change, they are 
inaccurate and often underestimated. This dissertation posited that the principles of 
automaticity apply to how people process personal health risk messages and may explain 
why people are biased to underestimate personal risks. 
Two theoretical propositions were advanced: 
  (1) Underestimation of health risks is driven by a self-positivity bias. When the 
self-schema is active, perceptions of susceptibility will be biased upward for positive 
health conditions and downward for negative ones. Perceptions of severity will be biased 
downward for negative health conditions. 
(2) Underestimation of personal susceptibility to and severity of negative health 
risks is automatic. Biased perceptions of risk possess two features of automatic processes: 
lack of conscious awareness and efficiency. Underestimation of personal risks occurs 
without (a) conscious awareness of underestimation of health risks as a bias and of self-
schema activation as a source of the bias and (b) much cognitive resources. 
 Three pilot studies and three experiments tested these theoretical propositions and 
five derived hypotheses. Using implicit measures of risk perceptions, the studies provided 
conclusive evidence of (a) underestimation of susceptibility to negative health conditions 
and overestimation of susceptibility to positive ones and (b) efficiency of underestimation 
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of health risks. Results regarding self-schema activation as a source of underestimation of 
risks were not as conclusive. 
 Pilot Study 3 and Experiment 1 provided support for the first theoretical 
proposition. Consistent with previous literature, Pilot Study 3 provided evidence of 
implicit (dis)association between the self and negative/positive traits. Participants 
identified negative traits (e.g., gossipy) as non self-descriptive and positive traits (e.g., 
sincere) as self-descriptive. Sickness/health traits mirrored negative/positive traits in their 
implicit (dis)association with the self. Participants identified sickness traits (e.g., 
unhealthy) as non self-descriptive and health traits (e.g., healthy) as self-descriptive. In 
reaction time terminology, faster reaction times were recorded when participants 
identified negative and sickness traits as non self-descriptive and positive and health traits 
as self-descriptive. 
 Experiment 1 replicated the results of Pilot Study 3 with negative (e.g., stroke) 
and positive (e.g., healthy heart) health conditions. Participants underestimated the 
likelihood of experiencing negative health conditions and overestimated the likelihood of 
experiencing positive ones. Fast reaction times were recorded when participants 
dismissed the likelihood of experiencing negative health conditions and acknowledged 
the likelihood of experiencing positive ones. 
Using implicit measures of risk perceptions, both Pilot Study 3 and Experiment 1 
supported self-report studies of risk perceptions that documented people’s tendency to 
underestimate their risks. Negative and sickness traits were deemed non self-descriptive 
whereas positive and health traits were deemed self-descriptive. Similarly, negative 
health conditions were deemed not likely to happen to oneself whereas positive 
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conditions were deemed likely to happen to oneself. Thus, it appears that making such 
judgments frequently qualifies them to migrate from consciousness to unconsciousness. 
Fast reaction time is an indication that these judgments are less thoughtful and well-
rehearsed automatic processes. 
Experiment 2 provided conclusive support that underestimation of health risks is 
an efficient process. Efficiency refers to processes that occur when people lack sufficient 
cognitive resources, time, or motivation to engage in elaborate processing. As supported 
in Experiment 2, when people lack cognitive resources, underestimation of health risks is 
more likely. 
Evidence of self-schema activation as a source of underestimation of risks was 
sporadic, however. In Pilot Study 3, participants primed with self-identity words had 
slower reaction times in response to sickness traits compared to positive ones. 
Experiment 2 provided evidence of underestimation of perceptions of susceptibility to 
and severity of Cluster 1 health conditions (e.g., brain tumors) but only for perceptions of 
severity when under high load. 
Such evidence, although limited to a specific cluster of health conditions, 
provides some insights to the effects of self-schema activation on biasing risk 
perceptions. One explanation could be that the self-schema is highly accessible (Bargh, 
1989). Thus, self-schema could have been active in other prime conditions (i.e., third-
person, neutral), which minimized the predicted differences for the self primes. 
Self-report data from Pilot Studies 1 and 2 and implicit measures of risk 
perceptions from Experiment 2 revealed an inverted relationship between susceptibility 
and severity, the two dimensions that are typically added or multiplied to form an index 
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of health risk perceptions. Participants do not underestimate or overestimate both 
susceptibility and severity. If the severity of a health condition was undisputable (e.g., 
leukemia), participants downplayed their likelihood of experiencing the condition. In 
contrast, if susceptibility to a health condition was undisputable (e.g., stress), participants 
downplayed the severity of the condition. Such a relationship allows people to maintain 
risk perceptions at a manageable level in light of undeniable evidence about their 
susceptibility to or severity of a given health condition. Slovic and his colleagues 
documented a negative correlation between risk and benefit in people’s minds, which is 
similar to the susceptibility – severity inverted relationship found in this study (Slovic, 
Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982; Slovic & Peters, 2006). 
Such judgments, again, reflect well-rehearsed automatic processes. Fast reaction 
times were recorded when participants acknowledged the severity of Cluster 1 (e.g., brain 
tumors) and 2 (e.g., diabetes) health conditions and dismissed their likelihood of 
experiencing such conditions. In contrast, fast reaction times were recorded when 
participants acknowledged their likelihood of experiencing Cluster 3 health conditions 
(e.g., flu, sunburn) and dismissed these health conditions as non severe.  
Evidence from three studies (Pilot Study 3, Experiment 1, and Experiment 2) 
suggests there are defaults in people’s minds when it comes to health risk perceptions: 
(1) We are likely to experience positive health conditions and unlikely to 
experience negative health conditions. Dismissing the likelihood of experiencing negative 
health conditions was easy (as evidenced by fast reaction time). 
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(2) The default is underestimation of perceptions of susceptibility to and severity 
of a health condition. Underestimation of risk can be seen as the default because it occurs 
under limited cognitive resources. 
(3) We are likely to acknowledge the severity of health conditions but dismiss the 
likelihood of experiencing them. In contrast, we acknowledge the likelihood of 
experiencing highly prevalent health conditions but dismiss them as not severe. 
 Experiments 1, 2, and 3 provided evidence regarding the relationship between 
individual difference variables (e.g., self-efficacy) and risk perceptions. Such individual 
differences have been shown in self-report studies to influence risk perceptions upwards 
or downwards. It was unclear from the literature whether these individual differences 
would have the same effect on implicit measures of risk perceptions. Evidence from all 
three experiments suggests that individual difference variables did not affect reaction 
time data. 
 On another level, these individual differences have shown some association with 
response key data. Consistent with previous literature, high levels of self-efficacy, self-
esteem, and dispositional optimism (as measured by the life orientation test), and low 
levels of depression were associated with underestimation of risk. Evidence regarding the 
association between health locus of control, psychological reactance, self-awareness and 
self-reflection (the two subscales of self-consciousness), on the one hand, and biased 
health risks, on the other hand, was sporadic, but consistent with previous literature when 
found. 
 Finally, Experiments 2 and 3 provided evidence regarding health risk 
characteristics and their influence on risk perceptions. Participants tended to 
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underestimate their susceptibility to health conditions that score low on prevalence, 
personal experience, controllability, stereotype salience, and exempt beliefs. In contrast, 
participants tended to overestimate their susceptibility to health conditions that scored 
high on these health risk characteristics. Coupled with reaction time data on susceptibility 
to and severity of clusters of health conditions, it is evident that the health risk’s 
characteristics play an important role in the perception of health risks. It remains to be 
tested whether people make compensatory (e.g., take all risk characteristics into account 
when estimating their risk perceptions) or non-compensatory (e.g., base risk perceptions 
on one risk characteristic and discount all others) decisions about health conditions based 
on health risk characteristics. 
 Manipulating health risk controllability in Experiment 3 elicited increased 
perceived susceptibility to and severity of the health condition in question. Further, 
exposure to information about an uncontrollable health condition prompted participants 
to seek additional information regarding the disease, as evidenced by a behavioral 
measure. 
 In the next section, theoretical, practical, and methodological implications of this 
work are presented. Limitations of the work are also discussed. 
Theoretical implications 
This dissertation posited that self-schema activation is the source of 
underestimated health risk perceptions. A theoretical model is presented in Figure 19 to 
describe how people arrive at these biased health risk perceptions. First, the model details 
how self-schema can be automatically activated. Second, it summarizes pathways by 
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which the active self-schema can bias risk perceptions via an indirect and/or a direct route 
of information processing. 
Automatic Self-schema Activation. 
Self-schema can be activated by one of three automatic processes: pre-conscious, 
post-conscious and goal-dependent automaticity – depending on preconditions necessary 
for each process to occur (Bargh, 1989, 1994). In pre-conscious automaticity, the mere 
presence of a stimulus triggers an automatic process beyond one’s conscious awareness, 
control, or intention (Bargh, 1989, 1997). Because “self-relevant information is among 
the most frequently experienced, it is likely that individuals possess chronically 
accessible constructs for such domains of social information” (Bargh, 1989, p.13). 
Several cues – contingent upon one’s proximal environment and activities – can trigger a 
pre-conscious activation of self-schema such as exposure to one’s reflection in a mirror, 
name, or self-portrait (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003). 
Post-conscious automaticity is a non-conscious outcome for a recent conscious 
thought. A message “it could be you” will activate the self-schema, which continues to 
influence message processing. Here, a person is consciously aware of the second person 
pronoun, but is unaware of its effects on self-schema activation and processing of the 
health message. 
Goal-dependent automaticity is an intended or unintended outcome of a conscious 
goal. When attending to a risk message, a viewer’s conscious goal would be to process 
the information. An intended outcome of goal-dependent automaticity would be to self-
protect by discounting and refuting message arguments and underestimating one’s risks 
(Higgins, 1987). In an unintended outcome, self-schema activation influences conscious 
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message processing and results in discounting and underestimating the risk, an outcome 
consistent with the chronic positive self-schema (Bargh, 1989), yet inconsistent with the 
intended outcome of reaching accurate risk estimates. 
In sum, self-schema can be activated by one of three automaticity processes. The 
more preconditions required for an automatic process to occur, the less prevalent self-
schema activation is because all necessary preconditions must be present (and vice 
versa). Pre-conscious automaticity does not require any preconditions. Post-conscious 
automaticity requires “awareness of instigating stimulus” whereas goal-dependent 
automaticity requires “specific processing goal in place, intention that effect occur, 
allocation of focal attention to processes” (Bargh, 1989, p.10). Thus, automatic activation 
of self-schema will occur more frequently under pre-conscious followed by post-
conscious and, lastly, goal-dependent automatic processing. 
Effects of Automatic Self-schema Activation on Risk Perceptions. 
The self-schema, once active, can influence health risk information processing 
and bias risk perceptions in two ways: indirectly via elaborate/controlled information 
processing or directly in a completely automatic fashion. 
Although the elaboration likelihood (ELM) and heuristic systematic (HSM) 
models assume people seek accurate judgments, both models propose ways in which 
judgments can be biased. Motivation (e.g., defense motive in HSM) and ability (i.e., prior 
knowledge) can bias outcomes of a persuasion process if people have a preference for 
one outcome versus another or if prior knowledge is imbalanced to begin with. In this 
regard, people will select, attend to, perceive information and/or selectively retrieve 
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elements of self-knowledge that support their motives and preferences (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997; Petty & Wegner, 1999). 
Automatic self-schema activation can influence elaborate/controlled information 
processing indirectly. When a message is encoded in terms of an active self-schema, one 
integrates additional information and inferences from that schema into the objective 
message, transforming the message into a subjective stimulus, which results in an 
understanding, interpretation and recall of information that is consistent with an overly 
positive self view (Bargh, 1997; Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1989). This influence occurs 
through several routes. Self-schema directs attention to certain aspects of the message; 
message elements are further automatically evaluated as positive or negative (Bargh, 
Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Ferguson, 2007); judgments and decisions are based 
on active schemas, both conscious and unconscious, which makes the influence of 
automatic self-schema activation on conscious decisions and judgments likely. 
Automatic self-schema activation will solely drive judgments in a completely 
automatic fashion when people do not engage in intentional information gathering or lack 
the ability and/or motivation to engage in elaborate information processing (Bargh, 
1989).  
Such influence of automatic processes on judgments and decisions is 
unquestionable because “ one implicitly trusts in the veracity of the interpretation made, 
because one is not aware of any processing effort being applied” (Bargh, 1989, p.19). 
Further, automatic processes continue to operate with limited cognitive resources, 
resembling real life when people are distracted or engaged in other activities during 
exposure to health risk messages (Perse, 1990). 
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In the event that people are motivated to reach accurate decisions, they must be 
aware of both the magnitude and direction of the positivity bias and be motivated to and 
have the ability (time and processing capacities) to overcome this bias. Such a confluence 
of conditions rarely exists (Wegner & Petty, 1995). 
To illustrate, consider a health risk message that explicitly references the self: 
“When was the last time you REALLY checked yourself? Syphilis is up to 365% in LA 
County gay men since 2001. So, it’s essential to get checked out every 6 months or every 
3 months if you’re HIV+. The good news is syphilis is curable – but left untreated, it can 
permanently damage your health. (Tagline): (really) CHECK YOURSELF. Get tested for 
syphilis every 6 months” (County of LA Department of Public Health). 
Upon reading this message, self-schema is activated (i.e., post-conscious 
automaticity because one is consciously aware of the words: you, yourself). Once active, 
self-schema can influence risk perceptions in two ways: 
(a) An indirect path where one interested in learning about syphilis will engage in 
elaborate information processing. The positivity bias, however, would direct attention to 
certain messages aspects. One might think the 365% is unrealistic or think the message is 
not credible because no source is cited. In considering disease prevalence and message 
source, one is unaware this allocation of attention is driven by self-schema and, thus, 
trusts that his conclusion to discount the message is based on rational reasons (not a 
positivity bias). Finally, in making a risk judgment, a necessary step to get checked for 
syphilis, input from all active mental representations used to encode the message is 
integrated. This includes consciously (e.g., syphilis, gay men) and unconsciously (e.g., 
self-schema) activated schemas. 
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(b) A direct path where one does not have the motivation and/or ability to engage 
in elaborate processing. The information will simply be perceived as inconsistent with 
one’s positive self-schema and therefore risk perceptions will be underestimated. 
Practical implications 
An agenda for research and practice is presented next.  The research agenda 
integrates literature on the self and automatic processes to better understand personal risk 
perceptions. The practice agenda centers around two outcomes: message content and 
implementation and evaluation strategies. 
A Research Agenda.  
The self and risk perceptions. Underestimation of risk has been documented for 
personal risks. Are risk perceptions underestimated if one experiences the risk via a 
virtual self? The virtual self is a representation of one’s self in the virtual world via an 
avatar (Fox & Bailenson, 2009). For example, in addressing calorie intake as a risk factor 
for obesity, one could experience an increase in size/body fat via the virtual self. Two 
contradictory hypotheses are worth exploring: risk perceptions (1) will be underestimated 
(as in self-report studies of risk perceptions) or (2) will be acknowledged because one’s 
experience of the risk is almost real. 
Another research area is risk perceptions for the extended self. “Extended self” 
refers to people we consider part of ourselves (e.g., children, significant others) (Belk, 
1988). These perceptions are important when making proxy decisions. For example, a 
parent assesses her child’s susceptibility to a disease and decides whether or not to 
vaccinate the child. Are the parent’s perceptions of the child’s susceptibility (i.e., parent’s 
extended self) subject to the same biases in estimating personal risks? 
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Health risk communication could benefit from neuroimaging technology. 
Previous studies have shown active areas of the brain when processing self-relevant 
information and patterns involved in processing self + positive versus self + negative 
information (Kelley et al., 2002; Kircher et al., 2002; Watson et al., 2007). Neuroimaging 
can be used to record brain responses to personal health risk messages and provide 
neurological evidence on how people process health risk information. 
Automatic processing and risk perceptions. Although logically derived from a 
body of research on automaticity and dual process theories of persuasion, the model 
proposed here should be empirically tested especially with high-risk groups and patient 
populations. With these populations, it is unknown whether biased risk perceptions will 
shift to severity and/or treatment effectiveness and in what ways, if any. 
Given that automatic and controlled processing are not mutually exclusive 
(Bargh, 1989), scholars should look into the combination of automatic versus controlled 
processing of health risk information. Procedures such as the Process Dissociation 
Paradigm allow scholars to estimate the automatic and controlled contributions to any 
mental process. 
Susceptibility – severity relationship. Theories of behavioral change differ in the 
way they combine the two dimensions of risk perceptions: susceptibility and severity. 
PMT (Rogers, 1975) and EPPM (Witte, 1992; Witte & Allen, 2000) posit an additive 
relationship whereas TRA, TPB, and the IBM posit a multiplicative one (Ajzen, 1991; 
Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2008). In other theories, like HBM, the 
nature of the relationship between susceptibility and severity is unidentified (Becker, 
 118
1974). Only few studies suggested that susceptibility and severity are two independent 
constructs (Witte & Allen, 2000). 
Given the conclusive evidence of the inverted susceptibility – severity 
relationship found in this study, it is no longer acceptable to combine the two dimensions 
in an additive or multiplicative index. Future research should define more clearly the 
relationship between susceptibility and severity. It is not clear if the two dimensions are 
equally important or if one dimension drives people’s risk perceptions (e.g., susceptibility 
drives preventive behaviors such as vaccination whereas severity drives detection 
behaviors such as cancer screening) (Brewer et al., 2007). Identifying the nature of the 
susceptibility – severity relationship will result in straightforward recommendations for 
health communication practitioners. 
A Practice Agenda. 
Message content. Risk messages should boost positivity bias when beneficial and 
override it when detrimental to behavioral change. For example, messages promoting 
initiation or maintenance of a behavior could emphasize optimism about its effectiveness. 
Furthermore, boosting optimism can help people who have acknowledged their risks cope 
with health issues (Taylor et al., 1992). 
When maladaptive for behavioral change, risk messages should have alternative 
foci than personal risk. This includes using heuristics such as anchoring to bring risk 
perceptions closer to objective risk estimates (Dillard, McCaul, Kelso, & Klein, 2006); 
relying on identifiable factors such as age to socially pressure those at risk to adhere to 
recommended behaviors (Brewer & Hallman, 2006); delivering risk information for a 
similar other to override optimism about personal risks (Rimal & Morrison, 2006); using 
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prototypical people to trigger an assimilation rather than a contrast effect where people 
distance themselves from stereotypical exemplars (Menon et al., 2008; Zillmann, 2002). 
Implementation and evaluation strategies. For audiences who underestimate 
their risks, messages focusing on beliefs, attitudes and norms or those tailored on 
personal risks are irrelevant (Witte & Allen, 2000). Thus, audience segmentation by 
positivity bias could improve the effectiveness of health interventions. 
It is important to probe for a comprehensive list of individual difference variables 
(e.g., self efficacy, locus of control) and health risk characteristics (e.g., perceived risk 
controllability) that bias risk perceptions in the formative research phase of health 
interventions. Probing for predictors/correlates of underestimated risk perceptions is 
important because people are unlikely to elaborate on factors influencing a bias they are 
unaware of. Further, these variables should be assessed in the summative/evaluation 
phase of health interventions to detect unintended effects (e.g., desensitizing or 
overwhelming not-at-risk groups or those pessimistic about their risk) (Cho & Salmon, 
2007). 
Methodological implications 
Health communication research should use priming and reaction times to advance 
our understanding of risk perceptions and health-related attitudes and behaviors. These 
methods uncover implicit cognitions, those beyond one’s awareness of mental processes 
in place and override people’s unwillingness to report these judgments (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
Limitations 
Theoretical limitations. 
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This dissertation took an individual-level psychological approach to risk 
perceptions. It did not address cultural, anthropological, or sociological perspectives to 
risk perceptions (Lavino & Neumann, 2010). 
As theorized here, personal health risk perceptions are subject to an efficient and 
out-of-awareness influence of self-schema activation. This by no means indicates that 
underestimation of risk is exclusively automatic. “Automatic processes, of whatever 
variety, do not occur in a vacuum, but in parallel or in combination with other ongoing 
automatic and controlled cognitive work” (Bargh, 1989, p. 27). In fact, the proposed 
model includes direct (automatic) and indirect (controlled) influences of self-schema 
activation on risk perceptions, both of which can be simultaneously at work. 
Although this dissertation focused on underestimated risk perceptions, automatic 
self-schema activation can bias risk perceptions upward. In such instances, people 
overestimate their risks or exhibit a pessimistic bias. Research should explore individual 
difference variables (e.g., locus of control) (Hoorens & Buunk, 1993) and health risk 
characteristics (e.g., dread) (Slovic, 1987) that can alter the effect (direction and/or 
magnitude) of self-schema activation on risk perceptions. 
Methodological limitations. 
As with all experimental studies, the experiments conducted here are low on 
external validity (i.e., the extent to which the results are generalizable beyond the study 
participants) (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). 
Selection of health traits in Pilot Study 3 and positive health conditions in 
Experiment 1 could have been the cause for slow reaction time data for health traits and 
positive conditions. Some health traits chosen for inclusion in Pilot Study 3 were not 
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frequently associated with health nor commonly used terms (e.g., “hale”). In Experiment 
1, positive health conditions were created by rewording negative conditions to reflect a 
positive valence (e.g., healthy heart, healthy weight). As a result, response key and 
reaction time data for positive health conditions might have been driven by the length of 
the words common across positive health conditions. 
Response key and reaction time data have limitations. The design of the 
experiments allowed participants to choose response key yes or no. Giving participants 
the choice of response key resulted in fewer data points for one response key when the 
majority of participants chose the other response key. For example, few participants 
responded yes in response to whether sickness traits were self-descriptive. As a result, 
few cases were available for analysis with the listwise deletion setting in statistical 
packages. A better approach could be the Implicit Association Test format. Although 
participants would be forced to give a certain response yes or no in any given trial, this 
method would ensure a complete data set of response key and reaction time data on all 
stimulus words. Further, reaction time, as a dependent variable, is potentially influenced 
by a host of variables other than the independent variable (e.g., age) (Nosek, Greenwald, 
& Banaji, 2007). 
Results should be interpreted with caution if the data did not meet the 
assumptions underlying the statistical tests used. Further, several scales (e.g., health locus 
of control) had low internal reliabilities, which may have affected the rigor of the 
statistical tests. Finally, additional controls (e.g., race, ethnicity, language fluency) could 
have been included. 
Conclusion 
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This dissertation took a psychological approach to explain why people 
underestimate health risks despite health communication efforts to inform them. It 
posited that people are predisposed to automatically underestimate self-relevant risks. 
Rationale for the theoretical propositions advanced here was derived from research 
documenting that health risk information is (a) self-relevant, (b) inconsistent with the 
positivity bias and self-threatening, and that (c) self-schema activation is automatic. 
 Three experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that people 
underestimate their likelihood of experiencing negative health conditions and 
overestimate their likelihood of experiencing positive ones. Experiment 2 examined 
whether underestimation of health risks is an efficient process, one that occurs when 
people are mentally taxed. Finally, Experiment 3 tested the effects of health risk 
controllability and psychological reactance on health risk perceptions. In all three 
experiments, participants were primed with self-identity, third-person, or neutral words. 
Several individual difference variables (e.g., self efficacy, dispositional optimism) and 
characteristics of the health risk (e.g., prevalence) that influence risk perceptions were 
controlled for. 
 The experiments provided evidence of automatic underestimation of negative 
health conditions and overestimation of positive ones. Further, underestimation of risk is 
the default process when one is mentally taxed. Self-schema activation biased health risk 
perceptions for Cluster 1 health conditions. Finally, the experiments showed an inverted 
relationship between susceptibility and severity dimensions of health risk perceptions. 
 Together, these experiments show people automatically underestimate their health 
risks, that is, without awareness, intention, or effort. The automatic activation of health 
 123
risk perceptions is likely undetected because one is unaware of the activation of 
automatic processes and their effects on risk perceptions or of the triggers of these 
processes to begin with. Attempts to override or correct these automatic tendencies 
require awareness of the bias and its magnitude and direction, motivation to correct the 
bias and availability of processing resources (time and mental capacity). The presence of 
all these preconditions is unlikely, making biased health risk perceptions inevitable. 
It is noteworthy that automatic processes are retained because they are functional. 
Both human processing abilities and information available to decision makers are limited. 
When a schema is constantly associated with a triggering environmental cue (e.g., a 
learned script on how to behave when checking in a clinic); when an object is always 
evaluated as positive or negative (e.g., health evaluated as positive and sickness as 
negative) (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004); and when a specific construct 
is frequently associated with a certain goal (e.g., self-enhancement goals), well-learned 
decisions migrate from consciousness to unconsciousness, which frees up the mind from 
thinking about them (Bargh, 2008; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). 
The problem for health risk communication is with biased risk perceptions “rather 
than with their unconsciousness or automaticity per se” (Higgins, 1989, p. 76). Thus, to 
improve the effectiveness of health interventions, we need to understand and predict 
situations where these biases are most likely applied (Peters et al., 2006). Accordingly, 
health practitioners should design messages such that people are unlikely to be subject to 
decision biases or are likely to benefit from the intuitive/automatic information 
processing (Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009). 
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The theoretical propositions advanced here suggest health risk perceptions are 
subject to positivity bias under both elaborative and non-elaborative modes of 
information processing: Underestimation of risks is the default option. The proposed 
model and agenda for health risk communication provides a road map that should 
advance our understanding of risk perceptions theoretically, practically, and 
methodologically. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Summary results 
 
Hypothesis Results 
PS3 
Partially supported. Main effect for trait category was supported whereas the effect of self primes was not. Ps identified positive 
and health traits as self-descriptive and negative and sickness traits as non self-descriptive. Ps found it easier to identify positive 
and health traits as self-descriptive (as evidenced by faster reaction time) but more difficult to identify negative and sickness traits 
as self-descriptive (as evidenced by slower reaction time). 
H1 Partially supported. Main effect for valence of health conditions was supported whereas the effect of self primes was not. Ps 
identified themselves as likely to experience positive health conditions and unlikely to experience negative ones. Not being 
susceptible to a negative health condition was the easiest of decisions participants had to make (as evidenced by faster reaction 
time). Identifying oneself as being susceptible to negative and positive conditions as well as not being susceptible to positive 
conditions was more difficult (as evidenced by slower reaction time). 
H2a 
Partially supported. Main effects for self primes were evident for susceptibility to Cluster 1 health conditions. Ps primed with self-
identity words underestimated their susceptibility to Cluster 1 conditions. Main effects for cognitive load were evident for 
susceptibility to Clusters 2 and 3 and severity of Cluster 2 conditions. Ps under high cognitive load underestimated their 
susceptibility to Cluster 2 and 3 conditions and the severity of Cluster 2 conditions. 
H2b Partially supported. Self primes and high cognitive load interacted to bias severity of Cluster 1 health conditions downward. Ps 
primed with self-identity words underestimated the severity of Cluster 1 conditions when under high cognitive load. 
H3a Partially supported. Main effect for health risk controllability was supported whereas main effects for self primes and psychological 
reactance were not. Uncontrollable health conditions elicited perceptions of susceptibility to and severity of the disease. 
H3b 
H3c 
H3d 
Not supported. 
H4 Supported. Participants underestimated their susceptibility to health conditions that scored low on prevalence, personal experience, 
controllability, stereotype salience, and exempt beliefs. 
H5 Partially supported. Participants low on depression, high on self-efficacy, self-esteem, and dispositional optimism underestimated 
their susceptibility to negative health conditions. 
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Table 2: Study procedures 
 
Experiment  Pre-measures 
In-lab session 
Welcome Self-schema activation 
Other independent 
variable manipulation Dependent measures  
Experiment 1 
Depression 
Inventory 
 
Dispositional 
optimism 
 
Health locus of 
control 
 
Psychological 
Reactance 
 
Self-consciousness 
 
Self-efficacy 
 
Self-esteem 
I n i
t i a
l  g
r e e
t i n
g ,  
c o
n s
e n
t ,  a
n d
 i n
s t r
u c
t i o
n s
 
Supraliminal 
priming 
 
Susceptibility to positive and 
negative health conditions 
 
Response key 
Reaction time 
D e
b r i
e f i
n g
 
Subliminal 
priming 
None 
 
Subliminal 
priming 
Cognitive load 
(high vs. low) 
Susceptibility to and severity 
of negative health conditions 
 
Response key 
Reaction time 
Experiment 3 
Independent 
variable 
(measured) 
 
Psychological 
Reactance 
Subliminal 
priming 
Health risk 
controllability 
 
(controllable vs. 
uncontrollable) 
Susceptibility to and severity 
of health condition 
Response key 
Reaction time 
 
Perceived risk controllability 
 
Behavioral measure 
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Table 3: Zero-order correlation matrix for health risk characteristics, personal and third-person susceptibility and severity (Pilot 
studies 1 and 2) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Prevalence PS1 1           
2. Stereotype salience PS1 .71** 1          
3. Controllability PS1 .41** .54** 1         
4. Exempt beliefs PS1 .81** .70** .51** 1        
5. Personal experience PS1 .86** .70** .18 .69** 1       
6. Personal susceptibility PS1 .84** .65** .24* .82** .83** 1      
7. Personal severityPS1 -.41** -.18 -.14 -.25* -.36** -.38** 1     
8. Personal susceptibilityPS2 .87** .64** .25* .73** .86** .81** -.36** 1    
9. Personal severityPS2 -.57** -.40** -.14 -.47** -.56** -.55** .78** -.56** 1   
10. Third-person susceptibility PS2 .85** .72** .47** .68** .73** .66** -.37** .85** -.52** 1  
11. Third-person severity PS2 -.55** -.37** -.11 -.45** -.55** -.53** .77** -.55** .96** -.47** 1 
            
M 25.37 3.99 3.18 3.32 1.58 2.85 4.52 3.08 5.07 3.46 5.10 
SD 20.61 1.28 1.38 1.11 1.55 1.26 1.02 1.28 1.10 1.30 1.10 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 93 93 93 93 
N varied according to familiarity frequencies. 
* p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
PS1 represents data from pilot study 1 whereas PS2 is data from pilot study 2. 
Prevalence rates were measured on a 0 – 100 scale. Susceptibility and exempt belief were on a 0 – 7 scale, where 0 = impossible and 7 = very likely. Stereotype 
salience, controllability, and severity were on a 1 – 7 scale, where 7 represented ease of imaging a person who could suffer from the disease, high perceived risk 
controllability, and extreme severity. Personal experience was on 0 – 6 scale, where 0 = has not happened to anyone I know before to 6 = has happened to me 
more than once.
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Table 4: Cluster analysis: Descriptive statistics and differences on health risk characteristics (Pilot study 1) 
 
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Equality of means test* n = 17 n = 26 n = 7 
Prevalence** 15.22 (5.01)e 32.51 (12.86)f 77.34 (10.09)g B-F(2, 21.767) = 104.15 
Stereotype salience   3.21 (.53)a   4.87 (.81)b   5.81 (.62)c F(2, 47) = 43.73 
Controllability    2.50 (1.32)a   3.75 (1.07)b   4.60 (1.02)b F(2, 47) = 10.01 
Exempt beliefs   2.67 (.48)a   3.91 (.47)b   5.68 (.45)c F(2, 47) = 103.05 
Personal experience**     .70 (.47)e   2.07 (1.03)f   5.12 (.64)g B-F(2, 31.417) = 95.39 
N = 50 diseases. 
Cells represent means (and standard deviations). 
* p < .001. 
** Equal variances were not assumed as evidenced by a significant Levene’s test for prevalence (F(2, 47) = 4.11, p = .023) and personal experience (F(2,47) = 
3.65, p = .033). Brown-Forsythe, a robust test of equality of means, was reported. 
a, b, c Groups statistically different at .05 level based on Tukey’s HSD post hoc analysis. 
e, f, g Groups statistically different at .05 level based on Dunnett C post hoc analysis for heterogeneous variances. 
Prevalence rates were measured on a 0 – 100 scale, where 100 reflect high prevalence rates. Susceptibility and exempt belief were on a 0 – 7 scale, where 0 = 
impossible and 7 = very likely. Stereotype salience, controllability, and severity were on a 1 – 7 scale, where 7 represented ease of imaging a person who could 
suffer from the disease, high perceived risk controllability, and extreme severity. Personal experience was on 0 – 6 scale, where 0 = has not happened to anyone I 
know before to 6 = has happened to me more than once. 
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Table 5: Zero-order correlations for perceived health risk controllability dimensions (Pilot study 2) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Personal susceptibility control 1          
2. Personal severity control .45 1         
3. Personal progression rate control .52 .85 1        
4. Personal treatment effectiveness control .49 .82 .82 1       
5. Personal general control .63 .81 .82 .83 1      
6. Third-person susceptibility control .79 .48 .54 .50 .65 1     
7. Third-person severity control .46 .81 .79 .77 .75 .49 1    
8. Third-person progression rate control .53 .83 .86 .85 .78 .52 .90 1   
9. Third-person treatment effectiveness control .54 .79 .82 .79 .76 .50 .79 .84 1  
10. Third-person general control .61 .71 .73 .75 .83 .59 .73 .80 .72 1 
           
M 3.09 2.73 3.21 3.23 2.99 3.00 2.71 3.10 3.20 2.89 
SD 1.71 1.80 2.00 1.97 1.86 1.68 1.56 1.80 1.71 1.74 
N = 70. 
All correlations are significant at .05 level, 2-tailed. 
Perceived health risk controllability was measured on a 1 – 7 scale, where 7 = very easy to control.
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Table 6: Factor loadings for perceived health risk controllability (Pilot study 2) 
 
Item General control Susceptibility control  
1. Personal susceptibility control .00 .94 
2. Personal severity control .97 -.09 
3. Personal progression rate control .92 .01 
4. Personal treatment effectiveness control .93 -.02 
5. Personal general control .73 .28 
6. Third-person susceptibility control .02 .92 
7. Third-person severity control .95 -.07 
8. Third-person progression rate control .96 -.01 
9. Third-person treatment effectiveness control .89 .01 
10. Third-person general control .68 .28 
   
Rotation sums of squared loadings 7.232 4.331 
Reliability α = .96 r = .79 
Factor correlation .58 
N = 70. 
Solution is based on a Principal Components Analysis oblique rotation. 
Factor loadings > .30 are in boldfaced.
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Table 7: Mean response key descriptive statistics (Pilot study 3) 
 
  Trait category M 95% CI [LL – UL] 
  Positive Negative Health Sickness  
Self condition (n = 75)       
       
Self-descriptive  .89 (.13) .08 (.10) .70 (.18) .06 (.11) .43 [.42 – .45] 
Non self-descriptive  .10 (.13) .91 (.10) .29 (.18) .93 (.11) .56 [.54 – .57] 
       
Neutral condition (n = 75)       
       
Self-descriptive  .91 (.11) .10 (.15) .71 (.20) .04 (.09) .44 [.42 – .45] 
Non self-descriptive  .08 (.11) .89 (.15) .28 (.20) .95 (.09) .55 [.54 – .57] 
       
Self-descriptive       
M  .90 .09 .70 .05  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [.88 – .92] [.07 – .11] [.67 – .74] [.03 – .07]  
       
Non self-descriptive       
M  .09 .90 .29 .94  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [.07 – .11] [.88 – .92] [.26 – .32] [.92 – .96]  
N = 150. 
Cells represent means (and standard deviations).
131 
 
 132
Table 8: Reaction time descriptive statistics (Pilot study 3) 
 
  Trait category M 95% CI [LL – UL] 
  Positive Negative Health Sickness  
       
Self condition (n = 75)  857.03 (1.21) 936.26 (1.23) 991.51 (1.24) 910.33 (1.24) 922.57 [885.11 – 961.61] 
Self-descriptive  842.36 (1.20) n = 75 
1119.95 (1.33) 
n = 49 
958.95 (1.24) 
n = 74 
1390.27 (1.40) 
n = 27 
1088.93 
[993.11 – 1191.24] 
Non self-descriptive  1036.09 (1.39) n = 50 
926.40 (1.24) 
n = 75 
1090.18 (1.34) 
n = 74 
897.22 (1.23) 
n = 75 
993.11 
[933.25 – 1056.81] 
       
Neutral condition (n = 75)  883.07 (1.21) 931.32 (1.18) 987.18 (1.20) 898.87 (1.17) 924.69 [887.15 – 963.82] 
Self-descriptive  867.96 (1.20) n = 75 
1149.74 (1.28) 
n = 49 
953.45 (1.22) 
n = 73 
1213.38 (1.27) 
n = 18 
1061.69 
[954.99 – 1177.60] 
Non self-descriptive  1180.04 (1.33) 
n = 44 
923.42 (1.19) 
n = 75 
1142.08 (1.35) 
n = 72 
889.40 (1.17) 
n = 75 
1051.96 
[981.74 – 1124.60] 
Combined reaction time       
M  868.96 933.25 988.55 903.64  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [843.33 – 897.42] [905.73 – 963.82] [957.19 – 1023.29] [877.00 – 933.25]  
       
Reaction time (yes)       
M  877.00 1202.26 990.83 1273.50  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [826.03 – 931.10] [1086.42 – 1333.52] [918.33 – 1071.51] [1142.87 – 1415.79]  
       
Reaction time (no)       
M  1099.00 963.82 1124.60 916.22  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [1030.38 – 1169.49] [922.57 – 1009.25] [1059.25 – 1193.98] [879.02 – 954.99]  
N = 150. 
Cells represent mean reaction time in milliseconds (and standard deviations). 
Analysis was performed on log-transformed data. Reported means and standard deviations have been back transformed to milliseconds using 10ш formula. 
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Table 9: Zero-order correlation matrix for individual difference variables (Experiment 1) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Depression inventory 1          
2. Life orientation test -.44** 1         
3. Health locus of control -.00 .09 1        
4. Psychological reactance .22** -.12* .07 1       
5. Self reflection .21** -.14** .02 .19** 1      
6. Self awareness .00 .15** .06 .11* .30** 1     
7. Self consciousness .32** -.26** -.06 .10 .53** .35** 1    
8. Self efficacy -.37** .44** .16** -.05 -.05 .27** -.25** 1   
9. Self esteem -.47** .64** .09 -.04 -.24** .18** -.37** .55** 1  
10. Gender .03 -.05 .00 -.10 -.05 .04 .03 .00 -.05 1 
           
M 1.36 2.54 3.85 3.07 2.63 2.91 2.53 3.59 3.04 .74 
SD .29 .65 .49 .46 .86 .51 .37 .50 .46 .43 
           
Scale Statistics           
# of items 20 6 11 14 2 4 23 17 10 - 
Reliabilitya .85 .79 .58 .78 .49 .54 .74 .86 .86 - 
N = 325. 
* p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
a Cronbach’s alpha is reported for all scales except for the two-item self-reflection scale for which a correlation is reported. 
Gender: 0 = male, 1= female.
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Table 10: Factor loadings for health locus of control scale (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Item Internal External Internal External Internal External 
1. If I take care of myself, I can avoid illness .44 .13 .58 .14 -.44 .41 
2. Whenever I get sick it is because something I’ve done or not done .55 -.13 .57 -.13 -.79 -.06 
3. Good health is largely a matter of good fortune .11 .49 .03 .48 .09 .56 
4. No matter what I do, if I am going to get sick I will get sick .28 .48 .23 .39 -.11 .49 
5. Most people do not realize the extent to which their illnesses are 
controlled by accidental happenings -.05 .38 -.13 .38 -.04 .49 
6. I can only do what my doctor tells me to do -.12 .33 -.13 .39 .20 .51 
7. There are so many strange diseases that you can never know how or 
when you might pick one up -.05 .24 .06 .37 -.11 .49 
8. When I feel ill, I know it is because I have not been getting the proper 
exercise or eating right .48 .01 .52 -.05 -.58 -.07 
9. People who never get sick are just plain lucky .20 .50 .20 .45 -.10 .44 
10. People’s ill health results from their own carelessness .52 -.18 .52 -.01 -.55 .02 
11. I am directly responsible for my health .46 .16 .50 .11 -.48 .15 
       
Rotation sums of squared loadings 1.425 1.200 1.678 1.163 2.038 1.950 
Reliability .60 .56 .67 .56 .69 .67 
Factor correlation .08 .13 -.25 
N = 325, 476, and 90 for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Solution is based on a Principal Axis Factoring oblique rotation. 
Factor loadings > .30 are in boldfaced. 
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Table 11: Factor loadings for self-consciousness scale (Experiment 1) 
 
Item Social Anxiety Public Self Private Self Self awareness Self reflection 
1. I’m always trying to figure myself out .15 .15 .59 -.07 -.82 
2. I’m concerned about my style of doing things .04 .38 .16   
3. Generally, I’m not very aware of myself -.12 .17 .39 .42 -.05 
4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations .73 .00 .02   
5. I reflect about myself a lot .13 .06 .77 .37 -.47 
6. I’m concerned about the way I present myself -.03 .63 .16   
7. I’m often the subject of my own fantasies -.03 .13 .12   
8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me .35 .09 .06   
9. I never scrutinize myself .22 .20 .25   
10. I get embarrassed very easily .58 .32 -.08   
11. I’m self-conscious about the way I look .27 .58 .01   
12. I don’t find it hard to talk to strangers .63 -.11 -.06   
13. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings -.07 .01 .46 .71 .11 
14. I usually worry about making a good impression .10 .52 .09   
15. I’m constantly examining my motives .03 .14 .56 .04 -.61 
16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group .57 .03 -.12   
17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror .01 .55 -.02   
18. I sometimes have the feeling that I’m off somewhere watching myself .03 .04 .24   
19. I’m concerned about what other people think of me .20 .57 .01   
20. I’m alert to changes in my mood -.00 .00 .38 .49 .00 
21. I’m usually aware of my appearance -.09 .50 .12   
22. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem -.18 -.01 .34 .30 -.08 
23. Large groups make me nervous .73 .06 .09   
      
Rotation sums of squared loadings 2.567 2.338 2.157 1.608 1.712 
Reliabilitya .77 .73 .70 .54 .49 
Factor correlation    -.49 
N = 325. 
a Cronbach’s alpha is reported for all scales except for the two-item self-reflection scale for which a correlation is reported. 
Solution is based on a Principal Axis Factoring varimax rotation. 
Solution for private self subscales (self-refection and self-awareness) is based on a Principal Axis Factoring oblique rotation. 
Factor loadings > .30 are in boldfaced.
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Table 12: Standardized canonical coefficients, canonical correlation, and proportions of 
variance between individual differences and mean response key no to susceptibility to 
positive and negative health conditions (Experiment 1) 
 
 First canonical variate 
 Correlations Coefficients 
Individual differences set   
Depression inventory -.75 -.40 
Life orientation test .71 .16 
Health locus of control .25 .15 
Psychological reactance -.13 .00 
Self reflection -.16 .05 
Self awareness .08 -.19 
Self consciousness -.32 .15 
Self efficacy .73 .33 
Self esteem .83 .43 
Percent variance 53.29 
   
Mean response key   
Susceptibility to positive conditions -.28 -.12 
Susceptibility to negative conditions .99 .97 
Percent variance 2.62 
Canonical correlation .30 
N = 325.
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Table 13: Mean response key descriptive statistics (Experiment 1) 
 
  Valence of health condition M 
95% CI [LL – UL]   Positive Negative   Subliminal  Supraliminal Subliminal  Supraliminal 
Self condition (n = 93)       
       
Yes  .89 (.11) .93 (.08) .22 (.11) .19 (.09) .56 [.54 – .58] 
No  .10 (.11) .06 (.08) .77 (.11) .80 (.09) .43 [.41 – .45] 
       
Third-person condition (n = 93)       
       
Yes  .91 (.11) .90 (.10) .24 (.14) .26 (.17) .58 [.56 – .59] 
No  .08 (.11) .10 (.10) .75 (.14) .73 (.17) .42 [.40 – .43] 
       
Neutral condition (n = 93)       
       
Yes  .90 (.17) .90 (.09) .23 (.15) .25 (.12) .57 [.55 – .59] 
No  .10 (.17) .09 (.09) .76 (.15) .74 (.12) .42 [.40 – .44] 
       
Yes       
M  .90 .91 .23 .23  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [.88 – .92] [.89 – .93] [.21 – .26] [.21 – .26]  
       
No       
M  .09 .08 .76 .76  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [.07 – .11] [.06 – .10] [.74 – .78] [.73 – .78]  
N = 279. 
Cells represent means (and standard deviations).
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Table 14: Reaction time descriptive statistics (Experiment 1) 
 
  Valence of health condition M 
95% CI [LL – UL]   Positive Negative   Subliminal Supraliminal Subliminal Supraliminal 
Self condition (n = 93)    993.11   968.27 974.98 939.72 968.27 [933.25 – 1006.93] 
       
Response key “yes”    941.88   957.19 993.11 1009.25  
Response key “no”  1006.93 1000.00 914.11 916.22  
Third-person condition (n = 93)    993.11 1076.46 968.27 993.11 1006.93 [970.50 – 1044.72] 
       
Response key “yes”  1018.59 1101.53 1035.14 1064.14  
Response key “no”  1183.04 1056.81 977.23 981.74  
Neutral condition (n = 93)    954.99 1044.72 920.44 979.48 974.98 [937.56 – 1011.57] 
       
Response key “yes”   831.76 1066.59 997.70 1037.52  
Response key “no”   986.27 1099.00 847.22 948.41  
Combined reaction time       
M  979.48 1028.01 954.99 970.50  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [948.41 – 1013.91] [993.11 – 1064.14] [926.82 – 988.55] [941.88 – 1000]  
       
Reaction time (yes)       
M  957.19 1039.92 1009.25 1037.52  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [909.91 – 1006.93] [990.83 – 1091.44] [966.05 – 1051.96] [995.40 – 1081.43]  
       
Reaction time (no)       
M  1054.38 1051.96 912.01 948.41  
95% CI [LL – UL]  [968.27 – 1150.80] [966.05 – 1142.87] [868.96 – 957.19] [905.41 – 993.11]  
N = 279. 
Cells represent mean reaction time in milliseconds. 
Analysis was performed on log-transformed data. Reported means have been back transformed to milliseconds using 10ш formula. 
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Table 15: Zero-order correlation matrix for individual difference variables (Experiment 2) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Depression inventory 1          
2. Life orientation test -.49** 1         
3. Health locus of control -.17** .23** 1        
4. Psychological reactance .19** -.18** -.03 1       
5. Self reflection .24** -.13** -.07* .18** 1      
6. Self awareness -.10* .17** .02 .02 .33** 1     
7. Self consciousness .29** -.27** -.09* .10* .64** .27** 1    
8. Self efficacy -.41** .50** .16** -.12** -.11** .28** -.28** 1   
9. Self esteem -.56** .63** .12** -.11* -.21** .25** -.35** .59** 1  
10. Gender .12** -.01 -.10* -.05 .06 .01 .22** -.03 -.03 1 
           
M 1.35 2.61 3.79 3.00 2.72 2.92 2.49 3.66 3.08 .76 
SD .28 .62 .50 .45 .66 .48 .39 .46 .44 .42 
           
Scale Statistics           
# of items 20 6 11 14 4 4 23 17 10 - 
α .83 .82 .62 .78 .69 .60 .78 .84 .86 - 
N = 476. 
* p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
Gender: 0 = male, 1= female. 
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Table 16: Factor loadings for self-consciousness scale (Experiment 2) 
 
Item Social Anxiety Public Self Private Self Self reflection Self awareness 
1. I’m always trying to figure myself out .27 .10 .61 .78 -.08 
2. I’m concerned about my style of doing things .24 .19 .13   
3. Generally, I’m not very aware of myself -.25 .17 .35 -.04 .57 
4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations .77 .04 .04   
5. I reflect about myself a lot .05 .18 .69 .58 .23 
6. I’m concerned about the way I present myself .19 .56 .16   
7. I’m often the subject of my own fantasies .01 .17 .19   
8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me .39 .14 .04   
9. I never scrutinize myself .16 .15 .37 .40 .03 
10. I get embarrassed very easily .60 .31 .06   
11. I’m self-conscious about the way I look .29 .49 .09   
12. I don’t find it hard to talk to strangers .59 .02 -.14   
13. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings -.15 .13 .55 .16 .57 
14. I usually worry about making a good impression .15 .60 .09   
15. I’m constantly examining my motives .15 .01 .50 .57 -.03 
16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group .57 .15 -.09   
17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror .02 .54 .01   
18. I sometimes have the feeling that I’m off somewhere watching myself .19 .02 .23   
19. I’m concerned about what other people think of me .23 .62 .05   
20. I’m alert to changes in my mood -.11 .01 .37 .01 .50 
21. I’m usually aware of my appearance -.11 .59 .09   
22. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem -.15 -.06 .33 -.02 .43 
23. Large groups make me nervous .66 .01 .04   
      
Rotation sums of squared loadings 2.817 2.305 2.146 1.810 1.541 
Reliability .79 .74 .70 .69 .60 
Factor correlation    .42 
N = 476. 
Solution is based on a Principal Axis Factoring varimax rotation. 
Solution for private self subscales (self refection and self awareness) is based on a Principal Axis Factoring oblique rotation. 
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Table 17: Standardized canonical coefficients, canonical correlation, and proportions of variance between individual differences and 
mean response key no to susceptibility and severity of health conditions (Experiment 2) 
 
 First canonical variate Second canonical variate 
 Correlations Coefficients Correlations Coefficients 
Individual differences set     
Depression inventory .84 .67 .01 -.32 
Life orientation test -.60 -.09 -.38 -.61 
Health locus of control -.40 -.24 -.18 -.12 
Psychological reactance -.05 -.19 .24 .10 
Self reflection .13 -.38 .66 .77 
Self awareness -.07 .07 .15 -.12 
Self consciousness .46 .40 .33 -.11 
Self efficacy -.46 .04 .28 .75 
Self esteem -.67 -.22 -.20 -.22 
Percent variance 1.93 .56 
     
Mean response key     
Susceptibility to Cluster 1 health conditions -.28 1.63 -.05 .53 
Severity of Cluster 1 health conditions .20 .50 .31 -.05 
Susceptibility to Cluster 2 health conditions -.64 -2.15 -.06 -.44 
Severity of Cluster 2 health conditions -.04 -.53 .00 .55 
Susceptibility to Cluster 3 health conditions -.34 .09 .32 .42 
Severity of Cluster 3 health conditions -.04 .29 -.78 -1.12 
Percent variance 11.04 13.77 
Canonical correlation .28 .23 
N = 476.
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Table 18: Mean response key yes descriptive statistics (Experiment 2) 
 
   Prime    
  Self (n = 160) 
Third-person 
(n = 158) 
Neutral 
(n = 158) 
 M 
95% [LL – UL] 
Susceptibility       
High load (n = 238)       
Cluster 1  .14 (.21) .20 (.25) .21 (.27)  .18 [.15 – .22] 
Cluster 2  .26 (.18) .31 (.21) .26 (.22)  .28 [.25 – .30] 
Cluster 3  .53 (.31) .55 (.29) .52 (.32)  .53 [.50 – .57] 
       
Low load (n = 238)       
Cluster 1  .15 (.24) .18 (.23) .24 (.29)  .19 [.16 – .22] 
Cluster 2  .28 (.21) .34 (.20) .34 (.24)  .32 [.29 – .35] 
Cluster 3  .65 (.24) .68 (.25) .63 (.23)  .65 [.62 – .69] 
       
Severity       
High load (n = 238)       
Cluster 1  .54 (.35) .60 (.31) .55 (.29)  .56 [.52 – .59] 
Cluster 2  .36 (.23) .42 (.22) .40 (.22)  .39 [.37 – .42] 
Cluster 3  .14 (.20) .11 (.14) .14 (.20)  .13 [.11 – .15] 
       
Low load (n = 238)       
Cluster 1  .74 (.22) .66 (.26) .79 (.17)  .73 [.69 – .76] 
Cluster 2  .51 (.17) .51 (.18) .57 (.15)  .53 [.50 – .56] 
Cluster 3  .14 (.19) .15 (.17) .18 (.20)  .16 [.13 – .18] 
N = 476. 
Cells represent means (and standard deviations).
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Table 19: Reaction time descriptive statistics (Experiment 2) 
 
   Prime     
  Self Third-person Neutral  Yes 95% [LL – UL] 
No 
95% [LL – UL] 
Susceptibility        
High load         
Cluster 1  1116.86 1061.69 1061.69  1258.92 [1202.26 – 1318.25] 1191.24 [1137.62 – 1250.25] 
Cluster 2  1099.00 1056.81 1069.05  1127.19 [1086.42 – 1169.49] 1164.12 [1114.29 – 1218.98] 
Cluster 3  1064.14 1091.44 1061.69  1059.25 [1016.24 – 1104.07] 1180.32 [1124.60 – 1241.65] 
        
Low load         
Cluster 1  1039.92 1042.31   979.48  1267.65 [1213.38 – 1324.34] 1122.01 [1073.98 – 1174.89] 
Cluster 2  1030.38 1013.91   977.23  1101.53 [1064.14 – 1140.24] 1091.44 [1047.12 – 1140.24] 
Cluster 3  1059.25 1020.93   966.05  1016.24 [977.23 – 1056.81] 1127.19 [1076.46 – 1183.04] 
        
Severity        
High load         
Cluster 1  1056.81 1035.14 1028.01  1042.31 [995.40 – 1091.44] 1210.59 [1145.51 – 1279.38] 
Cluster 2  1069.05 1061.69 1042.31  1069.05 [1025.65 – 1114.29] 1135.01 [1088.93 – 1183.04] 
Cluster 3    977.23 1020.93 1035.14  1086.42 [1018.59 – 1158.77] 1042.31 [997.70 – 1091.44] 
        
Low load         
Cluster 1  1047.12 1006.93   946.23  1020.93 [979.48 – 1064.14] 1169.49 [1114.29 – 1227.43] 
Cluster 2  1096.47 1030.38   988.55  1042.31 [1004.61 – 1083.92] 1111.73 [1071.51 – 1153.45] 
Cluster 3  1037.52 1011.57   948.41  1086.42 [1025.65 – 1148.15] 1013.91 [974.98 – 1054.38] 
N = 476. 
Cells represent means. 
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Table 20: Zero-order correlation matrix for individual difference variables (Experiment 3) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Depression inventory 1          
2. Life orientation test -.59** 1         
3. Health locus of control .01 .07 1        
4. Psychological reactance .39** -.45** .06 1       
5. Self reflection .32** -.23* .12 .30** 1      
6. Self awareness -.12 -.01 .04 .08 .23* 1     
7. Self consciousness .47** -.28** .04 .31** .61** .30** 1    
8. Self efficacy -.45** .32** .15 -.02 -.01 .13 -.24* 1   
9. Self esteem -.66** .66** .08 -.38** -.19 .12 -.33** .64** 1  
10. Gender .06 .16 -.11 -.21* .01 -.04 .13 -.07 .08 1 
           
M 1.41 2.56 3.88 3.00 2.85 3.10 2.59 3.60 3.10  
SD .34 .77 .61 .54 .62 .57 .37 .52 .50  
           
Scale Statistics           
# of items 20 6 11 14 4 2 23 17 10 - 
Reliabilitya .87 .85 .73 .83 .70 .31 .74 .87 .89 - 
N = 90. 
* p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
a Cronbach’s alpha is reported for all scales except for the two-item self-reflection scale for which a correlation is reported. 
Gender: 0 = male, 1= female. 
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Table 21: Factor loadings for self-consciousness scale (Experiment 3) 
 
Item Social Anxiety Public Self Private Self Self reflection Self awareness 
1. I’m always trying to figure myself out .27 .24 .56 .81 -.09 
2. I’m concerned about my style of doing things .01 .46 .01   
3. Generally, I’m not very aware of myself -.06 .03 .51 .21 .41 
4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations .84 .00 -.11   
5. I reflect about myself a lot -.03 .06 .61 .56 .14 
6. I’m concerned about the way I present myself .20 .46 .20   
7. I’m often the subject of my own fantasies -.07 .05 .10   
8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me .28 .09 .05   
9. I never scrutinize myself .15 .20 .31 .49 -.10 
10. I get embarrassed very easily .48 .29 .16   
11. I’m self-conscious about the way I look .18 .84 .06   
12. I don’t find it hard to talk to strangers .71 .10 -.12   
13. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings -.11 .12 .63 .36 .40 
14. I usually worry about making a good impression .12 .34 .10   
15. I’m constantly examining my motives .15 .04 .65 .59 .14 
16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group .53 .20 -.09   
17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror -.01 .49 .03   
18. I sometimes have the feeling that I’m off somewhere watching myself .01 .12 .34 .18 .24 
19. I’m concerned about what other people think of me .21 .64 -.01   
20. I’m alert to changes in my mood -.03 -.15 .34 -.19 .76 
21. I’m usually aware of my appearance -.09 .32 .19   
22. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem -.21 -.21 .24   
23. Large groups make me nervous .57 -.00 .07   
      
Rotation sums of squared loadings 2.501 2.377 2.375 2.082 1.378 
Reliabilitya .77 .71 .71 .70 .31 
Factor correlation    .33 
N = 90. 
a Cronbach’s alpha is reported for all scales except for the two-item self-reflection scale for which a correlation is reported. 
Solution is based on a Principal Axis Factoring varimax rotation. 
Solution for private self subscales (self refection and self awareness) is based on a Principal Axis Factoring oblique rotation. 
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Table 22: Logistic regression analysis of susceptibility, severity, and behavioral measure as a function of individual difference 
variables and experimental treatment (Experiment 3) 
 
 Susceptibility  Severity  Behavioral measure 
 B χ2  B χ2  B χ2 
1. Depression inventory 2.06 1.73  3.24 5.72* .47 .13 
2. Life orientation test .22 .08  -.04   .006 .53 .80 
3. Health locus of control -.87 2.61 .02   .004 -.34 .46 
4. Psychological reactance .27 .10   -.61 1.03 -.91  1.89 
5. Self reflection 1.54 5.36*   -.83 1.68 1.25*  4.79* 
6. Self awareness .42 .38   1.92 9.89** 1.90**  8.84** 
7. Self consciousness -.41 .10  -1.65 1.94 -.76 .44 
8. Self efficacy -.06 .005    1.55 3.91* -.54   .46 
9. Self esteem 1.36 1.11     -.68   .43 -.46 .19 
10. Gender -.93 1.37  .77 1.38 1.43*  4.83* 
       
Model χ2 (df = 10) 11.30 22.99 17.20 
       
11. Self prime .93 1.64  .43 3.04 .25 .84 12. Neutral prime -.11 -.76 .68 
13. Risk controllability (uncontrollable) 1.90 7.47** 1.35* 5.36*  1.53*   6.56* 
       
Model χ2 (df =13) 20.46 30.90 24.78 
       
N = 90. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
χ2 to remove variable from the model. 
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Figure 1. Perceived health risk susceptibility control: Manipulation check (Pilot Study 2) 
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Figure 2. Mean reaction time by prime (self vs. neutral) and trait category (Pilot Study 3) 
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Figure 3a. Mean reaction time by trait category and response key split by yes and no 
(Pilot Study 3: Self condition) 
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Figure 3b. Mean reaction time by trait category and response key split by yes and no 
(Pilot Study 3: Neutral condition) 
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Figure 4. Mean reaction time to positive and negative health conditions by priming 
method (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 5. Mean reaction time for susceptibility to positive and negative health conditions 
split by yes and no responses (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 6. Mean perceived susceptibility (response key yes) to Cluster 1 health conditions 
(Experiment 2) 
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Figure 7. Mean perceived severity (response key yes) of Cluster 1 health conditions 
(Experiment 2) 
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Figure 8. Mean perceived susceptibility (response key yes) to Cluster 2 health conditions 
(Experiment 2) 
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Figure 9. Mean perceived severity (response key yes) of Cluster 2 health conditions 
(Experiment 2) 
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Figure 10. Mean perceived susceptibility (response key yes) to Cluster 3 health 
conditions (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 11. Mean perceived severity (response key yes) of Cluster 3 health conditions 
(Experiment 2) 
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Figure 12. Mean reaction time for perceived susceptibility to health condition clusters 
(combined for yes and no responses) (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 13. Mean reaction time for perceived severity of health condition clusters 
(combined for yes and no responses) (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 14. Response key yes for perceived susceptibility and severity by health condition 
clusters (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 15. Mean reaction time for susceptibility to and severity of health condition 
clusters split by response key yes and no (Experiment 2) 
 
 163
Figure 16. Mean reaction time for susceptibility to and severity of Cluster 1 health 
conditions split by yes and no responses (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 17. Mean reaction time for susceptibility to and severity of Cluster 2 health 
conditions split by yes and no responses (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 18. Mean reaction time for susceptibility to and severity of Cluster 3 health 
conditions split by yes and no responses (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 19. Routes of automatic self-schema activation and its influence on health risk information processing and risk perceptions 
 
Forms of 
automatic 
processes 
   Preconditions for automatic 
processes 
 
Health risk information processing 
 
         
Pre-conscious 
   
• None 
Self-schema 
activation 
 
 Direct path (automatic) 
Biased health risk 
perceptions 
Post-conscious 
 
• Awareness of triggering 
stimulus 
     
Goal-dependent  • Specific processing goal  
• Intention that effects 
occur 
• Attention to process 
 
   Indirect path (controlled) 
 
• Selective attention to message elements  
• Automatic evaluation of message 
elements as positive or negative 
• Unconscious active schemas 
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APPENDIX 2: 
MANIPULATIONS AND MEASURES 
Independent Variables 
 Self-schema activation (manipulated). 
 
Subliminal primes. 
 Self primes. I, me, my, mine, myself, self. 
 Other primes. He/she, him/her, his/her, his/hers, himself/herself, other. 
 Neutral primes. It, its, itself. 
 
Supraliminal primes.91 
 (I/he/it) go(es) to Chicago [above].  
 Anticipation fills (me/him/it) all-over [between]. 
 (I/he/it) can see skyscrapers [after]. 
 (I/he/it) want(s) to explore [against]. 
 Attractions always escape (me/him/it) [within]. 
 (my/his/its) voice is everywhere [despite]. 
 (I/he/it) see(s) the sights [during]. 
 (I/he/it) always window shop(s) [since]. 
 (my/his/its) television is black [front]. 
 (I/he/it) almost always linger(s) [addition]. 
 (my/his/its) time is over [front]. 
 (I/he/it) must leave now [except]. 
Boston belongs to (me/him/it) [despite]. 
(I/he/it) will return back [into]. 
(I/he/it) am/is almost there [beside]. 
This photograph is (mine/his/its) [like]. 
(my/his/its) ride is here [into]. 
(I/he/it) is taking lessons [underneath]. 
(I/he/it) typed a letter [addition]. 
(I/he/it) opened a bottle [toward]. 
(I/he/it) stared for hours [off]. 
(I/he/it) got a grade [without]. 
 The pen is (mine/his/its) [above]. 
 (I/he/it) moved a chair [beyond]. 
 (I/he/it) ran two miles within.  
Psychological reactance (measured).92 
                                                 
91 Participants were instructed to form grammatically correct sentences using only four of the five words 
presented. Words in brackets represent those that do not belong to the sentence. Words in parentheses are 
the primes. 
 
92 α = .80. 
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Response scale: 1= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
agree, and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
1. Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me. 
2. I find contradicting others stimulating. 
3. When something is prohibited, I usually think “that’s exactly what I am going to do.” 
4. The thought of being dependent on others aggravates me. 
5. I consider advice from others to be an intrusion. 
6. I become frustrated when I am unable to make free and independent decisions. 
7. It irritates me when someone points out things which are obvious to me. 
8. I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted. 
9. Advice and recommendations induce me to do just the opposite. 
10. I am content only when I am acting of my own free will. 
11. I resist the attempts of others to influence me. 
12. It makes me angry when another person is held up as a model for me to follow. 
13. When someone forces me to do something, I feel like doing the opposite. 
14. It disappoints me to see others submitting to society’s standards and rules. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Depression inventory.93 
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of statements 
carefully. Then pick out one statement in each group that best describes the way you have 
been feeling the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY! Circle the number beside the 
statement you picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle 
each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice. 
 
A: Mood 
0. I do not feel sad. 
1. I feel sad. 
2. I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it. 
3. I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
 
B: Pessimism 
0. I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
1. I feel discouraged about the future. 
2. I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
3. I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
 
C: Sense of failure 
0. I do not feel like a failure. 
1. I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
2. As I look back on my life all I can see is a lot of failures. 
3. I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
                                                 
93 Spilt-half reliability= .86. 
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D: Lack of satisfaction 
0. I get as much satisfaction out of thins as I used to. 
1. I don’t enjoy things the way I used to. 
2. I don’t get real satisfaction out of anything any more. 
3. I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
 
E: Guilty feeling 
0. I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
1. I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
2. I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3. I feel guilty all the time. 
 
F: Sense of punishment 
0. I don’t feel I am being punished. 
1. I feel I may be punished. 
2. I expect to be punished. 
3. I feel I am being punished. 
 
G: Self hate 
0. I don’t feel disappointed in myself. 
1. I am disappointed in myself. 
2. I am disgusted with myself. 
3. I hate myself. 
 
H: Self accusations 
0. I don’t feel I am worse than anybody else. 
1. I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
2. I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
3. I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
I: Self-punitive wishes 
0. I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1. I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2. I would like to kill myself. 
3. I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
J: Crying spells 
0. I don’t cry any more than usual. 
1. I cry more now than I used to. 
2. I cry all the time now. 
3. I used to be able to cry but now I can’t cry even though I want to. 
 
K: Irritability 
0. I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
1. I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to. 
2. I feel irritated all the time now. 
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3. I don’t get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me. 
 
L: Social withdrawal 
0. I have not lost interest in other people. 
1. I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
2. I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
3. I have lost all my interest in other people. 
 
M: Indecisiveness 
0. I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
1. I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
2. I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
3. I can’t make any decisions at all anymore. 
 
N: Body image 
0. I don’t feel I look any worse than I used to. 
1. I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
2. I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance and they make me look 
unattractive. 
3. I believe that I look ugly. 
 
O: Work inhibition 
0. I can work about as well as before. 
1. It takes extra effort to get started at doing something. 
2. I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
3. I can’t do any work at all. 
 
P: Sleep disturbance 
0. I can sleep as well as usual. 
1. I don’t sleep as well as I used to. 
2. I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
3. I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
 
Q: Fatigability 
0. I don’t get more tired than usual. 
1. I get tired more easily than I used to. 
2. I get tired from doing almost anything. 
3. I get too tired to do anything. 
 
R: Loss of appetite 
0. My appetite is no worse than usual. 
1. My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
2. My appetite is much worse now. 
3. I have no appetite at all anymore. 
 
S: Weight loss* 
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I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. Yes/ No. 
0. I haven’t lost much weight, if any, lately. 
1. I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
2. I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
3. I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
 
T: Somatic preoccupation 
0. I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
1. I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset stomach; or 
constipation. 
2. I am very worried about physical problems and it’s hard to think of much else.  
3. I am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot think about anything else. 
 
U: Loss of libido 
0. I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
1. I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2. I am much less interested in sex now. 
3. I have lost interest in sex completely. 
 
* Reverse-coded item. 
 
Life orientation test.94 
Response scale: 0 = strongly disagree, 1= disagree, 2 = neutral, 3 = agree, and 4 = 
strongly agree. 
 
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
2. If something can go wrong for me, it will.* 
3. I’m always optimistic about my future. 
4. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.* 
5. I rarely count on good things happening to me.* 
6. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. 
 
* Reverse-coded items. 
 
Health locus of control.95 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly 
agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree. 
 
1. If I take care of myself, I can avoid illness (I) 
2. Whenever I get sick it is because something I’ve done or not done (I) 
3. Good health is largely a matter of good fortune (E) 
                                                 
94 α = .78. Test-retest reliability: α = .68 (4 months), α = .60 (12 months), α = .56 (24 months), and α = .79 
(28 months). 
 
95 α = .72. 
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4. No matter what I do, if I am going to get sick I will get sick (E) 
5. Most people do not realize the extent to which their illnesses are controlled by 
accidental happenings (E) 
6. I can only do what my doctor tells me to do (E) 
7. There are so many strange diseases around that you can never know how or when you 
might pick one up (E) 
8. When I feel ill, I know it is because I have not been getting the proper exercise or 
eating right (I) 
9. People who never get sick are just plain lucky (E) 
10. People’s ill health results from their own carelessness (I) 
11. I am directly responsible for my health (I) 
 
I = internally worded, E = externally worded. The scale is scored in the external direction 
with each item scored from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree for the externally 
worded items and reverse scored for the internally worded items. 
 
Self consciousness.96 
Response scale: 0 = extremely uncharacteristic to 4 = extremely characteristic. 
 
1. I’m always trying to figure myself out. 
2. I’m concerned about my style of doing things. 
3. Generally, I’m not very aware of myself.* 
4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations. 
5. I reflect about myself a lot. 
6. I’m concerned about the way I present myself. 
7. I’m often the subject of my own fantasies. 
8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me. 
9. I never scrutinize myself.* 
10. I get embarrassed very easily. 
11. I’m self-conscious about the way I look. 
12. I don’t find it hard to talk to strangers.* 
13. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings. 
14. I usually worry about making a good impression. 
15. I’m constantly examining my motives. 
16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group. 
17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in the mirror. 
18. I sometimes have the feeling that I’m off somewhere watching myself. 
19. I’m concerned about what other people think of me. 
20. I’m alert to changes in my mood. 
21. I’m usually aware of my appearance. 
22. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem. 
23. Large groups make me nervous. 
 
                                                 
96 Test-retest correlations for the subscales were: public self-consciousness = .84; private self-
consciousness = .79; social anxiety = .73; and total score = .80. 
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* Items are reverse scored. 
 
Self-efficacy. 
Response scale: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly 
disagree. 
 
1. When I make plans, I am certain I can make them work.* 
2. One of my problems is that I cannot get down to work when I should. 
3. If I can’t do a job the first time, I keep trying until I can.* 
4. When I set important goals for myself, I rarely achieve them. 
5. I give up on things before completing them. 
6. I avoid facing difficulties. 
7. If something looks too complicated, I will not even bother to try it. 
8. When I have something unpleasant to do, I stick to it until I finish it.* 
9. When I decide to do something, I go right to work on it.* 
10. When trying to learn something new, I soon give up if I am not initially successful. 
11. When unexpected problems occur, I don’t handle them well. 
12. I avoid trying to learn new things when they look too difficult for me. 
13. Failure just makes me try harder.* 
14. I feel insecure about my ability to do things. 
15. I am a self-reliant person.* 
16. I give up easily. 
17. I don’t seem capable of dealing with most problems that come up in life. 
 
* Items are reverse scored. 
 
Self-esteem scale.97 
Response scale: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree. 
 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.* 
2. At times I think I am no good at all. 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.* 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.* 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
6. I certainly feel useless at times. 
7. I fell that I’m a person of worth.* 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. All in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure. 
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.* 
 
* Items are reverse scored. 
 
Dependent Measures 
                                                 
97 α ranges from .74 to .84. 
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 Affect/ arousal. 
Please click on the number that best describes how you feel on the following items.  
Bad -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Good 
Disappointed -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Satisfied 
Sad -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Happy 
Displeased -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Pleased 
Calm -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Excited 
Energetic* -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Tired 
Down -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Elated 
Sedate -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Aroused 
 
* Item reverse coded.
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APPENDIX 3:  
PILOT WORK 
Pilot Study 1: Selection of health conditions 
List of health conditions presented to rating groups for initial screening. Clusters 1, 2, and 
3 denote health conditions familiar to 90% or more of student population based on Pilot 
Studies 1 and 2 and the cluster to which the disease belongs. Positively valenced health 
conditions used in Experiment 1 appear in parentheses.  
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Bone cancer (Healthy bones) Alcoholism Binge drinking 
Brain damage (Healthy brain) Allergies Broken bone 
Brain injury Appendicitis Constipation 
Brain tumors Arthritis Diarrhea 
Gum disease (Healthy gums) Asthma Flu 
Heart abnormalities Bladder infection Stress 
Hepatitis B Cardiac arrest Sunburn 
HIV/ AIDS Chlamydia  
Human papillomavirus Depression  
Infertility (Fertility) Diabetes  
Leukemia Genital warts  
Malaria Hearing loss (Healthy hearing)  
Organ transplant Heart attack  
Pancreatic cancer Heart failure (Healthy heart)  
Personality disorder (Healthy personality) Herpes  
Schizophrenia Kidney stones (Healthy kidneys)  
Seizure Lung cancer (Healthy lungs)  
 Melanoma  
 Migraine  
 Nervous breakdown  
 Obesity (Healthy weight)  
 Pneumonia  
 Skin cancer  
 Stomach ulcer  
 Stroke  
 Suicide  
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Familiarity:98 Have you encountered the name of this health condition before this study? 
- Yes 
- No99 
 
Population prevalence: Estimate the percentage of students at the university to whom 
this event could occur. 
----- % (Write a number between 0 and 100. For example: 50%). 
 
Stereotype salience: How easy is it to imagine the kind of person who typically suffers 
from this event? 
Very hard to imagine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to imagine 
 
Perceived risk controllability: Can a person control whether this health condition 
happens to them? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Exempt beliefs: If an individual had not yet experienced this health condition, how likely 
is it to happen for them? 
Impossible 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Personal experience: Do you know of anyone to whom this health condition has 
happened?100 
0 Has not happened to anyone I know before 
1 Has happened to few acquaintances 
2 Has happened to many acquaintances 
3 Has happened to few friends or close relatives 
4 Has happened to many friends or close relatives 
5 Has happened to me once 
6 Has happened to me more than once 
 
Personal susceptibility: How likely is it for you to encounter this health condition? 
Impossible 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Personal severity: If you encounter this health condition, how severe or serious will it 
be? 
Not severe at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely severe 
                                                 
98 Words in bold are variable names and did not appear on the questionnaire. 
 
99 If a participant were unfamiliar with a specific health condition, she would skip over the questions 
pertaining to disease (e.g., prevalence, personal experience). 
 
100 Personal experience was a multiple-choice question, where participants could choose more than one 
option. The response that reflected the strongest personal experience was selected for data analysis 
purposes. For example, if a participant circled 2 (has happened to many acquaintances) and 5 (has 
happened to me once), a score of 5 was selected for personal experience. 
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Pilot Study 2: Pretesting health risk controllability manipulation 
Stimulus material: Balamuthia mandrillaris ameba infection 
 
Version 1: Controllable (191 words) 
 
Balamuthia infection 
 It can be stopped! 
 
Balamuthia is a free-living ameba. Anyone can be exposed to Balamuthia, people who 
are healthy or those with weakened immune systems. It causes a serious infection of the 
brain and spinal cord called granulomatous amebic encephalitis (GAE) that is usually 
fatal with a death rate of 95%. 
 
Why is it stoppable? 
 
 Much is known about how a person becomes infected. It infects the body through 
skin wounds and cuts or when dust or water containing Balamuthia is breathed in or 
forced through the nose or mouth. 
 
 Preventing infection includes avoiding contact with stagnant waters, refraining 
from water-related activities in bodies of warm fresh water, hot springs, and thermally-
polluted water such as water around power plants, and avoiding digging in or stirring up 
the sediment while taking part in water-related activities in shallow, warm fresh water 
areas. 
 
 It takes only days to develop the first symptoms of Balamuthia after exposure. 
Diagnosis of Balamuthia is easy, and it may be easily distinguished from other 
neurological and non-infectious diseases. Tests to identify Balamuthia are widely 
available. 
 
 Treatment options are available and almost all patients have survived with 
treatment. 
 
Version 2: Uncontrollable (193 words) 
 
Balamuthia infection 
 It cannot be stopped! 
 
Balamuthia is a free-living ameba. Anyone can be exposed to Balamuthia, people who 
are healthy or those with weakened immune systems. It causes a serious infection of the 
brain and spinal cord called granulomatous amebic encephalitis (GAE) that is usually 
fatal with a death rate of 95%. 
 
Why is it unstoppable? 
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 Balamuthia infection can occur at any time of year. Little is known about how a 
person becomes infected and what specific factors make people more susceptible to 
infection and disease from Balamuthia. 
 
 There are no known ways to prevent infection with Balamuthia since it occurs 
worldwide in soil, dust, and fresh water. Everyday activities like gardening, playing with 
dirt, breathing in soil carried by wind, and water-related activities increase the risk for 
infection. 
  
 It takes weeks to months, even 2 or more years, to develop the first symptoms of 
Balamuthia after exposure. Diagnosis of Balamuthia is difficult, as it may be easily 
confused with other neurological and non-infectious diseases. Tests to identify 
Balamuthia are not widely available. 
 
The best treatment options are still unknown and only a handful of patients have 
survived with treatment. 
 
Version 3: Neutral (192 words) 
 
Balamuthia infection 
 
Balamuthia is a free-living ameba. Anyone can be exposed to Balamuthia -- 
people who are healthy or those with weakened immune systems. It causes a serious 
infection of the brain and spinal cord called granulomatous amebic encephalitis (GAE) 
that is usually fatal with a death rate of 95%. 
 
Early symptoms might include a combination of the following: severe headache; 
stiff neck, or neck pain with neck movement; sensitivity to light; nausea and vomiting; 
unusual fatigue; fever; difficulty walking or talking; sudden one-sided weakness; 
behavioral changes; seizures; unusual skin lesions that persist over months. 
 
 Early diagnosis and treatment may increase the chances for survival. 
 
 Infections with Balamuthia can be diagnosed on biopsies of skin, brain, and other 
infected tissues through routine pathologic testing. 
 
There are several recorded cases of Balamuthia infection where the patients 
survived after long-term treatment with multiple drugs. In some of those cases, the 
patients were able to return to normal, functioning lives. 
 
Drugs used in treating GAE caused by Balamuthia have included a combination 
of flucytosine, pentamidine, fluconazole, sulfadiazine and either azithromycin or 
clarithromycin. Recently, miltefosine in combination with some of these other drugs has 
shown some promise. 
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Familiarity:101 Have you encountered the name of this health condition before this study? 
- Yes 
- No 
 
Population prevalence: Estimate the percentage of students at the university to whom 
this event could occur.  
----- % (Write a number between 0 and 100. For example 50%). 
 
Stereotype salience: How easy it is to imagine the kind of person who typically suffers 
from this event? 
Very hard to imagine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to imagine 
 
Exempt beliefs: If an individual had not yet experienced this health condition, how likely 
it is to happen for them? 
Impossible 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely 
 
Personal experience: Do you know of anyone to whom this health condition has 
happened? 
0 Has not happened to anyone I know before  
1 Has happened to few acquaintances 
2 Has happened to many acquaintances  
3 Has happened to few friends or close relatives 
4 Has happened to many friends or close relatives 
5 Has happened to me once 
6 Has happened to me more than once 
 
Personal susceptibility control: Can you control whether this health condition happens to 
you? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Personal severity control: Can you control how severe or serious will the disease be if 
you encounter it? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Personal progression rate control: Can you control the rate of progress of this health 
condition if you encounter it? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Personal treatment effectiveness control: Can you control the effects of treatment of this 
health condition if you encounter it? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Personal general control: In general, can you control this health condition? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
                                                 
101 Words in bold are variable names and did not appear on the questionnaire. 
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Third-person susceptibility control: Can a person control whether this health condition 
happens to them? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Third-person severity control: Can a person control how severe or serious will the 
disease be if they encounter it? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Third-person progression rate control: Can a person control the rate of progress of this 
health condition if they encounter it? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Third-person treatment effectiveness control: Can a person control the effects of 
treatment of this health condition if they encounter it? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Third-person general control: In general, can a person control this health condition? 
Very hard to control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very easy to control 
 
Part 2: Replication of Pilot Study 1. Participants in each group rated 33 health 
conditions. 
 
Familiarity: Have you encountered the name of this health condition before this study? 
- Yes 
- No 
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Pilot Study 3: Associative strength between the self and health as a trait. 
 
List of personality traits and health- and sickness-related words presented to participants. 
Numbers next to traits appear in Anderson’s (1968) article and reflect trait likeability, 
where 1 is the most likeable. Numbers were not shown to the participants. Asterisks 
indicate health- or sickness-related words that were added to the list for the purposes of 
this pilot but were not in Anderson’s original list or were not randomly selected from it.  
 
Positive Negative Health Sickness 
1 sincere  475 gossipy * healthy * unhealthy (365) 
7 intelligent 478 irritating * able-bodied * unwell 
8 dependable  483 egotistical  * bouncing * sickly 
10 thoughtful  491 discourteous * fit * ill 
14 reliable 499 irresponsible * hale * diseased 
16 warm  502 jealous * hearty * sick 
21 happy 503 unpleasant * strong * unfit 
27 humorous 504 unreliable * robust * unsound 
28 responsible 509 quarrelsome * vigorous (130) * indisposed 
29 cheerful 514 boring  * sound * weak (429) 
30 trustful 522 unfriendly * well * feeble 
42 courteous 539 conceited * well-conditioned  
47 imaginative 540 greedy  * whole  
53 polite  543 insincere * wholesome (113)  
56 forgiving 544 unkind   
62 efficient 545 untrustworthy   
67 alert  548 malicious   
69 witty 550 untruthful   
73 patient 551 dishonest   
83 capable 554 phony   
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